Ethiopian man burns himself to death in protest

Events in Ethiopia have taken a disturbing turn following reports that a teacher in his late 20s burnt himself alive last week in protest against the ongoing brutal clampdown on dissent in the country. According to reports Yenesew Gebre made an impassioned plea at a protest gathering before dowsing himself in petrol and setting himself on fire.

Addressing fellow protestors he is reported to have said: ’I want to show to all that death is preferable than a life without justice and liberty and I call upon my fellow compatriots to fear nothing and rise up to wrench their freedom and rights from the hands of the local and national tyrants.’

It is understood that Gebre died from his injuries three days later at the Tercha city local hospital.

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Ethiopia charges six journalists with terrorism

New York, November 11, 2011--A judge in Ethiopia's federal high court charged six journalists with terrorism on Thursday under the country's antiterrorism law, bringing the number of journalists charged under the statute since June to 10, CPJ research found.

Twenty-four people, including imprisoned dissident blogger Eskinder Nega and five other journalists critical of the government who work online and in exile, were charged, according to the court charge sheet obtained by CPJ. Nega, a contributor to U.S.-based Ethiopian diaspora news websites; editors Mesfin Negash and Abiye Teklemariam of the U.S.-based Addis Neger Online; Abebe Gellaw of the U.S.-based Addis Voice; Abebe Belew of the U.S.-based radio station Addis Dimts; and Fasil Yenealem of Netherlands-based station ESAT were charged with providing support to Ginbot 7, a banned opposition movement that the government formally designated a terrorist entity under the sweeping 2009 antiterrorism law this year, the charge sheet said. The law criminalizes any reporting that authorities deem "encourage" or "provide moral support" to groups the government has labeled terrorists. The five journalists in exile were charged in absentia.

Love Ethiopia, Fear Its Government

BY TEMESGEN ZEWDIE(Ex-MP) beza22000@yahoo.com
(Source, Addis Fortune, 6 November 2011)

It is certainly pleasing to belong to a nation of people known for their hospitality, communal life of sharing and caring, refined social mores, compassionate to faults and longest surviving civilization in the world. With greater initiative and modern marketing, Ethiopia could have been the most preferred tourist destination of Africa, not only for its unique heritages but also for the exceptional value that it offers as a country free from violent street crimes.

The positive values of its culture oblige some of us to be involved in public service no matter how small a contribution we could make in the economic, social, and political life of its people. Similarly, the deeply embedded love of the nation remains the utmost reason for some of us to join the sphere of politics that, traditionally, has been the proclivity of illiterate monarchs, brutal military dictators and unscrupulous thugs.

Even today, Ethiopian politics is shrouded with acrimony and adversaries that can seriously endanger and deprive life and liberty by those who feel threatened for whatever reason their fertile imagination can concote. A case in point is the recent barb Prime Minister Meles Zenawi unloaded in parliament, alleging that two of the credible opposition parties in the country are serving as fronts for terrorist organizations. His gibe focused especially on members of Medrek and the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) parties.

He elaborated that his government has hard evidences to substantiate his claim. As usual, no one could challenge him to the accuracy of his blatant and incriminating statements as MPs can only submit questions in the prevailing Ethiopian parliamentary setting. It is always him that conveys the answers in any format that he wishes; no rebuttal is allowed no matter how fictional his accusations are.

While the ‘dear leader’ can deliver an emotionally loaded deadly blow to the image and reputation of honorable citizens and their organizations, his expressions that castigate, belittle and insult the opposition, have always been tolerated. Often, it is accorded with thunderous applause by his rubber-stamp parliament as an expression of respect and admiration for his eloquence and acumen, to throw at will, and in admirable speed, snide remarks against the political opposition.

The emotional tantrum accompanying his speech is the distinguishing feature of an ordinary man at any corner of the streets of Addis Abeba rather than a leader of a country of 80 million people. No one can dare stop him before he is satisfied with his quarterly presentation of a litany of trashing the opposition. Certainly, the parliamentary rules and procedures on the use of civilized language within the parliament are forgotten and selectively enforced.

For those of us who had the misfortune of listening to him closer, or raise questions that are either too hard for him to answer, too close in exposing the purported lies made to glorify him and his henchmen or challenge his near-paranoia to hold at bay potential threats to his government’s authority from sources his fancy dictates, parliamentary sessions have always been traumatic experiences to be endured.

If what the Prime Minister has alleged in parliament has any substance at all, it should have been the responsibility of the police to investigate and the courts to hear the case, not the Parliament. Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, however, he is consolidating his power and stifling any form of dissent to his one party rule as it is becoming the rule, and not the exception, in most sub-Saharan African countries. To those who had the slightest doubt that Ethiopia is ruled by men who wield excessive power, and not by the much touted rule of law, the recent parliamentary session should serve as indisputable evidence.

Even though the constitution of the country clearly and unambiguously states that ‘ne is presumed innocent, until proven guilty at a court of law,’ the Prime Minister, not only in contravention to the constitutional article, but also in a manner that defies any rational thinking, has declared that the accused and their organizations are guilty. His argument came before the defendants had any chance to be heard in a neutral and independent court.

Surely, his allegation has exposed the public and the courts to a prejudicial judgment and conclusion, preempting the authority of the courts to assess guilt or innocence based on evidence.

In a federal system of government, one among the many advantages enjoyed, used to be the separation of power among the three branches of government. It involves checks and balances to tame the unrestrained hunger for power by any branch of a government. To our dismay, all three branches of the federal government in Ethiopia are totally subservient to one party from the center that makes the separation of power theory and practice a charade.

The Prime Minister's emotional accusation of the political opposition is a telling example for his total disregard for rule of law and the authority of the judiciary to address issues on fair and equal bases to all the citizens of the country, without bias. No one can say the he is not aware of this distinction. Arguably, it is the feeling of impunity that compels him to make such disparaging statements in public.

In a world where interdependence of countries for economic, military, and political reasons is the order of the day, the future of democratization and respect for rule of law seem to have fallen exclusively in the hands of the ruling Revolutionary Democrats. They feel no pressure, locally or internationally, to institute multi-party democracy any time soon. The hope and aspirations for justice and equality under the law is fading with no threat of economic, moral or political consequence for their actions from any of the superpowers.

To make matters worse, Western governments seem to attach their support not to democratic values that they are so much fond of repeating with boring redundancy, but to their purported allies in the fight against terrorism. It is all happening despite their knowledge of gross human rights violations and undemocratic practices by ruling parties at the helm of unrestrained power.

Their simplistic view of ‘see no evil, hear no evil,’ as long as ruling parties appear committed to fight terrorism, would eventually boomerang in ways that cannot only be totally forecasted for its long-term effect, but the consequences in the short-term could end up incubating home-grown dictators that would violate universally accepted norms of civilized human behavior in governing their people.

The true measure of leaders’ commitment in fighting global terrorism should have been the respect for the rule of law and commitment to democratization in their own country.

The current indifference of continental organizations and Western powers to the plight of the masses in the hands of undemocratic governments in Africa would have repercussions that would reverberate in the entire world, unless timely measures are taken to correct the injustices.

The aspirations of the people for democracy should not be allowed to be circumvented by the few who seem to have no boundary in subjecting them to economic, political and social deprivations with a blind pursuit to undeserved eminence and unrestrained power.

THE 2011 LEGATUM PROSPERITY INDEX: Ethiopia Ranks 108 out of 110 Countries, Ranking Just Above Zimbabwe and Central African Republic

The ruling party in Ethiopia should be advised by friends of Ethiopia and people of goodwill in Western Europe and North America to spend more resources on developments that benefit the people instead of building its defense arsenals by buying more tanks from Ukraine, Russia and other former Soviet Republics and building defense industries with the help of North Korea, in order to maintain its grip on power. It should also be advised to open the democratic space so that legitimate opposition parties (the loyal opposition) and civil society organizations, which are the building blocks of a democratic system, would flourish and get strong. If the current situation is allowed to continue, the future of Ethiopia as a united and viable state could be at stake.

Ethiopian National and Foreign Policy: A Critique

The aim of this paper is to critique the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The thrust of the critique is double-pronged: first, against a modest theoretical exposition of the concept of ‘human security’, it shall attempt to expose a caesura between the policy and praxis and make out a case for a paradigm shift in Ethiopia’s approach to national security. It contends that the central purpose of Ethiopia's foreign and security policy has remained the same, in spite of the shift in orientation as well as clichés and shibboleths. The crux of its contention is that a change in discourse has not brought about a change in essence. Still building defense capability takes precedence over ensuring human security in today’s Ethiopia. Non-military aspects of security have been relegated to a secondary place whilst human security should have been made to constitute the basis of the FANSPS. Second, against a conceptual elucidation of ‘inclusive security’, which treated as an aspect of human security, the critique hopes to bring out the hitherto neglect of the critical role that women could play in peace-making, peace-building, and security and call for a shift along this line. By way of recommendations, I suggest that the Government of Ethiopia should revise its FANSPS in such a manner as to provide a robust human security framework and live up to its promises. Nor can it afford to continue to disregard the promises offered by inclusive security, both as a matter of recognition and implementation of women’s roles and rights in peace and security, as it after all is duty bound by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1325(UNSC 1325). In this regard, it should, as a preliminary step, draw up a workable national action plan for the implementation of UNSC 1325.

Ethiopia’s Somalia Policy: A Very Brief Critique

 

Part II of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the 'FANSPS') of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, under a section devoted to explicating Ethiopia's policy towards Somalia, which goes by the same title, sets forth, in clear and unequivocal terms, the country's official foreign and security policy position. In the words of the FANSPS: "Our fundamental policy remains to persistently work towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia. But in light of the continuing instability, the policy we pursue should essentially be a damage-limitation policy to ensure that the instability does not further harm our country." (Italics mine) To this end, the FANSPS identifies three distinct, and yet inextricably intertwined, damage-limiting strategies, namely: (1) Extending assistance to the relatively stable parts of Somalia such as Somaliland and Puntland to enable them to continue enjoyment of the relative peace and stability they have managed to maintain; (2) Increasing Ethiopia's defense capability to defend and foil any terrorist or extremist attacks launched from Somalia; (3) Weakening and neutralizing any force coming from any part of Somalia in cooperation with the Somali themselves and the international community. Though, it appears to point out three different damage-limiting strategies, each of them are inextricably intertwined in that the second and third strategies boil down to one and the same strategy in the final analysis, i.e. resort to force or reliance upon military means, while the first may still consist in military assistance.

 

It should be borne in mind that Ethiopia's Somalia Policy, as can be gleaned from a close perusal of the FANSPS, takes the form of what I might call a 'negative policy', rather than a 'positive policy' inasmuch as it concerns itself with the need to primarily limit the harm arising from the instability in Somalia. By so doing, it relegates the FANSPS's fundamental policy consideration of "persistently work[ing] towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia" to a secondary place. Therefore, it appears that Ethiopia's Somalia Policy is misguided insofar as it downplays the role the positive policy can play in achieving the objectives of the negative policy, officially known as the 'damage-limitation policy'. On top of this, in order to demonstrate how others' misconceived perceptions of Ethiopia's defense capability resulted in unprovoked aggressions in the past, the FANSPS invokes Somalia under the leadership of Siad Barre along with Eritrea. According to the FANSPS, "Some time ago the Siad Barre regime in Somalia launched an attack on Ethiopia on the presumption that Ethiopia was unable to offer a united resistance and that it would break up under military pressure." In this regard, it is interesting to note the continuity in Ethiopia's foreign and security policy towards Somalia, despite the change in regime. The bottom line is that Somalia has never been taken off Ethiopia's security agenda.

 

That said, Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia is a clear indication of its strategy of conducting foreign policy through war, in lieu of conventional diplomacy, albeit war had to be kept to the minimal. It reminds us of Clausewitz's famous dictum: "[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Thus, one has to say that Ethiopia's decision to intervene in Somalia remains to be its biggest national security and foreign policy blunder, though it is hard to deny that she has had legitimate national security concerns in Somalia. This is so, because there were other ways and means of dealing with its security concerns short of resort to force. One was for Ethiopia to order the ENDF to keep on high alert by assuming a defensive military posture in keeping with a carefully crafted Grand Strategy and Somalia Strategy taking into account all elements of the power at its disposal, viz., diplomatic, informational, military, economic, intelligence, legal, and financial. Another was to adopt conventional deterrence as a military strategy to prevent aggression. In this connection, strategists must keep in mind one major limitation on deterrence, i.e. effective deterrence only works against states or groups that fear the consequences of retaliation. Suicidal states or groups cannot be deterred—they are willing to suffer severe damage or death in response to an attack, so threats of retaliation are rendered meaningless. A further strategy was for Ethiopia, in cooperation with the US, IGAD, and AU, to mediate between the UIC and the TFG so that they can reach a comprehensive peace agreement acceptable to both sides. Commenting on the non-military option, John Prendergast writes: "Had Ethiopia, the United States, and other regional powers focused on brokering a deal between the Islamic Courts and the transitional government, the current civil war may have been avoided."

 

If Ethiopia had embraced what Owen Harries calls the 'prudential ethic' as a signpost to international relations, it would not have opted for the use of force in a preemptive strike a la the Bush doctrine with a view to neutralizing potential security threats emanating from the Islamists in Somalia. According to Harries, the just war theory, assuming that war is inevitable, provides an important prudential ethic. The aim of the theory is two-fold: on the one hand, it prohibits an unjust war, by laying down rules for the determination of the legitimacy of use of force (jus ad bellum), and makes war less savage, by establishing rules of conduct (jus in bello), on the other. Hence, a resort to force must have a just cause, in that it is resorted to in response to injustice, is authorized by a competent authority, and is motivated by right intention. It must meet four prudential tests in that it must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil, have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort and be expected to result in a state of peace. The requirements of jus in bello are that when force is resorted to, it must be discriminate and proportional.

 

Leaving the issue of legitimacy aside, (not least because it was invited by the TFG) Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia hardly passes the four prudential tests. At least, we have every reason to doubt that the military intervention was a last resort and was expected to result in a state of peace. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become crystal-clear that Ethiopia's resort to force failed to bring about a state of peace in Somalia. Besides, reports that Ethiopia violated the requirements of jus in bello abound. For instance, in March and April 2007 Ethiopian soldiers allegedly violated international humanitarian law by using heavy artillery and rockets to fight an insurgency in Mogadishu, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing up to 400,000 people. Though Ethiopian troops have since withdrawn from Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated in June 2009 that the country has not ruled out a future redeployment. According to David Shin, "both the United States and Ethiopia followed a misguided policy in Somalia."

 

Though analysts, worth their salt, contend that Ethiopia fought in Somalia as proxy for the US, I agree with David Axe's claim that "Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion." However, it has to be noted that a copy of the actual wikileaked cable has not yet been produced and still remains to be seen if further wikileaked cables detailing the form and quality of the American support whether military intel, hardware, personnel or moral urging, if any, provided to the ENDF in the Somalia operation can be produced anytime soon. Granted, both Ethiopia and the US have had their own, albeit concurrent, legitimate national security interests in Somalia. As Terrence Lyons aptly put it, "it's important to note that Ethiopia moved into Somalia not as the puppet or proxy for the United States. Ethiopia had its own very specific national security interest relating to Somalia. Ethiopia saw stepped-up attacks on Ethiopia as originating in Somalia, aided by Eritrea. Ethiopia saw this as a real threat to the Ethiopian state and region. That´s why Ethiopia invaded, I believe, rather than just because the United States said ´Go get al-Qaeda.´" But the crux of the matter is whether they had to pursue their national security interests in the manner they did, i.e. through war.

 

The Ethiopian invasion, instead of improving, aggravated the status quo, and turned out, in the final analysis, to be disastrous as long as it eventually emboldened the threat emanating from the very Islamists Ethiopia had hoped to neutralize. It rallied Somalis of all clannish allegiance and political persuasion against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for extremist Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the invaders and their American allies. Violence reigned throughout the two years of Ethiopian occupation. In what seems a rare admission of guilt, Donald Yamamoto, the former US ambassador to Ethiopia reportedly said in March 2010, "We've made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia's entry in 2006 was not a really good idea."

Anarchy, Terrorism, and Piracy in Somalia: Revisited

  
 

Alemayehu Fentaw†

Somalia has long been anarchic, hitting rock-bottom claiming #1 in The Fund for Peace´s most recent Failed States Index. It had no functioning central government in the past two decades, albeit 14 attempts to reconstitute the state had been made since the ouster of the Cold War dictator Mohammad Siad Barre in 1991 after 22 years in power. All such efforts had been doomed to fail and whether or not the latest initiative shall succeed only remains to be seen. One thing is crystal clear at this point in time, nonetheless, that Somalia's ongoing state-building project has to be supported, rather than fought, by the international community in general and to be more specific, by the US, EU, AU, and countries of the Horn of Africa sub-region lest it should continue to be a hotbed of terrorism and piracy. 

Despite the hitherto neglect, the Somalia issue managed to come into the limelight of international affairs as a result of the sudden surge in piracy in the waters of the coast of Somalia. As Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN special envoy for Somalia, put it, "the problem of piracy has opened the eyes of those who have forgotten Somalia." The waters off the Somali coast are the most dangerous in the world - accounting for a third of the world's pirate attacks. The coast of Somalia has become the world´s worst piracy area only since 2007; though foreign fishing trawlers have been aggressively exploiting Somalia´s rich and unpatrolled waters since 1991 at the expense of coastal fishing villages. Illegal fishing has undoubtedly decreased due to the effectiveness of Somali pirates. In 2008, 40 out of 111 attacks succeeded; Somali pirates carried out a record number of attacks and hijackings in 2009, despite the deployment of international warships to thwart them and a United Nations Security Council resolution to bring the fight against them to shore. According to the Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau, pirates operating across the Gulf of Aden and along the coast of Somalia had attacked 214 vessels in 2009, resulting in 47 hijackings. In November 2010, the pirates held more than 25 foreign ships and 500 people hostage, according to Ecoterra International, an organization with offices in East Africa that keeps track of Somali piracy. Expert estimates has it that the Somali pirates netted more than $100 million, an astronomical sum for a war-racked country whose economy is in tatters.

It is worth noting that the international community launched a large naval operation in response to the widespread pirate attacks in the waters off the coast of Somalia. Naval powers from around the globe have dispatched a fleet of warships to the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy including, (i) "NATO Counter Piracy Operations" (Ocean Shield) off the Horn of Africa, (ii) the "African Partnership Station" (APS), designed by U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa to foster enhanced maritime safety and security in Africa, and (iii) the European Union Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia – "Operation ATALANTA". The presence of this huge naval fleet has managed to thwart attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden. The fact that NATO's Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR's Operation Atlanta have both been extended until December 2012 shows that the military option will continue to be the predominant mode of containing piracy off the coast of Somalia by the Western powers for some years to come. The United Nations Security Council on 27 April 2010 unanimously adopted the Russian sponsored Resolution 1918 (2010), which called on all states to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws. The Resolution also requires the UN Secretary‐General to report to the Security Council within three months on "possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy." This indicates that all efforts are geared towards prosecution.

Besides, at a recent conference in Brussels attended by the leadership from the UN, the EU, the AU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international community pledged $213 million toward strengthening Somali security forces. However, the question here is whether these measures are enough to address the piracy epidemic. The bone of contention is that the so-called antipiracy military measures are myopic and what the international community needs is a far-sighted long-term state-building agenda onshore in Somalia, promoting traditional peacemaking processes among the diverse conflicting Somali clans and sub-clans. In this regard, moderate Islam no doubt can provide a common ground for building consensus thereby easing the daunting task of entrenching a well-functioning and all-inclusive government.

Enough's recent strategy paper, entitled 'Beyond Piracy: Next Steps in Somalia', authored by Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen emphasizes the aforementioned point. It analyzes the current situation in Somalia and provides recommendations for how the international community in general and the United States in particular can help Somalis address multiple security threats that put their country, the region, and even far-flung countries at risk. It argues that while short-term measures to curb pirate attacks are certainly necessary, the Obama administration must not allow the piracy problem to distract it from putting in place a long-term strategy to help Somalis overcome their political predicament, i.e anarchy by enabling them to form a viable body politic which, with measured external support, can combat the twin problems of piracy and terrorism as well as promote peace and reconciliation. It describes the irony of the problem of piracy as: "The lowest order of threat to the TFG, the Somali people, the region, and the United States is actually the security item enjoying the greatest attention right now." It goes on to say that "Even so, the continued epidemic of piracy off the Somali coast is a problem and a test of the capacity of the TFG to extend its authority." The only viable and legitimate option would be for the TFG to prosecute piracy onshore, while leaving no room for the external actors, apart from helping in building the capacity of its security apparatus as well as in the ongoing peacemaking and peace-building initiatives.

The piracy epidemic in the Gulf of Aden waters is merely a reflection of the anarchy onshore. Piracy, like terrorism, is reflected by a deeper malaise. The root causes behind the mushrooming piracy off the coast of Somalia are state collapse, humanitarian crisis, abject poverty, and the ongoing exploitation of the waters by global factory fishing vessels that left very few viable livelihoods for anyone in Somalia these days. In order to capture the essence of this problem, let´s try to consider the Somali narrative on the ongoing piracy as told by Ken Menkhaus. The narrative "sees it is justifiable protection of Somali shores from illegal fishing, and … sees the piracy as a minor problem we are overreacting to. For instance -- they say at present there is a massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia, 3.5 million people at risk, and the UN is calling for $950 million in aid. We have only provided a fraction of that aid. Yet we're willing to mobilize the world's navies at considerable cost to stop a $20-40 million piracy problem. That's how Somalis see it." Such being the nature of the piracy problem, it calls for a truly holistic approach covering the political, security and humanitarian dimensions. Efforts to prosecute cases of piracy should also include the issue of illegal fishing and toxic dumping. Perpetrators of these crimes are no less guilty than pirates. In this regard, a practical proposal would be for the UN to enjoin governments whose national are engaged in fishing off the coast of Somalia to pay license fees to the TFG. 

Downplaying the piracy problem, Menkhaus contends that "the United States and the international community have overstated the threat of Somali piracy. Somali hijackers earned between $30 and $40 million in ransom in 2008, a handsome sum of cash in one of the world´s most impoverished countries, but a paltry sum for international shipping -- not even enough to appreciably raise insurance premiums for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden." Explaining away naval military operation as the dominant normative mode of engagement in Somalia, as he logically should, Menkhaus argues "Most shipping companies prefer to live with the current piracy modus vivendi. The risk of any one ship being pirated is still low; their crews, ships, and cargo are returned safely; and the ransom fees are manageable. A military rescue, by comparison, is much riskier to the crew and will raise insurance costs considerably, as insurance companies will have to factor in the possibility of injuries and loss of life to crew and ensuing lawsuits." For him, reasons that continued to justify the military response to the piracy problem are fear of copycat piracy elsewhere, fear of al Qaeda adopting the practice, and commitment to the principle of open seas, rather than the ransom amounts by themselves. Another reason, he pointed out, why the military response remained unwarranted is the practical impossibility to patrol a zone of 2.5 million square miles. Granted, piracy has over time grown in scope to include larger criminal networks, thereby posing a threat to efforts to bring an end to conflict in Somalia. As such, the situation calls for a comprehensive approach to addressing the root causes of the Somali predicament, namely state failure, abject poverty and humanitarian crisis, including strategies for effective environmental conservation and fisheries management.

Turning to the problem of terrorism, the military option equally failed to bring about lasting solution in Somalia. All military adventures, from the American Black Hawk Down in the 1990s to the December 2006 Ethiopian blitz, were doomed to fail. Although I beg to differ with all analysts who, worth their salt, claim that Ethiopia fought in Somalia as proxy for the US, I agree with David Axe's claim that "Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion." However, it still remains to be seen if further wiki leaked cables can provide us with details of the suspected American support and urging, if any. Both Ethiopia and the US have had their own, albeit concurrent, legitimate national security interests in Somalia. As Terrence Lyons aptly put it, "it's important to note that Ethiopia moved into Somalia not as the puppet or proxy for the United States. Ethiopia had its own very specific national security interest relating to Somalia. Ethiopia saw stepped-up attacks on Ethiopia as originating in Somalia, aided by Eritrea. Ethiopia saw this as a real threat to the Ethiopian state and region. That´s why Ethiopia invaded, I believe, rather than just because the United States said ´Go get al-Qaeda.´" But the crux of the matter is whether they had to pursue their security interests the way they did, that is: through war. The Ethiopian invasion, instead of improving aggravated the status quo, turned out to be disastrous as long as it eventually emboldened the threat emanating from the very Islamists Ethiopia had hoped to neutralize. It rallied Somalis of all clannish allegiance and political persuasion against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for extremist Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the invaders and their American allies. Violence reigned throughout the two years of Ethiopian occupation. In what seems an admission of guilt, Donald Yamamoto, the former US ambassador to Ethiopia reportedly said in March "We've made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia's entry in 2006 was not a really good idea."

For instance, Johan Galtung- who is widely deservedly considered to be the Father of Peace Studies- claims, in a recent piece, that Ethiopia received payment from the US in exchange for its incursion in to Somalia. I dismiss Galtung's allegation that Ethiopia was paid by the US to attack Somalia as unsubstantiated, if not credulous. Galtung was not alone in entertaining the idea that Ethiopia obtained a pecuniary gain from the US for its incursion in to Somalia. A certain Eric Margolis also wrote in the Huffington Post that "Ethiopia received generous cash rewards from Washington for its invasion." The issue of American support aside, one has to be stupid enough to believe that Ethiopia invaded Somalia just because it was paid by the US or to believe that Ethiopia did what it did in Somalia in a bid to fight an American war on the Somali soil before engaging itself in a 'securitization calculus'. This, by no means, is meant to be a defense of the Ethiopian invasion, nonetheless. As to the merit of Ethiopia's decision to invade Somalia, it was nothing short of foolhardy and shall always remain to be its biggest foreign policy blunder, though I don´t gainsay its legitimate national security interests, given that there were other ways and means of safeguarding its interests short of use of force, not to mention the issue of whether the requirements of just war were fulfilled. Ethiopia could have adapted a defensive, rather than an offensive, military posture insofar as it affords her a no-less effective aggression neutralization mechanism.

Moreover, Galtung´s simpleminded characterization of Ethiopia and Somalia as Christian and Islamic respectively lends itself easily to a fallacious interpretation of the nature and causes of the conflict as it gives the impression that the major factor that plays itself out in the Ethio-Somalia conflict is religious difference, which is an outright reductio ad absurdum. First, FDR Ethiopia, unlike Imperial Ethiopia, is not a Christian state, as secularism is one of the pillars on which its new politico-legal order has been founded. Second, Ethiopia, in terms of its religious composition, is a country where almost half of its populace is Muslim. In the words of Terrence Lyons: "While many portray Ethiopia as a Christian nation, the country in fact has roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. Ethnic and national identity rather than religion has proven to be the most important social cleavage. It is possible, of course, that religious divisions will grow as an additional spillover from Ethiopia´s incursion into Somalia. This is another reason why settling this conflict is imperative." 

Commenting on the futility of military intervention in Somalia by drawing a parallel with the war in Iraq, Sadia Ali Aden said, "Like the Iraq war, the military solution is a failed solution. The military solution will only discredit if not altogether alienate the moderate elements, radicalize insurgents, and perpetuate bloodshed and chaos. Therefore, it seems that the only way toward a win-win solution is through diplomacy and by adopting an alternative, constructive policy toward Somalia." Writing in the same vein, Donald Levine also suggested "Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia, with US concurrence, if not active backing, is likely to have a similar effect. Our goal should be to strengthen the moderate Somalis there, not undermine them through arousing anti-Ethiopia and anti-US hysteria."

At any rate, the international community in general and Ethiopia and the US in particular should bear in mind the need to have a full grasp of the inner logic that governs and perpetuates anarchy in Somalia and its workings. The twin problems of piracy and terrorism are symptoms of the deeper and broader problem in Somalia, namely anarchy or state failure. Any effort to address piracy or terrorism in isolation from its wider context would not produce the desired results. If a genuinely viable solution to the twin problems of piracy and terrorism is to be found, the international community must primarily focus on helping the Somalis address their deeper malaise themselves. Commenting on the piracy problem, Ken Menkhaus writes "the Somali piracy epidemic is unquestionably an on-shore crisis demanding an on-shore solution. Naval operations to interdict and apprehend pirates will help, but cannot possibly halt the daily quest of over a thousand gunmen in such vast waters when the risks are so low, rewards so high and alternatives so bleak in desolate Somalia." Menkhaus argues that "The solution will ultimately have to be on-shore, with more effective government in Somalia." In keeping with Menkhaus's proposal, Michael Shank argues that if we can find stability on land first, and then order will return to the seas. 

What transpires from the foregoing is the fact that the key to solving the twin problems of piracy and terrorism on- and off-shore is to promote a negative peace agenda on-shore and off-shore buttressed by a positive peace agenda on-shore capitalizing on the gains of the Transitional Federal Government while ensuring its inclusiveness. On the former, the West must rally as long as it has all the resources if it has the requisite political will. Countries of the Horn of Africa must build consensus as to the necessity of getting over the prevalent anarchy in Somalia if their effort geared towards realizing a robust and effective regional integration, be it economic or political, is to bear fruit as long as it is in the best interest of the sub-region as a whole and its members as individual states. After all, the Somalis are such a widely dispersed population throughout much of the sub-region, and hence, the stability and prosperity of Somalia is a precondition for the enjoyment of stability and prosperity in the sub-region in general and to be more specific, in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

† The writer, Alemayehu Fentaw (LLB, MA summa cum laude), is an academic lawyer and public policy analyst based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He can be reached at alemayehufentaw@yahoo.com.