Kofi Annan Addresses Need for a "uniquely African Green Revolution"

30 April 2008
Salzburg, Austria
Kofi Annan has called for a “uniquely African Green Revolution” founded on “bold pro-poor policies” to address the food crisis facing Africa and the world.

Kofi Annan gave the keynote speech on Wednesday this week to open a special conference, Towards a 'Green Revolution' in Africa?, organised by the Salzburg Global Seminar, the Institute for Development Studies and the Future Agricultures Consorium.

Mr. Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations and current Chair of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), pointed to the current gloabl food crisis as even greater impetus to seek imediate solutions within "the context of a long-term concerted effort to transform smallholder agriculture, increase productivity and sustainabilty, and end poverty and hunger." There is a clear need for a new vision for agricultural development in Africa that can deal with the complexities of agriculture in diverse settings across the region and meet the conditions necessary to achieve more equitable benefits for Africa's farmers. As Mr. Annan stated, "action is needed now."

The Honorable State Minister for Agriculture in Ethiopia, Abera Deressa provided a response to Mr. Annan's remarks underscoring the importance of African agricultural development for the continent.

The Conference is the start of a multi-year initiative that will support the articulation of a uniquely African apporach to a new green revolution and strategic partnerships and strategies to advance African agricultural development within a broader development framework.

Full-text transcript of Kofi Annan's presentation delivered on 30 April, 2008

Watch the video here:

http://www.salzburgseminar.org/2009/News.cfm?IDMedia=40083

A Moment With...Haile Gerima

What struggles do independent filmmakers face in bringing projects to fruition? Filmmaker Haile Gerima talks about these issues and his film 'Sankofa,' a widely acclaimed movie about slavery. He also describes the influence of his Ethiopian heritage on his work.

Unless the government is overthrown by a coup staged by the army, opposition parties won’t assume power through electoral victory

A Rare Interview with Alemayehu Fentaw

(Translation of The Reporter Newspaper, Issue of Wednesday 16 January 2008, Amharic Edition)

Addis Ababa
On the one hand, the fact that Article 8(1) of the FDRE stipulates that “All sovereign power resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia”, Article 39(1) provides that “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession” , and Article 34(5) stipulates further that “This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute” demonstrates that legal pluralism is intimately intertwined with multinational federalism.

On the other, the nine regional state governments are yet under construction whilst the federal government is full-fledged even after 13 years. Although all States have their own constitutions pursuant to Article 50(5), which reads, “The State Council has the power of legislation on matters falling under State jurisdiction. Consistent with the provisions of this Constitution, the Council has power to draft, adopt and amend the state constitution,” they are not very different from their federal counterpart in all respects. The States have been hardly capable of executing the powers directly bestowed upon them, let alone exercising the power to interpret the constitution vested indirectly with them. The federal system fares not so well as it appears on paper. Though it seems that the pressures that were brought to bear upon Haile Selassie’s and Dergue’s regimes have been eased with respect to the current regime by virtue of the fact of its promulgation of the FDRE constitution, the problems still persist. Questions that need to be addressed within the constitutional framework abound.

Mr. Alemayehu Fentaw teaches at Jimma University Law Faculty and serves as Deputy Editor-in-Chief of its law journal. He is also head of the Research and Publications Office. In a recent issue of the journal, he has published an article about legal pluralism and multinational federalism. We have talked to him on matters relating to his research and others concerning the right of self-determination and problems arising from implementation of such a right.

Reporter: Does the law go hand in hand with the politics? Many have doubts.

Mr. Alemayehu: In order to assess the success and failure of the multinational federation in Ethiopia, we have to look at two factors. First, we need to look at the constitutional provisions in search of answers for such questions as what does the legal framework look like, what’s the role of the federal or central government, what does the division of powers look like, what does the division of revenues look like, and what does the division of development opportunities look like? The second important point is to look at the question of how the constitution is being implemented. The first question calls for a legal answer whilst the second question calls for a political answer. The constitution doesn’t disclose main problems when it comes to the issue of enshrinement of federal ethos, albeit for lack of clarity and ambiguity in relevant parts. It seems to me that this can be worked out in due course. It can be improved through constitutional review. Even though Ethiopia stands as the only state in the world to uphold the right of secession at the moment, it used to be recognized as a right in the constitutions of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in the past. What marks Ethiopia off is the right of secession is wedded to political pluralism. When we raise the question of how effective political pluralism is, so far it has been members of the EPRDF coalition and its affiliates that hold majority seat both at the federal and regional level. Therefore, because an absolute dominance of a single party and a unitary modus operandi are discernible within the framework of political pluralism and multinational federalism, it can be concluded that the history of the constitution is that of utter failure for the past 13 years. How can we sustain the federal system? When is it that the federal system moves beyond its unitary modus operandi and starts to function as politically and culturally pluralist? We can hardly sustain the federal system unless we cultivate progressively political pluralism and cease to persist in this unitary-looking modus operandi.


Reporter: What’s the contribution of political parties to consolidating political pluralism?

Mr. Alemayehu: One of the central pillars of democracy is political pluralism. And for that to materialize we need liberal democratic political parties. Doctrinaire political parties have no place here. The role these political parties play is critical to sustaining the federal system and the realization of the cultural communities and the states. Our political parties need to be robustly competitive. For that, they need mature outlooks and well-thought-out agenda. Unfortunately, such political parties are so few in number and at times they are regarded, in effect, as totally non-existent. Many of them are so fragile that they can’t even last longer than the particular election for which they were formed. Many wither away as a result more of internal frictions than governmental pressure. To guarantee the rights of all cultural communities and states, new and robust political parties have to be organized, the existing ones need to examine themselves, and the incumbent should be such that it can win without pressure and fraud. Not even the Constitution of the United States was complete when it was adopted in Philadelphia. It took its current shape in due course through the combined efforts of the public, the judiciary, political parties and the democratic institutions. We can all focus more productively on building consensus around the existing constitution, instead of starting all the time afresh, by making amendments and revisions. To have to start from zero all the time is counter-productive. Politics or public affairs have to be conducted according to the rules of the game. Everyone should contribute his part to the formulation of laws, policies, and strategies by engaging in public forums. Political parties should also be able to serve the public best by formulating and articulating alternative well-thought-out policies and procedures and shaping the attitudes of their constituencies. They should find a way of serving the public permanently rather than creating public clamor during and after election campaigning. Or else, even the federal system might not last long. Perhaps, unless the army overthrows the government as the federal government gets weaker, it is unlikely that opposition parties will assume power through electoral victory. If so, we’ll go back to totalitarianism. Since the army cannot handle the nationality question properly, it will fragment along ethnic lines resulting in total dismemberment of the country called Ethiopia. Therefore, our political parties must carry on their peaceful struggle without losing sight of their vision and hope.

Reporter: Political parties complain that as long as the House of Federation does not actively participate in constitutional interpretation, the government is centralizing and consolidating its powers. They are also suspicious of the independence of the judiciary and the electoral board. Since this is a dangerous attitude, what do you think is the problem? What’s the solution?

Mr. Alemayehu: The constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary and the electoral board. We say a board that is nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives is far from being independent, just because EPRDF is the ruling party. There’s nothing wrong in principle. The same procedure holds for the opposition when they win a majority seat in parliament. Its institutional and personal independence derives its support from the law. But we should all strive for its proper political implementation. The problem lies in the fact that the ruling party runs the state machinery single-handedly. So the question is whether it puts any pressure on the judiciary and the electoral board. And this paradoxically can only be resolved not so much by amendment as by winning an election in a free and fair election.

Reporter: In a recently published work of yours, you have indicated that the States have problems with exercising whatever rights they have been vested with. How is this problem of incapacity to demand their proper powers back from the federal government to be seen in light of the absence of federal governmental institutions established for the purpose of facilitating and promoting such activities?

Mr. Alemayehu: When we look at the issue of division of powers, say, legislative powers, the States are vested with not so insignificant powers. Of course, the major ones are granted to the federal government. Article 52 of the Constitution provides that all powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States. They must execute this overly broad, albeit unspecified, powers. The rights of the cultural communities and the States can only be safeguarded when they have effective state governments organized into legislative, executive, and judicial bodies that creatively take into account linguistic, cultural, political, and economic diversity. The only law that the States have enacted so far is family law. They could enact criminal laws, but they didn’t. Of course, state constitutions are already in place. For instance, the constitutions of 3 States of the US predate the federal Constitution. State legislatures have powers over matters falling within their jurisdiction. The can extend greater protection to their citizens than are obligated under the federal Constitution. To say that the rights and protections are similar with that of the federal government is not to say that they are simply redundant. The federal constitution lays down the minimum below which they can’t succumb. That they can enact criminal procedure codes can be established by constitutional construction. Generally, there are problems with exercising whatever powers they have been vested with. It is my hope that ongoing efforts at institutionalization by the federal government will encourage the States to exercise their powers.


Reporter: What accounts for the inter-ethnic animosity among the Oromo, Amhara and Tigre, apart from power rivalry? What are the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts among university students from these ethnic groups?


Mr. Alemayehu: More often than not, political movements start in universities. Students usually succumb to irrationalism and instinctiveness. If you consider the student movement of the 1970s and compare it with the most recent ones that took place in Addis Ababa University during my student days and those that take place in Jimma University where I am teaching currently, they don’t raise agendas of national scope. A minor incident escalates into a major conflict that could otherwise have been prevented through dialogue. Questions of the kind student activists of the like of Walelign Mekonnen, such as land, were seen to raise can hardly be found today. I did not see the identity question being raised. Nor did I see questions relating to wider legal frameworks (such as land and nationality). No single new question of national importance has been on the agenda. One question that is worth recalling and I deem to be relevant is that concerning the illegitimacy of the presence of the Federal Police forces within the university campuses. That aside, we have not seen the student body at the forefront setting national agenda, except being manipulated by parties with hidden agenda or external forces. A case in point is the inter-ethnic conflicts that arose in Jimma and Arba Minch universities. That did not bring out questions that could not be resolved within the constitutional framework.

Reporter: There’s an occasion where the students raise questions concerning the right of self-determination. They complain that all cultural communities are not being treated equally as recognized by the constitution. The fact that the federation is dominated by TPLF led to protests and the prevalence of mistrust among Oromo, Amhara, and Tigre as well as among citizens at large. How can we avoid this problem?


Mr. Alemayehu: It seems to me that the relationship that exists among member parties of the EPRDF coalition is puppet-like. By the year 2001, EPRDF faced a major crisis. The crisis enabled the 4 EPRDF member-parties and the 5 EPRDF affiliated-parties dominated States to undertake review of their State constitutions. The issue of one party dominance within the EPRDF coalition concerns more than anyone else, individual members of the respective party members or affiliates of the EPRDF coalition, as the case may be. If the conflict is among members of these parties, then the university is the right place to take their fights to. The university has to remain independent of any partisan or religious movements. The university is the last place to host an intra-party political wrangling.

Reporter: Characterizing the Amhara as harboring a hang-over ambition of restoring its past hegemonic position, the Oromo as secessionist and anti-Ethiopian, the Tigre as being instrumental in maintaining the status quo of the incumbent, and the role-play as accuser and accused is a dangerous trend. What should be done to nip this kind of mentality in the bud?


Mr. Alemayehu: The university student was supposed to be far more advanced than his community, educate his community, and advocate the rights and liberties of his community. But it is the community, as things stand at the moment, which leads the student. How on earth can a student point his finger at a fellow student for a past he is not responsible for and that’s totally gone based on alleged unwholesome historical inter-ethnic relations? It falls short of any nomenclature as struggle or civic sensibilities. That’s why university students are said to succumb to irrationalism. Even entertaining the idea of secession should not hurt anyone’s civic sensibilities inasmuch it is deemed to be a right in our legal system. A student from Tigray does not enjoy special benefits by virtue of his ethnicity. The problem stems from the lack of a culture of tolerance in our country. The government must address this issue properly. And the assignment should not be confined to researches undertaken within the academia. It should also be undertaken by the political parties as long as they also serve as political laboratories. Identity politics has to be regarded, whether by the incumbent or opposition parties, as a goal and not an end in itself.


Reporter: How do you see the contribution of the society to the consolidation of the federal system?


Mr. Alemayehu: It should engage as actively as it did in May 2005. It should demonstrate that sovereignty lies with it by exercising its voting rights in elections. It should, instead of giving up on hope, carry on believing that it can correct mistakes made by the government or by the opposition in the past. It should persist in its belief that its quest for peace, democracy, development, and liberty are not to be delivered or abrogated by the government or by a struggle waged by the political parties. Every individual and cultural community has to fight for its rights within the bounds of the legal framework and continue to believe that the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution can never be abridged or abrogated by anyone. The activities of civil society organizations working in the realms of cultural, economic, and political rights have to be promoted. And that’s when politics becomes a public affair, as opposed to a private affair of 3 or 4 individuals.

Capital, the English weekly, reviews Alemayehu Fentaw's work on Ethiopian Law of Unfair Competition

Ethiopian Unfair Competition Law

By Kirubel Tadesse

It is a central tenet of a capitalist economic system that competition is desirable and needed. Underlying this is the belief that robust competition between commercial rivals keeps prices low, results in high quality and provides overall economic efficiency. If business organizations compete on a level playing field, it is believed that they will flourish, and consumers are more likely to pay lower prices, and get better quality and more choices.

Explaining state of business competition legislation, Alemayehu Fentaw (LLB) in his article ‘Ethiopian Unfair Competition Law: A Critical Evaluation’ writes that one fundamental purpose of the unfair competition law is to assure that competition is fairly and properly carried out. He explains that the rules against unfair competition aim at securing fair competition for consumers and traders through the preservation of goodwill. Many academic lawyers agree that goodwill and consumers’ expectations, however divergent, are directly related. A certain consumer, who is a habitual customer of a given trader, has a legitimate interest in the preservation of the trader’s goodwill, precisely because, in the eyes of the consumer, it is this trader and only this trader who can market products or services of the best quality or of the most quantity or of his taste or whatever at a relatively lower price. Put differently, the consumers’ interest consists in their right not to be deceived, misled, confused, or wronged as to the business,products/services, or commercial activities of the trader whom they look up to and continue to patronize. In Everett F. Goldberg’s, the Protection of Trademarks in Ethiopia, Journal of Ethiopian Law, the harm that a competitor does to his rival through unfair competition is explained as cutting down or taking away his clientele. However, each and every act of taking away a trader’s clients does not amount to an act of unfair competition. This is so, because such clients may be taken away by virtue of honest and proper competition. A case in point is a competitor taking away a good portion of his rival’s clientele by offering a product or service of better quality. yet, there are other trade practices that aim at taking away a competitor’s clients and thereby cutting down the goodwill, which are presumed to be unfair and improper, and, as such, are prohibited by law. In this sense, commerce is like a game in which competitors must play by the rules, which are the rules against unfair competition.

Alemayehu Fentaw explains in his article that the law of unfair competition is primarily comprised of acts that cause an economic injury to a business through a deceptive or wrongful business practice. In the words of Everett Goldberg, “Unfair competition is a particular type of extra-contractual liability. …unfair competition is a type of liability based upon fault.” Alemayehu also infers that unfair competition, as a species of extra-contractual liability, can be broken down into two categories: commercial unfair competition and, civil unfair competition.
The definition of commercial unfair competition in Art.133 of the Commercial Code has been supplemented recently by Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003. Besides supplementing the Commercial Code’s definitional provision of commercial unfair commercial competition, the Trade Practice Proclamation broadens its scope of protection. According to Alemayehu’s article it prohibits three categories of unfair trade practices: anti-competitive practices, unfair competition, and abuse of dominance. Generally, unfair trade practices which may affect trade within Ethiopia are prohibited by the Commercial Code, the Civil Code, Trade Practice Proclamation, Trademarks Registration and Protection Proclamation, and the Criminal Code. However, since the scope of this article is limited to the second category of unfair trade practices known as “unfair competition”, no attempt shall be made to treat the remaining two categories. Generally, unfair trade practices which may affect trade within Ethiopia are prohibited by the Commercial Code, the Civil Code, Trade Practice Proclamation, Trademarks Registration and Protection Proclamation, and the Criminal Code.

Alemayehu, invoking Article 133 of the Commercial Code, defines any act of competition contrary to honest commercial practice as ‘unfair’. He explains unfair competition as any act likely to mislead customers regarding the undertaking, products or commercial activities of a competitor and as any false statement made in the course of business with a view to discrediting the undertaking, products or commercial activities of a competitor. “Unfair competition depends upon commercial custom in determining what acts are honest and what are not. By virtue of its flexibility, the general standard requires judges to exercise their discretionary powers. In exercising their judicial discretion, the judges must take into account the peculiarities of each case as well as the historical and cultural context in which the case arises,” said Alemayehu Fentaw in his article.

“Any act gives rise to liability if it is likely to mislead customers”, though it does not create actual confusion. It is sufficient that an act passes the test of likelihood of confusion. One standard example of an act of unfair competition that is likely to mislead or confuse customers is trademark infringement. To prove a claim of unfair competition based upon trademark infringement, it is not necessary to prove actual confusion of specific customers. Proof of the likelihood of confusion in the market circumstances satisfies the requirement, so that similarity between two marks can make the case for unfair competition. Strictly speaking, sub-art (2) (a) does not grant legal rights in trademarks beyond registration. However, sub-art (2) (a) affords a remedy for unfair competition involving special designations, including trademarks. Unlike trademark infringement claims under the Trademarks Registration and Protection Proclamation, unfair competition claims do not require any registered marks. As a result, sub-art (2) (a) of Art.133 involves all unfair competition claims based upon trademark infringement and extend further to cover other situations of unfair competition. A likelihood of confusion exists when there is confusion as to the enterprise/undertaking/business, products and services, or commercial activities. More particularly, confusion may occur with respect to any of the following: (a) trade-names, (b) distinguishing marks, (c) the appearance of a product, and (d) the presentation, including advertising, of products or services,” illustrates Alemayehu Fentaw in his article. “Sub-art.(2) (b) of Art.133 broadens the touchstone of liability for unfair competition by making actionable any false statement that is likely to discredit or compromise the reputation of a business or its activities, when made in a competitive context. A claim of unfair competition under sub-art (2) (b) requires a showing that a party made misrepresentations in the course of business. The elements an alleged injured party must show to sustain a claim of unfair competition based on false discrediting statements are: a party uses any false statement in the course of business to misrepresent the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of a competitor’s undertaking, goods or services with the purpose of discrediting the establishment, products or services of a competitor,” he further explained in the sub-section on ‘False Discrediting Statements’.

Alemayehu points out that unfair competition is also subject to regulation by legislation, the Trade Practice Proclamation No329/2003. Commenting on the definition of unfair competition in Art.10 of this Proclamation, he said “First, it is important to bear in mind that the logical organization of Art.10 is parallel to that of Art.133 of the Commercial Code. Despite the absence of the test of honest commercial practice in sub-art.(1) of Art.10, unlike sub-art.(1) of Art.133, both deploy general standards: likelihood of elimination of competitors in the former and contrariness to honest commercial practice in the latter. Also sub-arts.(2) of the two articles consist of specific standards. The difference between these sub-articles lies in the former’s inclusion of such activities as provided for in (d), (f), (g), (h), and (i). In Alemayehu’s opinion, the whole of the provisions under sub-art(2) can be reformulated in such a manner as to avoid redundancy, which he suspects has been an outcome of bad legislative draftsmanship. In this regard, his proposal is to merge some of the provisions together as follows:

a)and (c): Misleading/confusing activities;
(b)and (e): False discreditory statements;
(d): Secret information;
(f) and(g):Restricting, impeding, debaring, or weakening the competitive(efficient) production and distribution of goods and services;
(h): Dumping, and
(i): Trading in humanitarian aid.

With respect to sub-art.(2)(d), it is interesting to note two serious pitfalls. That the information has to be secret is self-evident in as much as what is prohibited is the acquisition, disclosure, or use of such information contrary to honest commercial practice. But, what kind of information is considered secret is not clear. Besides, the legislation fails to pin down the nature of the sort of information that it purports to protect. The legislation should have made it explicit that to qualify for protection, a piece of information should not only be secret, but also a trade secret. He concludes his article by pointing out one serious procedural lacuna, the absence of a rule precluding the administrative tribunal known as the Investigation Commission where a proceeding for unfair competition has been instituted in a regular court prior to any time before a complaint has been brought before the Commission. He contends that this violates an important consideration of fairness, as it in effect subjects a defendant to two forums on the same matter.
http://www.capitalethiopia.com/archive/2007/december/week3/feature.htm

Capital reviews Alemayehu Fentaw's work on Legal Pluralism

Legal Pluralism: Its promises and pitfalls for Ethiopia

By Kirubel Tadesse

Ethiopia has dealt with diversity in ways that recognize legal identities on the basis of cultural as well as territorial boundaries. The ideas of multinational federalism and legal pluralism are mutually reinforcing. The present politico-legal order of Ethiopia is based upon a federal constitution which was adopted in 1994. In Ethiopia today, multinational federalism is given expression in Article 8 of the Constitution, what might be called the sovereignty clause, which vests sovereignty in the various ethno-national groups of the country, and Article 39 which reassures these groups their “unconditional right to self-determination, including secession”. As a manifestation of their right of self-determination on a cultural level, every ethno-national group has been left to their customary way of maintaining group cohesion. Particularly, Article 34 (5) gives expression to what Lawrence Friedman calls “cultural pluralism”, which he considers as one of the two variants of horizontal legal pluralism in addition to structural pluralism. This presses on the idea of multinational federalism. The article by Alemayehu Fentaw, Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Jimma University, which arises from his senior research which was supported by the research and graduate programme of Addis Ababa University in June 2004, explains that legal pluralism rests upon the very idea of federalism, be it mono national or multinational.
Alemayehu Fentaw explains, “Federalism is inherently and inextricably intertwined with legal pluralism. In keeping with federal theory and practice elsewhere, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has established a federal state structure where governmental powers are shared between the federal governments on the one hand and nine constitutive units of the federation. Logically speaking, such division of powers, especially legislative power between the two levels of government, necessarily entails pluralism in the law. This is exactly what has been referred to as “structural pluralism” by Friedman. Consequently, in ways that would reflect diversity in the law on a territorial basis, currently in Ethiopia there are one federal and nine state legal systems. While the federal is full-fledged and real, the state legal systems are fledgling and yet under construction.
On his acclaimed article which was expressed as, ‘a thesis which examined Ethiopia’s new experiment in federalism with care and fresh insight’ by Andreas Eshete, president of Addis Ababa University, Alemayehu goes on to explain the growing importance of legal pluralism which has been reflected in the demands of the country’s ethnic groups for representation in their respective political and legal institutions, both at local and national levels. He states, “Non-territorially, attempts have been made to accommodate the interests of cultural and religious communities. For instance, Muslims are given adjudicatory authority in accordance with Islamic law with respect to civil matters. In such cases, religious rules determine family law with the effect that citizens embracing different faiths are subject to different legal norms.
Although family law may seem too insignificant an area of jurisdiction to call this a case of non-territorial self-government, as Ayelet Schachar points out, it has alongside its distributive role regarding maintenance and succession, a demarcating function that determines ascriptive membership in a community through lineage and marriage.”
Alemayehu, following the tack taken by Professor Andreas Eshete, proposes to consider legal pluralism as a federalist policy and practice “under the unfavorable condition aspect of non-ideal theory,’ which, in the words of John Rawls, ‘deals with unfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of peoples whose historical, social, and economic circumstances make achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or hierarchical, difficult, if not impossible.” Alemayehu says Andreas remarks that ‘Federalism is a public value tailored to conditions unfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but rather peculiar to certain societies.’ For him, therefore, a general justification of federalism grounded in an invariant particularist value is utterly indefensible. Instead, federalism is justified to the extent that it comes to terms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or, at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.”
Despite the purported decentralization or devolution of legislative powers, the Ethiopian regional states have little legislative autonomy says Alemayehu Fentaw, and to assert his point quotes Professor Andreas, “What is dispersed to regional states is executive power. If this is correct, the problem is to explain or explain away the legislative… powers that the constitution grants to member states. The real power of the states, in respect to the law is therefore the administration of justice, not legislation.” Therefore, legislative federalism is not realized in Ethiopia and the center continues to overshadow the peripheries/states as has been the case throughout Ethiopia’s history; as Andreas points out one-party dominance establishes the legislative supremacy of the center,” concludes Alemayehu Fentaw.
Obviously legal pluralist ethos has played a central role in the making of the new Ethiopian Constitution, Alemayehu says what might be called, a major departure from the received constitutional tradition of the country, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides the framework for the independent validity of non-state or unofficial laws such as customary and religious laws in some fields of social activity. Here it is important to draw a distinction regarding the nature of legal pluralism. One helpful distinction is that between formal, or what Professor Gordon Woodman calls “state legal pluralism,” and informal, or as Woodman calls “deep legal pluralism.” Both formal and informal legal pluralism are discernible in Ethiopia. According to Andre Hoekema formal pluralism is a legal concept referring to the inclusion within the legal order of a principle of recognizing ‘other’ law.
Alemayehu on his article’s chapter ‘Informal Legal Pluralism: Crafting a Second Recognition’ explains that in most parts of Ethiopia, the traditional practice of dispute resolution in accordance with the ethnically based criminal norms applied by community elders is kept alive and well. Despite the extension of the formal legal system to all corners of the country, it has difficulty penetrating the indigenous legal cultures since its advent. This is more so in the peripheries than in the center. For instance, the customary law systems hold sway in the day to day affairs of these nationalities: the Somali, the Amhara and the Gumuz.
Alemayehu Fentaw explains that two chief challenges tend to complicate the effort to appraise the successes and failures of legal pluralism in Ethiopia: adequate protection of human rights and forum shopping. These are at best challenges posed by the fact of legal diversity. Particularly, they complicate the task of synchronizing the state and non-state law systems. The problem of adequate protection of human rights figures in prominently, since the non-official norms axiomatically deviate, at least in some ways, from the official constitutional and statutory norms. On a different plane, legal pluralism gives rise to the notorious problem of forum shopping, which has been the subject of unending debates in contemporary conflict of laws. Of course, much of the intricate problems of conflict of laws are excluded, as they fall outside the scope of this article. In the sections that follow, we shall attempt to paint, albeit with a broad brush, the two challenges and point to some possible ways of mediating them, so to speak.
Alemayehu Fentaw says “having analyzed the implementation of legal pluralism in Ethiopia, I have arrived at the following points by way of recommendation. On the one hand, the federal government should:
1. Launch a state-led statewide field research by legal anthropologists, with an eye to studying and analyzing all of the customary law systems within its boundaries and conforming them to the minimal standards for adequate protection of the human rights of its citizens;
2. Extend full public recognition to the ethnically based customary law systems; particularly, redraw the boundaries of formal legal pluralism to accommodate at least the well-established and dominant customary dispute (criminal) settlement mechanism; stated differently, leave elbowroom for the non-state actors.”
Alemayehu Fentaw finally recommends that state governments should assume a moral duty to execute their constitutions; and in order to effectively execute their constitutions, state judicial and legislative organs require judicial review and legislative autonomy respectively. “Both governments, federal and state, should enact codes of conflict of laws with a view to addressing the complex problem of choice of law, and tailored to meet challenges arising from legal diversity, especially forum shopping,” he concludes
http://www.capitalethiopia.com/archive/2007/november/week2/feature.htm

Ethiopia and the Search for Regional Peace in the Horn of Africa

By Terrence Lyons

Conflict in the Horn of Africa exploded in December 2006 as Ethiopia’s dramatic military intervention in Somalia shook the entire region. After a rapid and surprising advance, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supported by Ethiopian troops ousted the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and their affiliated militias that had controlled Mogadishu since June. It is too early to predict whether the regime now in Mogadishu will be able to consolidate its authority, whether supporters of the Islamic Courts will initiate a guerrilla war or a series of terrorist attacks in Somalia or Ethiopia as some al Qaeda leaders have urged, and whether Ethiopia will be able to withdraw its forces as quickly as planned. But it is clear that these events have transformed the Horn of Africa, thereby creating new and perhaps fleeting opportunities for building a more peaceful region.

The remarkable turn of events in Somalia is one part of a complex network of conflicts in the region. The power struggles within Somalia are embedded within regional rivalries between neighboring states Ethiopia and Eritrea and are complicated further by the connection to Washington’s concerns regarding the global war on terrorism. Stalled processes of political reform in Ethiopia and increased authoritarianism in Eritrea are also part of this regional system of insecurity and conflict. Policy makers in Washington and elsewhere in the international community should recognize that developments in one part of these interdependent conflicts have ripple effects that shape opportunities and risks in other parts.

From the perspective of Addis Ababa, the dangers emanating from Somalia in late 2006 were linked to threats from Eritrea and internal Ethiopian insurgent groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). These regional and domestic adversaries had increased their military presence in areas controlled by the UIC. To Ethiopia, the potential that these threats would increase over time – rather than the ideology of the Islamic Courts or their ties to al-Qaeda – compelled a response. Ethiopia acted preemptively by providing the military might to drive the UIC out of Mogadishu, to end the safe havens offered Ethiopia’s enemies, and to bring the TFG to power in the Somali capital. This intervention had both regional motivations and regional consequences.

Ethiopia’s next steps in Somalia will be crucial to regional stability. The new government’s authority in Mogadishu will be challenged if Somalis perceive it as an agent of Ethiopia. The new regime will need to reach out to key constituencies, most notably the powerful Hawiye clan leaders entrenched in Mogadishu as well as many of the moderate leaders within the diverse Islamic Courts’ movement, to build a broad-based coalition capable of administering the state without depending upon external forces for security. The sacking of the speaker of the transitional parliament who had talked to the Islamic Courts, however, is not encouraging. Ethiopia must withdraw its troops quickly as planned, most critically from Mogadishu. Plans by the Africa Union to deploy a peacekeeping force are welcome, but peacekeepers are unlikely to be deployed in sufficient numbers before Addis Ababa withdraws, leaving the potential for a destabilizing power vacuum. Ethiopia needs to apply pressure on its allies in the TFG to jumpstart an inclusive dialogue as quickly as possible in order to provide a political framework that will encourage troop contributing states to step forward. There is a brief window of opportunity to build stability in Somalia that Ethiopia and the broader international community should pursue with creativity and resourcefulness.

Beyond Somalia, regime change in Mogadishu may open up new opportunities to resolve other conflicts in the region. At the moment, Ethiopia is clearly victorious in the regional power struggle and has demonstrated a considerable degree of military capacity and boldness. In particular, it has outmaneuvered its regional rival, Eritrea, which had sought to gain advantage by backing the Islamic Courts in Somalia. A sense of triumph may make Addis Ababa less willing to take actions on other difficult issues. Past patterns of behavior suggest that Ethiopia may seek to consolidate its position rather than seizing opportunities to make progress on conflict resolution issues and political reform at the regional and domestic levels.

It is possible, however, that the reduction of threats from Somalia and a greater sense of security may make Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi more open to steps to end the stalemate over the disputed border with Eritrea. Some in Ethiopia argue that withdrawing from the town of Badme, as required by the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission set up by the 2000 Algiers peace agreement, would destabilize the regime by opening it up to questions regarding its commitment to defend Ethiopian interests. Larger threats to the ruling party, however, are likely to arise from opposition in the cities of Ethiopia proper and from the Oromo region. Little is gained by further delay in implementing the Border Commission decision, which affects an area of little intrinsic importance. The regime’s increased security and authority following its success in Somalia creates a propitious moment to move beyond the border stalemate and tackle the broader issues of regional peacebuilding.

The regime in Eritrea is characterized by deeply engrained patterns of obstinacy and may well dig in rather than reassess its regional policies after its setbacks in Somalia. The power shifts in Mogadishu, however, may encourage Asmara to examine new non-military options now that its allies in Somalia are on the run.

By the same token, the failure of Somalia-based military strategies pursued by some of the Ethiopian regime’s domestic opponents may provide opportunities for Meles to reach out to those leaders within the opposition who are willing to engage in electoral competition. The ONLF and OLF both worked with Eritrea and the UIC to increase their capacities to attack from safe havens in Somalia, a strategy that has failed. As a further consequence of the shifts of power in Somalia, talks with political leaders from the OLF may offer particular promise. Key local elections are scheduled later this year in Ethiopia, providing a context for renewed efforts to construct a more open political system.

Regional peacebuilding and democratization in the Horn of Africa face enormous challenges; expectations for progress must be modest. Nevertheless, Washington should test whether opportunities for new approaches are better in this moment of flux and uncertainty than has been the case recently. In particular, Washington and others should reinvigorate and provide substantial support for the beleaguered peace implementation process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UN peacekeeping mission and the border demarcation process are dangerously off the rails. If this constraining framework is allowed to collapse, the prospects for renewed war increase substantially. Ethiopia should be pressed to demarcate the border as required by the agreement while Eritrea should be sanctioned if it does not remove arbitrary restrictions it has placed on UN peacekeepers. Washington should furthermore continue to press Addis Ababa to release political prisoners and to restore the political freedoms Ethiopians enjoyed prior to the 2005 electoral crisis.

The dramatic events in Somalia in December should be seen in part within their regional context. In addition to creating an important opportunity to build a new political order in Somalia, the transformation of power in Mogadishu has opened up small windows of opportunity to rescue the faltering peace implementation process between Ethiopia and Eritrea and to press for talks between the ruling party and major opposition movements in Ethiopia. Washington should move quickly to explore these opportunities for peace across the Horn of Africa before distrust and old hostilities make leaders less flexible and conflicts more protracted. In addition to the urgent questions of building a new order in Somalia, promoting peace along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, and political reform within Ethiopia and Eritrea will contribute to a more favorable climate for the full range of U.S. objectives.

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Terrence Lyons is an associate professor on conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University and the author of a recent Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea.