Rasselas Review

Ethiopia's Anti-Terrorism Laws Must Not Be Misused to Curb Rights-UN

2012-02-02T21:50:00.000+01:00

2 February 2012

A group of independent United Nations human rights experts today spoke out against the ongoing use of anti-terrorism laws to curb freedom of expression in Ethiopia, where several journalists were recently given prison sentences under such legislation.

"Journalists play a crucial role in promoting accountability of public officials by investigating and informing the public about human rights violations," said Frank La Rue, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression. "They should not face criminal proceedings for carrying out their legitimate work, let alone be severely punished."

A week ago, three journalists and two opposition politicians were given prison sentences ranging from 14 years to life imprisonment under Ethiopia's anti-terrorism laws. This followed the sentencing of two Swedish journalists to 11 years in prison in December, a news release issued by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated.

Another 24 defendants are scheduled to appear in court next month, for various charges under the anti-terrorism law, several of whom may face the death sentence if convicted.

Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, said that "the anti-terrorism provisions should not be abused and need to be clearly defined in Ethiopian criminal law to ensure that they do not go counter to internationally guaranteed human rights."

The Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, emphasized that "journalists, bloggers and others advocating for increased respect for human rights should not be subject to pressure for the mere fact that their views are not in alignment with those of the Government."

She voiced concern at the case of Eskinder Nega, a blogger and human rights defender who may face the death penalty if convicted. Mr. Nega has been advocating for reform on the issue of the right to assemble peacefully in public.

Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, cautioned against the ongoing campaign of harassment against associations expressing dissenting views, while Gabriela Knaul, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, deplored the reported failure to ensure the defendants' right to a fair trial.

The experts called on the Ethiopian Government to respect the concerned individuals' fundamental rights, especially their right to a fair trial, and reiterated the need to apply anti-terrorism legislation cautiously and in accordance with the country's international human rights obligations.

Ethiopia: Future of Last Remaining Human Rights Monitoring NGO in the Balance

2012-02-01T21:46:00.001+01:00

Human Rights Watch
Press Release
February 1, 2012

On February 3, 2012, the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia will hear a petition by the Human Rights Council (HRCO), Ethiopia's oldest human rights organization, to admit an appeal against the freezing of its bank accounts. Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, CIVICUS, East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project and Human Rights Watch express deep concern at the obstacles and restrictions to which HRCO and other human rights organizations in Ethiopia are now subjected, as illustrated by this case. The decision of the Supreme Court will be of great significance for the future of HRCO's vital work and for the wider promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia.

HRCO's bank accounts were frozen after the introduction of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO law), adopted by the Ethiopian parliament in 2009 to regulate domestic and international civil society organizations. The CSO law prohibits human rights organizations in Ethiopia from receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources. As a result, the majority of independent Ethiopian civil society organizations working on human rights issues have had to discontinue their work. The CSO law has been widely criticized for failing to meet international human rights standards.

In December 2009, the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), a new regulatory body established under the CSO law, granted HRCO its license as an Ethiopian charity, but, in a letter dated three days before the registration, the CSA ordered four private banks to freeze all of HRCO's assets including its private bank accounts and reserve funds.

HRCO (formerly known as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, EHRCO) has been the leading human rights voice in the country, with a strong track record of investigating and reporting on violations and promoting human rights in the country since its establishment in 1991. As a result of the restrictions in the CSO law and the freezing of its accounts, HRCO has been forced to close nine of its twelve offices and cut 85 per cent of its staff.[1]

The CSO law does not allow for retroactive application, meaning the restrictions in the law cannot be applied to funds collected before the passing of the law. Further, the CSA did not secure a court-ordered warrant permitting it to freeze HRCO's assets and nor does the CSO law contain any provision permitting the CSA to block an organization's accounts. On these bases HRCO challenged the lawfulness of the freeze to the Board of the CSA, and subsequently to the Federal High Court in April 2010. The High Court upheld the decision of the regulatory body on October 24, 2011.

HRCO is now petitioning the Supreme Court, the highest adjudicating body in the country, to hear its appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court.

Ethiopia's once vibrant civil society has been severely decimated due to various legal and other impediments to its work imposed by the government. The CSO law is just one in a series of laws passed since 2008 to give legal grounding to restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association. The broad provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009, for example, have been used in the arrest and prosecution of a large number journalists and members of the political opposition in 2011.[2] This has severely affected freedom of speech and the ability to criticize governmental policies without fear of negative consequences. Most recently, on 19 January, 2012, three journalists, an opposition leader and a former opposition supporter were convicted under the anti-terrorism law for writing online articles critical of the government and for having telephone conversations discussing peaceful protest actions.[3]

Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, CIVICUS, the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project and Human Rights Watch urge the Supreme Court to protect the rights of HRCO and all human rights organizations in Ethiopia to conduct their legitimate and essential work, including through unrestricted access to their funds. The organizations further urge the Government of Ethiopia to create an enabling environment for civil society in accordance with its constitutional provisions and obligations under international law, to uphold the rights to freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.

CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global movement of civil society dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society across the world

[1]See Impact of the CSO Proclamation on the Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council July 2011

Ethiopia: Life sentence for blogger, prison for journalists

2012-01-26T03:59:00.000+01:00

CPJ Press Release
New York, January 26, 2012

A U.S.-based journalist convicted on politicized terrorism charges in Ethiopia was sentenced to life in prison in absentia today, while two other Ethiopian journalists received heavy prison sentences in connection with their coverage of banned opposition groups, according to news reports.

Elias Kifle, exiled Ethiopian editor of the Washington-based opposition website Ethiopian Review, was handed a life sentence in absentia today, which followed a 2007 life sentence given to him also in absentia on charges of treason for his coverage of the government's brutal repression of 2005 post-election protests, CPJ research shows. A court in the capital, Addis Ababa, sentenced Reeyot Alemu, a columnist with the independent weekly Feteh, and Woubshet Taye, deputy editor of the now-defunct weekly Awramba Times, to 14 years in prison and 33,000 birrs (US$1,500), news reports said.

"The life sentence for Elias Kifle and the prison sentences for Reeyot Alemu and Woubshet Taye are based on their writings about political dissent. This verdict has little to do with justice," said CPJ Africa Advocacy Coordinator Mohamed Keita. "We condemn this politicized prosecution designed to cow critical voices into silence and call on the Supreme Court to reverse all the convictions."

The three journalists were charged in September with lending support to an underground network of banned opposition groups, which has been criminalized under the country's 2009 antiterrorism law. Alemu and Taye were arrested in June and held for weeks on government accusations of plotting to sabotage telephone and electricity lines before they were charged. In the trial, government prosecutors presented as evidence intercepted emails and phone calls between the journalists, as well as more than 25 Ethiopian Review articles on the activities of opposition groups, CPJ research shows.

Eskinder Nega, another Ethiopian blogger, has been imprisoned since September and could be sentenced to death if convicted of similar politicized terrorism charges in connection with his coverage of banned opposition groups.

Ethiopia: Journalists, Politician Found Guilty

2012-01-19T22:09:00.000+01:00

By LUC VAN KEMENADE Associated Press
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia January 19, 2012 (AP)

An Ethiopian court on Thursday found three journalists, a politician and a politician's assistant guilty of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism, in a case that drew rebukes from rights groups who fear the country's anti-terrorism law is being used to suppress dissent.

The five were charged under Ethiopia's controversial anti-terrorism laws. Government spokesman Shimeles Kemal has said they were involved in planning attacks on infrastructure, telecommunications and power lines.

Alemu Gobebo, a private lawyer and a father of one of the defendants, called the case politically motivated. The five will be sentenced Jan. 26. They could face the death penalty.

Among the three journalist convicted were Reeyot Alemu, a columnist for the independent weekly Fetah and a former opposition member; Elias Kifle, editor-in-chief of a U.S.-based opposition website, who was tried in absentia; and Wubshet Taye, deputy editor-in-chief of the recently closed-down weekly newspaper Awramba Times.

International rights groups have been calling for the release of the journalists. Ethiopia recently found two Swedish reporters guilty of supporting terrorism and sentenced them to 11 years in prison.

Ethiopia has arrested close to 200 people, among them journalists and opposition politicians and members, under last year's anti-terrorism proclamation.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, more journalists have fled Ethiopia than any other country in the world.

To read the full AP story click on the title above

Ethiopia: Forced Relocations Bring Hunger, Hardship

2012-01-16T09:35:00.001+01:00

Human Rights Watch (Washington, DC)

The Ethiopian government under its “villagization” program is forcibly relocating approximately 70,000 indigenous people from the western Gambella region to new villages that lack adequate food, farmland, healthcare, and educational facilities, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. State security forces have repeatedly threatened, assaulted, and arbitrarily arrested villagers who resist the transfers.

The report, “‘Waiting Here for Death’: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region,” examines the first year of Gambella’s villagization program. It details the involuntary nature of the transfers, the loss of livelihoods, the deteriorating food situation, and ongoing abuses by the armed forces against the affected people. Many of the areas from which people are being moved are slated for leasing by the government for commercial agricultural development.

“The Ethiopian government’s villagization program is not improving access to services for Gambella’s indigenous people, but is instead undermining their livelihoods and food security,” said Jan Egeland, Europe director at Human Rights Watch. “The government should suspend the program until it can ensure that the necessary infrastructure is in place and that people have been properly consulted and compensated for the loss of their land.”

The government says the “villagization” program is designed to provide “access to basic socioeconomic infrastructures” to the people it relocates and to bring “socioeconomic & cultural transformation of the people.” But despite pledges to provide suitable compensation, the government has provided insufficient resources to sustain people in the new villages, Human Rights Watch said.

The residents of Gambella, mainly indigenous Anuak and Nuer, have never had formal title to the land they have lived on and used. The government often claims that the areas are “uninhabited” or “under-utilized.” That claim enables the government to bypass constitutional provisions and laws that would protect these populations from being relocated.

The report is based on more than 100 interviews in Ethiopia in May and June 2011, and at the Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab and Nairobi, Kenya, where many Gambellans have fled.

“My father was beaten for refusing to go along [to the new village] with some other elders,” a former villager told Human Rights Watch. “He said, ‘I was born here – my children were born here – I am too old to move so I will stay.’ He was beaten by the army with sticks and the butt of a gun. He had to be taken to hospital. He died because of the beating – he just became weaker and weaker.”

The Villagization Program
The Ethiopian government is planning to resettle 1.5 million people by 2013 in four regions: Gambella, Afar, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz. Relocations started in 2010 in Gambella, and approximately 70,000 people there were scheduled to be moved by the end of 2011. Under the Gambella Peoples’ National Regional State Government Plan, 45,000 households are to be moved during the three-year program. The plan pledges to provide infrastructure for the new villages and assistance to ensure alternative livelihoods. The plan also states that the movements are to be voluntary.

Instead of improved access to government services, however, new villages often go without them altogether. The first round of forced relocations occurred at the worst possible time of year – the beginning of the harvest – and many of the areas to which people were moved are dry with poor-quality soil. The nearby land needs to be cleared, and agricultural assistance – seeds and fertilizers – has not been provided. The government failure to provide food assistance for relocated people has caused endemic hunger and cases of starvation.

Human Rights Watch’s research showed that the forced relocation policy is disrupting a delicate balance of survival for many in the region. Livelihoods and food security in Gambella are precarious. Pastoralists are being forced to abandon their cattle-based livelihoods in favor of settled cultivation. Shifting cultivators – farmers who move from one location to another over the years – are being required to grow crops in a single location, which risks depleting their soil of vital nutrients. In the absence of meaningful infrastructural support and regular supplies of food aid, the changes for both populations may have life-threatening consequences, Human Rights Watch said.

The resident of one new village told Human Rights Watch: “We expect major starvation next year because they did not clear in time. If they [the government] cleared [the land] we would have food next year but now we have no means for food.”

Commercial Land Investment
The villagization program is taking place in areas where significant land investment is planned or occurring. The Ethiopian government has consistently denied that the resettlement of people in Gambella is connected to the leasing of large areas of land for commercial agriculture, but villagers have been told by government officials that this is an underlying reason for their displacement. Former local government officials confirmed these allegations to Human Rights Watch.

One farmer told Human Rights Watch that during the government’s initial meeting with his village, government officials told them: “We will invite investors who will grow cash crops. You do not use the land well. It is lying idle.”

“We want you to be clear that the government brought us here… to die... right here,” one elder told Human Rights Watch. “We want the world to hear that government brought the Anuak people here to die. They brought us no food, they gave away our land to the foreigners so we can’t even move back. On all sides the land is given away, so we will die here in one place.”

Mass displacement to make way for commercial agriculture in the absence of a proper legal process contravenes Ethiopia’s constitution and violates the rights of indigenous peoples under international law.

From 2008 through January 2011, Ethiopia leased out at least 3.6 million hectares of land, an area the size of the Netherlands. An additional 2.1 million hectares of land is available through the federal government’s land bank for agricultural investment. In Gambella, 42 percent of the total land area is either being marketed for lease to investors or has already been awarded to investors, according to government figures. Many of the areas that have been moved for villagization are within areas slated for commercial agricultural investment.

“The villagization program is being undertaken in the exact same areas of Ethiopia that the government is leasing to foreign investors for large-scale commercial agricultural operations,” Egeland said. “This raises suspicions about the underlying motives of the villagization program.”

Role of Foreign Donors
Foreign donors to Ethiopia, including the United Kingdom, United States, World Bank, and European Union, assert that they have no direct involvement in the villagization programs. However, the multi-donor Protection of Basic Services (PBS) program subsidizes basic services – health, education, agriculture, roads, and water – and local government salaries in all districts in the country, including areas where new villages are being constructed and where the main activity of local governments is moving people.

As a result of their potential responsibilities and liabilities, donors have undertaken assessments of the villagization program in Gambella and in Benishangul-Gumuz and determined that the relocations were voluntary. Human Rights Watch’s field-based research and interviews with residents, however, indicates that the moves have been coerced.

International donors should ensure that they are not providing support for forced displacement or facilitating rights violations in the name of development, Human Rights Watch said. They should press Ethiopia to live up to its responsibilities under Ethiopian and international law, namely to provide communities with genuine consultation on the villagization process, ensure that the relocation of indigenous people is voluntary, compensate them appropriately, prevent human rights violations during and after any relocation, and prosecute those implicated in abuses. Donors should also seek to ensure that the government meets its obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the economic and social rights of the people in new villages.

“It seems that the donor money is being used, at least indirectly, to fund the villagization program,” Egeland said. “Donors have a responsibility to ensure that their assistance does not facilitate forced displacement and associated violations.”

Selected Accounts from “Waiting Here for Death”

“We were told, ‘If somebody refuses, the government will take action’ – so the people went to the new village – by force.”
–Villager in Abobo woreda (district), May 2011

“Farmers in our woreda did not want to go. The woreda reported to the region that farmers are refusing to accept. The governor asked the woreda chairman to investigate. He did – ‘Yes, they are resisting. What shall we do?’ he asked the governor. The governor told him that five development agents should be suspended from their job, and that he would bring in the soldiers. So that is what happened.”
–Former woreda civil servant, June 2011

“The government is killing our people through starvation and hunger. It is better to attack us in one place than just waiting here together to die. If you attack us, some of us could run, and some could survive. But this, we are dying here with our children. Government workers get this salary, but we are just waiting here for death.”
–Elder in recently relocated village, Abobo woreda, May 2011

“There is a psychological impact on children. No learning is happening. There was a school in the old village, here there is none. No one is going to school now, as they are afraid. Who will protect them going to the old village? Even the children themselves are refusing to go.”
–Anuak woman from new village discussing the lack of promised school in Abobo woreda, May 2011

The Case of Eskinder Nega

2011-12-25T10:23:00.001+01:00

The New York Review of Books
JANUARY 12, 2012 • VOLUME 59, NUMBER 1

To the Editors:

On September 14, 2011, Eskinder Nega, an Ethiopian journalist and dissident blogger, was arrested by the Ethiopian authorities shortly after publishing an online column calling for an end to torture in Ethiopian prisons, a halt to the imprisonment of dissidents, and respect for freedom of expression. The charges against him are punishable by death, and carry a minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison,1 where both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch warn that he is at risk of torture.

Previous to his current arrest, Eskinder and his wife Serkalem Fasil, both newspaper publishers, were charged with treason following Ethiopia’s disputed 2005 elections, along with dozens of journalists, human rights activists, and opposition leaders, and spent seventeen months in jail. While in custody, Serkalem gave birth to their first child. Even after they were acquitted by Ethiopia’s Federal High Court, Eskinder and Serkalem were blocked from reopening their newspapers and the government continued to pursue civil charges against them.2

Eskinder also was detained earlier this year, after he published an online column asking members of the security services not to shoot unarmed demonstrators—as they did in 2005—in the event that the “Arab Spring” should spread to Ethiopia.3

Most of us would have fled into exile after such treatment—as have nearly all of Ethiopia’s significant opposition leaders and independent journalists since 2005. In all, eleven independent journalists and bloggers have been charged with terrorism this year, five of whom are behind bars. Ethiopia tops Iran and Cuba to lead the world in the number of journalists who have been forced into exile over the past decade, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.4

Having spent a large part of his childhood in suburban Washington, D.C., and being in possession of a US residence permit, Eskinder could have easily followed. That he has not is testimony to his commitment to democratic values that Western governments say they hold dear.

America and its Western allies have aligned themselves closely with Ethiopia’s government in the fight against radical Islamists in the Horn of Africa and in efforts to prevent a repeat of the 1984–1985 famine. Worthy as these goals are, we should not allow them to blind us to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s increasingly authoritarian bent—as exhibited by his regime’s 99.6 percent election victory in 2010 and most recently the decision to prosecute Eskinder as a terrorist, along with seven other dissidents.5

We therefore call on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and America’s Western allies to publicly repudiate Ethiopia’s efforts to use terrorism laws to silence political dissent. We also urge the US to ensure that our more than $6006 million in aid to Ethiopia is not used to foster repression.7

William Easterly
Professor of Economics
Co-Director, Development
Research Institute
New York University
New York City

Mark Hamrick
President
National Press Club
Washington, D.C.

Aryeh Neier
President
Open Society Foundations
New York City

Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Human Rights Watch
New York City

Joel Simon
Executive Director
Committee to Protect Journalists
New York City

1. See charging document (Amharic), at www.ethioforum.org/document/Court.pdf. ↩

2. See also "Ethiopia Reinstates Hefty Fines Against Publishing Houses," Committee to Protect Journalists , March 10, 2010, www.cpj.org/2010/03/ethiopia-reinstates-hefty-fines-against-publishing.php. ↩

3.See also "Ethiopian Journalist Alleges Detention for Inciting Egypt-Style Protests," Voice of America , February 17, 2011, www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Ethiopian-Journalist-Alleges-Detention-for-Inciting-Egypt-Style-Protests-116412719.html. ↩

4."Journalists in Exile 2011," Committee to Protect Journalists. Available at www.cpj.org/reports/2011/06/journalists-in-exile-2011-iran-cuba-drive-out-crit.php. ↩

5."Ethiopia Charges Opposition Figures, Reporter With Terrorism," Voice of America , November 10, 2011, www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Ethiopia-Charges-Opposition-Figures-Reporter-With-Terrorism-133638658.html. ↩

6.See US foreign assistance figures at www.foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=171&FY=2012&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Planned. ↩

7.See Helen Epstein, "Cruel Ethiopia," The New York Review , May 13, 2010, www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/cruel-ethiopia/. See also Human Rights Watch , March 24, 2010, "One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure: Violations of Freedom and Association in Ethiopia," and October 19, 2010, "Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/18/ethiopiadonor-aid-supports-repression. ↩

Letter From Reporters Without Borders to UN Special Rapporteur On Abuse of Anti-Terrorism Law

2011-12-22T14:33:00.000+01:00

Ben Emmerson

Paris, 20 December 2011

Dear Sir,

Reporters Without Borders, an international organization that campaigns for freedom of the press, wishes to draw your attention to the worsening climate for journalists in Ethiopia since the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi began using anti-terrorism legislation against them.

Since the law was passed in July 2009, Reporters Without Borders has written to the Ethiopian authorities to point out its shortcomings and how it can be misused against the press. The organization feared the law might be used to curb freedom of the press and crack down on journalists. In 2011, our fears were confirmed.

In June, Woubeshet Taye, the deputy editor of the Amharic-language weekly Awramba Times, and Reyot Alemu, a columnist for the Amharic-language weekly Fitih, were arrested. Both were accused of complicity with a group regarded as a terrorist organization.

On 1 July, two Swedish journalists of the Kontinent news agency, reporter Martin Schibbye and photojournalist Johan Persson, were arrested for entering Ogaden illegally to report on human rights abuses in the region, which is closed to the press. They are accused of entering Ethiopia illegally - which they have already admitted in court - and also of supporting a terrorist group.

Finally, in November the authorities charged six Ethiopian journalists, some of whom are in exile, with terrorism offences.

Serious though this is for those who have been arrested and prosecuted, Sir, it is also damaging for Ethiopia's privately-owned media as a whole. It fosters self-censorship and nurtures fear.

This climate has forced at least three journalists who feared arrest to flee the country in November. These were Abebe Tola, known as "Abe Tokichaw", a well-known columnist for the weeklies Fitih and Awramba Times, Tesfaye Degu of the newspaper Netsanet, and Dawit Kebede, managing editor of the Awramba Times.

The 2009 law has become a real threat for the news industry. In the name of the fight against terrorism, the government muzzles dissident and critical voices, thus abusing human rights and fundamental freedoms.

For this reason, we urge you to visit Ethiopia. In your capacity as Special Rapporteur in this field, it is incumbent on you to meet the Ethiopian government and persuade it to stop using the fight against terrorism to penalise freedom of expression.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require further details of the journalists who have been arrested and penalised.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Jean-François Julliard

CC: Frank La Rue, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression.

Dismantling Dissent: Intensified Crackdown on Free Speech in Ethiopia

2011-12-18T23:30:00.005+01:00

An new detailed and comprehensive report by Amnesty International, the London based watchdog, reveals that the crackdown on free speech by Ethiopian authorities has even more intensified since March 2011.

According to the Report, since March 2011, at least 108 opposition party members and six journalists have been arrested in Ethiopia for alleged involvement with various proscribed terrorist groups. By November, 107 of the detainees had been charged with crimes under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Criminal Code. A further six journalists, two opposition party members and one human rights defender, all living in exile, were charged in absentia. Trials in all these cases have begun, and are ongoing at time of writing.

Amnesty International believes that the prolonged series of arrests and prosecutions indicates systematic use of the law and the pretext of counter-terrorism by the Ethiopian government to silence people who criticise or question their actions and policies, especially opposition politicians and the independent media. Whilst these groups have often been arrested and prosecuted in the past, the large numbers of arrests indicates an intensified crackdown on freedom of expression in 2011.

Many of those arrested during 2011 have been vocal in their commentary on national politics and in criticising government practise, in the course of their legitimate roles as journalists and opposition politicians. As a result, many had been harassed by state actors over a long period, and in some cases arrested and prosecuted. Many arrests in 2011 came in the days immediately after individuals publicly criticised the government, were involved in public calls for reform, applied for permission to hold demonstrations at a time when the government feared large-scale protests taking place, or attempted to conduct investigative journalism in a region of Ethiopia to which the government severely restricts access.

Much of the evidence against those charged, and listed in the charge sheets, involves items and activities which do not appear to amount to terrorism or criminal wrongdoing. Rather, many items of evidence cited appear to be illustrations of individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression, acting peacefully and legitimately as journalists or members of opposition parties, and which should not be the subject of criminal sanctions. Evidence cited includes articles written by the defendants criticising the government or journalistic reporting on calls for peaceful protest. In relation to some of the charges, it appears that the overly broad definitions of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation are being used to prosecute individuals for any display of dissent. Calls for peaceful protest are being interpreted as acts of terrorism.

The trials of these individuals have become highly politicised due to the interest of, and statements made by, senior members of the government, including by the Prime Minister, who declared in the national parliament that all the defendants are guilty. Amnesty International is concerned that these comments could exert political pressure on the courts. These comments could also violate the right of the defendants to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

All 114 opposition members and journalists arrested during 2011 were initially detained at Maikelawi detention centre, where they were denied the rights accorded to detainees under Ethiopian and international law. All were denied access to lawyers and family members during the initial stages of their detention, increasing their risk of being subjected to other human rights violations. Many of the detainees complained, including in court, that they experienced torture and other ill-treatment during their detention and interrogation in Maikelawi. According to available information, the court has not ordered an investigation into any of the complaints of torture made by defendants, nor have the authorities indicated any intention of conducting investigations. Many of the detainees were reportedly forced to sign confessions or forced to acknowledge ownership or association by signing items of seemingly incriminating evidence.

Amnesty International believes that all the journalists and opposition members cited in this report were arrested primarily because of their legitimate and peaceful criticism of the government, and that the high level of political interest in the cases increases the risk that the independence of the judicial process will be subverted. The human rights violations widely reported to have taken place during pre-trial detention, and already raised in court several times with no result, raise further concerns that these individuals will not receive a fair trial and that they will be convicted for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association. It is essential, therefore, that all six trials mentioned in this report are systematically monitored for their compliance with international fair trial standards. In the absence of a functioning civil society in a position to undertake trial monitoring, Amnesty International is calling on the representatives of the international community in Addis Ababa to take up the role of monitoring the trials.

The Prime Minister expressed an intention to arrest more members of the political opposition, indicating that the crackdown is not yet over and, indeed, the arrests continue. In the first week of December Amnesty International received reports that at least 135 people had been arrested across Oromia, including members and supporters of the Oromo People’s Congress and Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement political parties.

These arrests, prosecutions and ongoing high level of government interest and involvement have had a wider impact on the exercise of freedom of expression in Ethiopia. They send a chilling message to other opposition politicians, journalists and anybody who has concerns about the policies and actions of their government to keep quiet, ask no questions or risk arrest. Several journalists and opposition members have already fled the country as a result.

It appears that the Ethiopian government is determined to destroy the few remaining traces of free expression in the country. There is increasingly no space in Ethiopia for individuals and publications who hold different opinions, represent different political parties or attempt to provide independent commentary on political developments.

To read the entire Report click on the title above.

Ethiopian Illicit Outflows Doubled In 2009, New Report Says

2011-12-06T23:02:00.000+01:00

By Christopher Matthews

Ethiopia lost $11.7 billion to outflows of ill-gotten gains between 2000 and 2009, according to a coming report by Global Financial Integrity.

That’s a lot of money to lose to corruption for a country that has a per-capita GDP of just $365. In 2009, illicit money leaving the country totaled $3.26 billion, double the amount in each of the two previous years. The capital flight is also disturbing because the country received $829 million in development aid in 2008.

According to GFI economist Sarah Freitas, who co-authored the report, corruption, kickbacks and bribery accounted for the vast majority of the increase in illicit outflows.

“The scope of Ethiopia’s capital flight is so severe that our conservative US$3.26 billion estimate greatly exceeds the US$2 billion value of Ethiopia’s total exports in 2009,” Freitas wrote in a blog post on the website of the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development.

The report, titled “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries over the Decade Ending 2009,” drew on data from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on external debt and trade mis-pricing to calculate illicit capital leakage. The study, which will be released later this month, measures the illicit financial flows out of 160 different developing nations.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries on earth as 38.9% of Ethiopians live in poverty, and life expectancy in 2009 was just 58 years.

“The people of Ethiopia are being bled dry,” Freitas wrote. “No matter how hard they try to fight their way out of absolute destitution and poverty, they will be swimming upstream against the current of illicit capital leakage.”

Persecution of Ethiopian Journalists

2011-12-01T20:48:00.000+01:00

Bertrand Pecquerie, CEO
Global Editors Network
Paris, France

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing as a proud member of The Global Editors Network(GEN), a
blogger, journalist, and scholar to bring to your attention the
continued and ever mounting persecution of journalists by the
Government of Ethiopia(GoE) in different manners. The GOE has
recently intensified the arrest and systematic harassment of
journalists and pundits publishing critical analyses, unfavorable
news, and unflattering contents.

In the trial held on November 23, 2011 of 24 people charged with
terrorism on November 10 where six of the suspects were journalists.
So far, ten journalists are being tried in three separate terrorism
related cases in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia is currently making illegal
use of its anti-terror law as a pretext to arrest journalists and
political activists. The editor of one of Ethiopia's few remaining
independent Amharic-language newspapers has fled the country amid
concerns that more arrests are coming. In this regard, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International issued a statement on 21 November 2011
calling on Ethiopian authorities to stop using anti-terrorism laws to
stifle political dissent.

Many Ethiopians, who did their best and hardest to remain neutral and
objective in the highly divided and polarized domestic politics, have
already run out of any hermeneutic charity with GoE ever since the
latest institution of a criminal suit in absentia on counts of
terrorism against Abiye Teklemariam and Mesfin Negash, the two
founding journalists of Addis Neger, who went into exile two years
ago, and worst of all, after it had been consistently denying that it
had no intention of criminally charging them and after the gruesome
rebuttal it issued against the teacher who burnt himself in protest
to the effect that he had been suffering from mental illness.

This is therefore to kindly request GEN to issue a statement
condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the unconstitutional acts
of the Government of Ethiopia.

Alemayehu Fentaw
Chicago, IL.

Ethiopian man burns himself to death in protest

2011-11-15T03:43:00.000+01:00

Events in Ethiopia have taken a disturbing turn following reports that a teacher in his late 20s burnt himself alive last week in protest against the ongoing brutal clampdown on dissent in the country. According to reports Yenesew Gebre made an impassioned plea at a protest gathering before dowsing himself in petrol and setting himself on fire.

Addressing fellow protestors he is reported to have said: ’I want to show to all that death is preferable than a life without justice and liberty and I call upon my fellow compatriots to fear nothing and rise up to wrench their freedom and rights from the hands of the local and national tyrants.’

It is understood that Gebre died from his injuries three days later at the Tercha city local hospital.

Click on the title above to read the full story.

Ethiopia charges six journalists with terrorism

2011-11-11T09:04:00.000+01:00

New York, November 11, 2011--A judge in Ethiopia's federal high court charged six journalists with terrorism on Thursday under the country's antiterrorism law, bringing the number of journalists charged under the statute since June to 10, CPJ research found.

Twenty-four people, including imprisoned dissident blogger Eskinder Nega and five other journalists critical of the government who work online and in exile, were charged, according to the court charge sheet obtained by CPJ. Nega, a contributor to U.S.-based Ethiopian diaspora news websites; editors Mesfin Negash and Abiye Teklemariam of the U.S.-based Addis Neger Online; Abebe Gellaw of the U.S.-based Addis Voice; Abebe Belew of the U.S.-based radio station Addis Dimts; and Fasil Yenealem of Netherlands-based station ESAT were charged with providing support to Ginbot 7, a banned opposition movement that the government formally designated a terrorist entity under the sweeping 2009 antiterrorism law this year, the charge sheet said. The law criminalizes any reporting that authorities deem "encourage" or "provide moral support" to groups the government has labeled terrorists. The five journalists in exile were charged in absentia.

Love Ethiopia, Fear Its Government

2011-11-07T17:51:00.000+01:00

BY TEMESGEN ZEWDIE(Ex-MP) beza22000@yahoo.com
(Source, Addis Fortune, 6 November 2011)

It is certainly pleasing to belong to a nation of people known for their hospitality, communal life of sharing and caring, refined social mores, compassionate to faults and longest surviving civilization in the world. With greater initiative and modern marketing, Ethiopia could have been the most preferred tourist destination of Africa, not only for its unique heritages but also for the exceptional value that it offers as a country free from violent street crimes.

The positive values of its culture oblige some of us to be involved in public service no matter how small a contribution we could make in the economic, social, and political life of its people. Similarly, the deeply embedded love of the nation remains the utmost reason for some of us to join the sphere of politics that, traditionally, has been the proclivity of illiterate monarchs, brutal military dictators and unscrupulous thugs.

Even today, Ethiopian politics is shrouded with acrimony and adversaries that can seriously endanger and deprive life and liberty by those who feel threatened for whatever reason their fertile imagination can concote. A case in point is the recent barb Prime Minister Meles Zenawi unloaded in parliament, alleging that two of the credible opposition parties in the country are serving as fronts for terrorist organizations. His gibe focused especially on members of Medrek and the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) parties.

He elaborated that his government has hard evidences to substantiate his claim. As usual, no one could challenge him to the accuracy of his blatant and incriminating statements as MPs can only submit questions in the prevailing Ethiopian parliamentary setting. It is always him that conveys the answers in any format that he wishes; no rebuttal is allowed no matter how fictional his accusations are.

While the ‘dear leader’ can deliver an emotionally loaded deadly blow to the image and reputation of honorable citizens and their organizations, his expressions that castigate, belittle and insult the opposition, have always been tolerated. Often, it is accorded with thunderous applause by his rubber-stamp parliament as an expression of respect and admiration for his eloquence and acumen, to throw at will, and in admirable speed, snide remarks against the political opposition.

The emotional tantrum accompanying his speech is the distinguishing feature of an ordinary man at any corner of the streets of Addis Abeba rather than a leader of a country of 80 million people. No one can dare stop him before he is satisfied with his quarterly presentation of a litany of trashing the opposition. Certainly, the parliamentary rules and procedures on the use of civilized language within the parliament are forgotten and selectively enforced.

For those of us who had the misfortune of listening to him closer, or raise questions that are either too hard for him to answer, too close in exposing the purported lies made to glorify him and his henchmen or challenge his near-paranoia to hold at bay potential threats to his government’s authority from sources his fancy dictates, parliamentary sessions have always been traumatic experiences to be endured.

If what the Prime Minister has alleged in parliament has any substance at all, it should have been the responsibility of the police to investigate and the courts to hear the case, not the Parliament. Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, however, he is consolidating his power and stifling any form of dissent to his one party rule as it is becoming the rule, and not the exception, in most sub-Saharan African countries. To those who had the slightest doubt that Ethiopia is ruled by men who wield excessive power, and not by the much touted rule of law, the recent parliamentary session should serve as indisputable evidence.

Even though the constitution of the country clearly and unambiguously states that ‘ne is presumed innocent, until proven guilty at a court of law,’ the Prime Minister, not only in contravention to the constitutional article, but also in a manner that defies any rational thinking, has declared that the accused and their organizations are guilty. His argument came before the defendants had any chance to be heard in a neutral and independent court.

Surely, his allegation has exposed the public and the courts to a prejudicial judgment and conclusion, preempting the authority of the courts to assess guilt or innocence based on evidence.

In a federal system of government, one among the many advantages enjoyed, used to be the separation of power among the three branches of government. It involves checks and balances to tame the unrestrained hunger for power by any branch of a government. To our dismay, all three branches of the federal government in Ethiopia are totally subservient to one party from the center that makes the separation of power theory and practice a charade.

The Prime Minister's emotional accusation of the political opposition is a telling example for his total disregard for rule of law and the authority of the judiciary to address issues on fair and equal bases to all the citizens of the country, without bias. No one can say the he is not aware of this distinction. Arguably, it is the feeling of impunity that compels him to make such disparaging statements in public.

In a world where interdependence of countries for economic, military, and political reasons is the order of the day, the future of democratization and respect for rule of law seem to have fallen exclusively in the hands of the ruling Revolutionary Democrats. They feel no pressure, locally or internationally, to institute multi-party democracy any time soon. The hope and aspirations for justice and equality under the law is fading with no threat of economic, moral or political consequence for their actions from any of the superpowers.

To make matters worse, Western governments seem to attach their support not to democratic values that they are so much fond of repeating with boring redundancy, but to their purported allies in the fight against terrorism. It is all happening despite their knowledge of gross human rights violations and undemocratic practices by ruling parties at the helm of unrestrained power.

Their simplistic view of ‘see no evil, hear no evil,’ as long as ruling parties appear committed to fight terrorism, would eventually boomerang in ways that cannot only be totally forecasted for its long-term effect, but the consequences in the short-term could end up incubating home-grown dictators that would violate universally accepted norms of civilized human behavior in governing their people.

The true measure of leaders’ commitment in fighting global terrorism should have been the respect for the rule of law and commitment to democratization in their own country.

The current indifference of continental organizations and Western powers to the plight of the masses in the hands of undemocratic governments in Africa would have repercussions that would reverberate in the entire world, unless timely measures are taken to correct the injustices.

The aspirations of the people for democracy should not be allowed to be circumvented by the few who seem to have no boundary in subjecting them to economic, political and social deprivations with a blind pursuit to undeserved eminence and unrestrained power.

THE 2011 LEGATUM PROSPERITY INDEX: Ethiopia Ranks 108 out of 110 Countries, Ranking Just Above Zimbabwe and Central African Republic

2011-11-05T06:56:00.002+01:00

The ruling party in Ethiopia should be advised by friends of Ethiopia and people of goodwill in Western Europe and North America to spend more resources on developments that benefit the people instead of building its defense arsenals by buying more tanks from Ukraine, Russia and other former Soviet Republics and building defense industries with the help of North Korea, in order to maintain its grip on power. It should also be advised to open the democratic space so that legitimate opposition parties (the loyal opposition) and civil society organizations, which are the building blocks of a democratic system, would flourish and get strong. If the current situation is allowed to continue, the future of Ethiopia as a united and viable state could be at stake.

Ethiopian National and Foreign Policy: A Critique

2011-09-05T07:07:00.000+02:00

The aim of this paper is to critique the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The thrust of the critique is double-pronged: first, against a modest theoretical exposition of the concept of ‘human security’, it shall attempt to expose a caesura between the policy and praxis and make out a case for a paradigm shift in Ethiopia’s approach to national security. It contends that the central purpose of Ethiopia's foreign and security policy has remained the same, in spite of the shift in orientation as well as clichés and shibboleths. The crux of its contention is that a change in discourse has not brought about a change in essence. Still building defense capability takes precedence over ensuring human security in today’s Ethiopia. Non-military aspects of security have been relegated to a secondary place whilst human security should have been made to constitute the basis of the FANSPS. Second, against a conceptual elucidation of ‘inclusive security’, which treated as an aspect of human security, the critique hopes to bring out the hitherto neglect of the critical role that women could play in peace-making, peace-building, and security and call for a shift along this line. By way of recommendations, I suggest that the Government of Ethiopia should revise its FANSPS in such a manner as to provide a robust human security framework and live up to its promises. Nor can it afford to continue to disregard the promises offered by inclusive security, both as a matter of recognition and implementation of women’s roles and rights in peace and security, as it after all is duty bound by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1325(UNSC 1325). In this regard, it should, as a preliminary step, draw up a workable national action plan for the implementation of UNSC 1325.

Ethiopia’s Somalia Policy: A Very Brief Critique

2011-01-17T09:11:00.002+01:00

Part II of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the 'FANSPS') of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, under a section devoted to explicating Ethiopia's policy towards Somalia, which goes by the same title, sets forth, in clear and unequivocal terms, the country's official foreign and security policy position. In the words of the FANSPS: "Our fundamental policy remains to persistently work towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia. But in light of the continuing instability, the policy we pursue should essentially be a damage-limitation policy to ensure that the instability does not further harm our country." (Italics mine) To this end, the FANSPS identifies three distinct, and yet inextricably intertwined, damage-limiting strategies, namely: (1) Extending assistance to the relatively stable parts of Somalia such as Somaliland and Puntland to enable them to continue enjoyment of the relative peace and stability they have managed to maintain; (2) Increasing Ethiopia's defense capability to defend and foil any terrorist or extremist attacks launched from Somalia; (3) Weakening and neutralizing any force coming from any part of Somalia in cooperation with the Somali themselves and the international community. Though, it appears to point out three different damage-limiting strategies, each of them are inextricably intertwined in that the second and third strategies boil down to one and the same strategy in the final analysis, i.e. resort to force or reliance upon military means, while the first may still consist in military assistance.

It should be borne in mind that Ethiopia's Somalia Policy, as can be gleaned from a close perusal of the FANSPS, takes the form of what I might call a 'negative policy', rather than a 'positive policy' inasmuch as it concerns itself with the need to primarily limit the harm arising from the instability in Somalia. By so doing, it relegates the FANSPS's fundamental policy consideration of "persistently work[ing] towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia" to a secondary place. Therefore, it appears that Ethiopia's Somalia Policy is misguided insofar as it downplays the role the positive policy can play in achieving the objectives of the negative policy, officially known as the 'damage-limitation policy'. On top of this, in order to demonstrate how others' misconceived perceptions of Ethiopia's defense capability resulted in unprovoked aggressions in the past, the FANSPS invokes Somalia under the leadership of Siad Barre along with Eritrea. According to the FANSPS, "Some time ago the Siad Barre regime in Somalia launched an attack on Ethiopia on the presumption that Ethiopia was unable to offer a united resistance and that it would break up under military pressure." In this regard, it is interesting to note the continuity in Ethiopia's foreign and security policy towards Somalia, despite the change in regime. The bottom line is that Somalia has never been taken off Ethiopia's security agenda.

That said, Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia is a clear indication of its strategy of conducting foreign policy through war, in lieu of conventional diplomacy, albeit war had to be kept to the minimal. It reminds us of Clausewitz's famous dictum: "[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Thus, one has to say that Ethiopia's decision to intervene in Somalia remains to be its biggest national security and foreign policy blunder, though it is hard to deny that she has had legitimate national security concerns in Somalia. This is so, because there were other ways and means of dealing with its security concerns short of resort to force. One was for Ethiopia to order the ENDF to keep on high alert by assuming a defensive military posture in keeping with a carefully crafted Grand Strategy and Somalia Strategy taking into account all elements of the power at its disposal, viz., diplomatic, informational, military, economic, intelligence, legal, and financial. Another was to adopt conventional deterrence as a military strategy to prevent aggression. In this connection, strategists must keep in mind one major limitation on deterrence, i.e. effective deterrence only works against states or groups that fear the consequences of retaliation. Suicidal states or groups cannot be deterred—they are willing to suffer severe damage or death in response to an attack, so threats of retaliation are rendered meaningless. A further strategy was for Ethiopia, in cooperation with the US, IGAD, and AU, to mediate between the UIC and the TFG so that they can reach a comprehensive peace agreement acceptable to both sides. Commenting on the non-military option, John Prendergast writes: "Had Ethiopia, the United States, and other regional powers focused on brokering a deal between the Islamic Courts and the transitional government, the current civil war may have been avoided."

If Ethiopia had embraced what Owen Harries calls the 'prudential ethic' as a signpost to international relations, it would not have opted for the use of force in a preemptive strike a la the Bush doctrine with a view to neutralizing potential security threats emanating from the Islamists in Somalia. According to Harries, the just war theory, assuming that war is inevitable, provides an important prudential ethic. The aim of the theory is two-fold: on the one hand, it prohibits an unjust war, by laying down rules for the determination of the legitimacy of use of force (jus ad bellum), and makes war less savage, by establishing rules of conduct (jus in bello), on the other. Hence, a resort to force must have a just cause, in that it is resorted to in response to injustice, is authorized by a competent authority, and is motivated by right intention. It must meet four prudential tests in that it must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil, have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort and be expected to result in a state of peace. The requirements of jus in bello are that when force is resorted to, it must be discriminate and proportional.

Leaving the issue of legitimacy aside, (not least because it was invited by the TFG) Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia hardly passes the four prudential tests. At least, we have every reason to doubt that the military intervention was a last resort and was expected to result in a state of peace. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become crystal-clear that Ethiopia's resort to force failed to bring about a state of peace in Somalia. Besides, reports that Ethiopia violated the requirements of jus in bello abound. For instance, in March and April 2007 Ethiopian soldiers allegedly violated international humanitarian law by using heavy artillery and rockets to fight an insurgency in Mogadishu, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing up to 400,000 people. Though Ethiopian troops have since withdrawn from Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated in June 2009 that the country has not ruled out a future redeployment. According to David Shin, "both the United States and Ethiopia followed a misguided policy in Somalia."

Though analysts, worth their salt, contend that Ethiopia fought in Somalia as proxy for the US, I agree with David Axe's claim that "Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion." However, it has to be noted that a copy of the actual wikileaked cable has not yet been produced and still remains to be seen if further wikileaked cables detailing the form and quality of the American support whether military intel, hardware, personnel or moral urging, if any, provided to the ENDF in the Somalia operation can be produced anytime soon. Granted, both Ethiopia and the US have had their own, albeit concurrent, legitimate national security interests in Somalia. As Terrence Lyons aptly put it, "it's important to note that Ethiopia moved into Somalia not as the puppet or proxy for the United States. Ethiopia had its own very specific national security interest relating to Somalia. Ethiopia saw stepped-up attacks on Ethiopia as originating in Somalia, aided by Eritrea. Ethiopia saw this as a real threat to the Ethiopian state and region. That´s why Ethiopia invaded, I believe, rather than just because the United States said ´Go get al-Qaeda.´" But the crux of the matter is whether they had to pursue their national security interests in the manner they did, i.e. through war.

The Ethiopian invasion, instead of improving, aggravated the status quo, and turned out, in the final analysis, to be disastrous as long as it eventually emboldened the threat emanating from the very Islamists Ethiopia had hoped to neutralize. It rallied Somalis of all clannish allegiance and political persuasion against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for extremist Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the invaders and their American allies. Violence reigned throughout the two years of Ethiopian occupation. In what seems a rare admission of guilt, Donald Yamamoto, the former US ambassador to Ethiopia reportedly said in March 2010, "We've made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia's entry in 2006 was not a really good idea."

Anarchy, Terrorism, and Piracy in Somalia: Revisited

2010-12-14T08:54:00.001+01:00

Alemayehu Fentaw†

Somalia has long been anarchic, hitting rock-bottom claiming #1 in The Fund for Peace´s most recent Failed States Index. It had no functioning central government in the past two decades, albeit 14 attempts to reconstitute the state had been made since the ouster of the Cold War dictator Mohammad Siad Barre in 1991 after 22 years in power. All such efforts had been doomed to fail and whether or not the latest initiative shall succeed only remains to be seen. One thing is crystal clear at this point in time, nonetheless, that Somalia's ongoing state-building project has to be supported, rather than fought, by the international community in general and to be more specific, by the US, EU, AU, and countries of the Horn of Africa sub-region lest it should continue to be a hotbed of terrorism and piracy.

Despite the hitherto neglect, the Somalia issue managed to come into the limelight of international affairs as a result of the sudden surge in piracy in the waters of the coast of Somalia. As Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN special envoy for Somalia, put it, "the problem of piracy has opened the eyes of those who have forgotten Somalia." The waters off the Somali coast are the most dangerous in the world - accounting for a third of the world's pirate attacks. The coast of Somalia has become the world´s worst piracy area only since 2007; though foreign fishing trawlers have been aggressively exploiting Somalia´s rich and unpatrolled waters since 1991 at the expense of coastal fishing villages. Illegal fishing has undoubtedly decreased due to the effectiveness of Somali pirates. In 2008, 40 out of 111 attacks succeeded; Somali pirates carried out a record number of attacks and hijackings in 2009, despite the deployment of international warships to thwart them and a United Nations Security Council resolution to bring the fight against them to shore. According to the Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau, pirates operating across the Gulf of Aden and along the coast of Somalia had attacked 214 vessels in 2009, resulting in 47 hijackings. In November 2010, the pirates held more than 25 foreign ships and 500 people hostage, according to Ecoterra International, an organization with offices in East Africa that keeps track of Somali piracy. Expert estimates has it that the Somali pirates netted more than $100 million, an astronomical sum for a war-racked country whose economy is in tatters.

It is worth noting that the international community launched a large naval operation in response to the widespread pirate attacks in the waters off the coast of Somalia. Naval powers from around the globe have dispatched a fleet of warships to the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy including, (i) "NATO Counter Piracy Operations" (Ocean Shield) off the Horn of Africa, (ii) the "African Partnership Station" (APS), designed by U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa to foster enhanced maritime safety and security in Africa, and (iii) the European Union Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia – "Operation ATALANTA". The presence of this huge naval fleet has managed to thwart attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden. The fact that NATO's Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR's Operation Atlanta have both been extended until December 2012 shows that the military option will continue to be the predominant mode of containing piracy off the coast of Somalia by the Western powers for some years to come. The United Nations Security Council on 27 April 2010 unanimously adopted the Russian sponsored Resolution 1918 (2010), which called on all states to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws. The Resolution also requires the UN Secretary‐General to report to the Security Council within three months on "possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy." This indicates that all efforts are geared towards prosecution.

Besides, at a recent conference in Brussels attended by the leadership from the UN, the EU, the AU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international community pledged $213 million toward strengthening Somali security forces. However, the question here is whether these measures are enough to address the piracy epidemic. The bone of contention is that the so-called antipiracy military measures are myopic and what the international community needs is a far-sighted long-term state-building agenda onshore in Somalia, promoting traditional peacemaking processes among the diverse conflicting Somali clans and sub-clans. In this regard, moderate Islam no doubt can provide a common ground for building consensus thereby easing the daunting task of entrenching a well-functioning and all-inclusive government.

Enough's recent strategy paper, entitled 'Beyond Piracy: Next Steps in Somalia', authored by Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen emphasizes the aforementioned point. It analyzes the current situation in Somalia and provides recommendations for how the international community in general and the United States in particular can help Somalis address multiple security threats that put their country, the region, and even far-flung countries at risk. It argues that while short-term measures to curb pirate attacks are certainly necessary, the Obama administration must not allow the piracy problem to distract it from putting in place a long-term strategy to help Somalis overcome their political predicament, i.e anarchy by enabling them to form a viable body politic which, with measured external support, can combat the twin problems of piracy and terrorism as well as promote peace and reconciliation. It describes the irony of the problem of piracy as: "The lowest order of threat to the TFG, the Somali people, the region, and the United States is actually the security item enjoying the greatest attention right now." It goes on to say that "Even so, the continued epidemic of piracy off the Somali coast is a problem and a test of the capacity of the TFG to extend its authority." The only viable and legitimate option would be for the TFG to prosecute piracy onshore, while leaving no room for the external actors, apart from helping in building the capacity of its security apparatus as well as in the ongoing peacemaking and peace-building initiatives.

The piracy epidemic in the Gulf of Aden waters is merely a reflection of the anarchy onshore. Piracy, like terrorism, is reflected by a deeper malaise. The root causes behind the mushrooming piracy off the coast of Somalia are state collapse, humanitarian crisis, abject poverty, and the ongoing exploitation of the waters by global factory fishing vessels that left very few viable livelihoods for anyone in Somalia these days. In order to capture the essence of this problem, let´s try to consider the Somali narrative on the ongoing piracy as told by Ken Menkhaus. The narrative "sees it is justifiable protection of Somali shores from illegal fishing, and … sees the piracy as a minor problem we are overreacting to. For instance -- they say at present there is a massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia, 3.5 million people at risk, and the UN is calling for $950 million in aid. We have only provided a fraction of that aid. Yet we're willing to mobilize the world's navies at considerable cost to stop a $20-40 million piracy problem. That's how Somalis see it." Such being the nature of the piracy problem, it calls for a truly holistic approach covering the political, security and humanitarian dimensions. Efforts to prosecute cases of piracy should also include the issue of illegal fishing and toxic dumping. Perpetrators of these crimes are no less guilty than pirates. In this regard, a practical proposal would be for the UN to enjoin governments whose national are engaged in fishing off the coast of Somalia to pay license fees to the TFG.

Downplaying the piracy problem, Menkhaus contends that "the United States and the international community have overstated the threat of Somali piracy. Somali hijackers earned between $30 and $40 million in ransom in 2008, a handsome sum of cash in one of the world´s most impoverished countries, but a paltry sum for international shipping -- not even enough to appreciably raise insurance premiums for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden." Explaining away naval military operation as the dominant normative mode of engagement in Somalia, as he logically should, Menkhaus argues "Most shipping companies prefer to live with the current piracy modus vivendi. The risk of any one ship being pirated is still low; their crews, ships, and cargo are returned safely; and the ransom fees are manageable. A military rescue, by comparison, is much riskier to the crew and will raise insurance costs considerably, as insurance companies will have to factor in the possibility of injuries and loss of life to crew and ensuing lawsuits." For him, reasons that continued to justify the military response to the piracy problem are fear of copycat piracy elsewhere, fear of al Qaeda adopting the practice, and commitment to the principle of open seas, rather than the ransom amounts by themselves. Another reason, he pointed out, why the military response remained unwarranted is the practical impossibility to patrol a zone of 2.5 million square miles. Granted, piracy has over time grown in scope to include larger criminal networks, thereby posing a threat to efforts to bring an end to conflict in Somalia. As such, the situation calls for a comprehensive approach to addressing the root causes of the Somali predicament, namely state failure, abject poverty and humanitarian crisis, including strategies for effective environmental conservation and fisheries management.

Turning to the problem of terrorism, the military option equally failed to bring about lasting solution in Somalia. All military adventures, from the American Black Hawk Down in the 1990s to the December 2006 Ethiopian blitz, were doomed to fail. Although I beg to differ with all analysts who, worth their salt, claim that Ethiopia fought in Somalia as proxy for the US, I agree with David Axe's claim that "Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion." However, it still remains to be seen if further wiki leaked cables can provide us with details of the suspected American support and urging, if any. Both Ethiopia and the US have had their own, albeit concurrent, legitimate national security interests in Somalia. As Terrence Lyons aptly put it, "it's important to note that Ethiopia moved into Somalia not as the puppet or proxy for the United States. Ethiopia had its own very specific national security interest relating to Somalia. Ethiopia saw stepped-up attacks on Ethiopia as originating in Somalia, aided by Eritrea. Ethiopia saw this as a real threat to the Ethiopian state and region. That´s why Ethiopia invaded, I believe, rather than just because the United States said ´Go get al-Qaeda.´" But the crux of the matter is whether they had to pursue their security interests the way they did, that is: through war. The Ethiopian invasion, instead of improving aggravated the status quo, turned out to be disastrous as long as it eventually emboldened the threat emanating from the very Islamists Ethiopia had hoped to neutralize. It rallied Somalis of all clannish allegiance and political persuasion against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for extremist Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the invaders and their American allies. Violence reigned throughout the two years of Ethiopian occupation. In what seems an admission of guilt, Donald Yamamoto, the former US ambassador to Ethiopia reportedly said in March "We've made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia's entry in 2006 was not a really good idea."

For instance, Johan Galtung- who is widely deservedly considered to be the Father of Peace Studies- claims, in a recent piece, that Ethiopia received payment from the US in exchange for its incursion in to Somalia. I dismiss Galtung's allegation that Ethiopia was paid by the US to attack Somalia as unsubstantiated, if not credulous. Galtung was not alone in entertaining the idea that Ethiopia obtained a pecuniary gain from the US for its incursion in to Somalia. A certain Eric Margolis also wrote in the Huffington Post that "Ethiopia received generous cash rewards from Washington for its invasion." The issue of American support aside, one has to be stupid enough to believe that Ethiopia invaded Somalia just because it was paid by the US or to believe that Ethiopia did what it did in Somalia in a bid to fight an American war on the Somali soil before engaging itself in a 'securitization calculus'. This, by no means, is meant to be a defense of the Ethiopian invasion, nonetheless. As to the merit of Ethiopia's decision to invade Somalia, it was nothing short of foolhardy and shall always remain to be its biggest foreign policy blunder, though I don´t gainsay its legitimate national security interests, given that there were other ways and means of safeguarding its interests short of use of force, not to mention the issue of whether the requirements of just war were fulfilled. Ethiopia could have adapted a defensive, rather than an offensive, military posture insofar as it affords her a no-less effective aggression neutralization mechanism.

Moreover, Galtung´s simpleminded characterization of Ethiopia and Somalia as Christian and Islamic respectively lends itself easily to a fallacious interpretation of the nature and causes of the conflict as it gives the impression that the major factor that plays itself out in the Ethio-Somalia conflict is religious difference, which is an outright reductio ad absurdum. First, FDR Ethiopia, unlike Imperial Ethiopia, is not a Christian state, as secularism is one of the pillars on which its new politico-legal order has been founded. Second, Ethiopia, in terms of its religious composition, is a country where almost half of its populace is Muslim. In the words of Terrence Lyons: "While many portray Ethiopia as a Christian nation, the country in fact has roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. Ethnic and national identity rather than religion has proven to be the most important social cleavage. It is possible, of course, that religious divisions will grow as an additional spillover from Ethiopia´s incursion into Somalia. This is another reason why settling this conflict is imperative."

Commenting on the futility of military intervention in Somalia by drawing a parallel with the war in Iraq, Sadia Ali Aden said, "Like the Iraq war, the military solution is a failed solution. The military solution will only discredit if not altogether alienate the moderate elements, radicalize insurgents, and perpetuate bloodshed and chaos. Therefore, it seems that the only way toward a win-win solution is through diplomacy and by adopting an alternative, constructive policy toward Somalia." Writing in the same vein, Donald Levine also suggested "Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia, with US concurrence, if not active backing, is likely to have a similar effect. Our goal should be to strengthen the moderate Somalis there, not undermine them through arousing anti-Ethiopia and anti-US hysteria."

At any rate, the international community in general and Ethiopia and the US in particular should bear in mind the need to have a full grasp of the inner logic that governs and perpetuates anarchy in Somalia and its workings. The twin problems of piracy and terrorism are symptoms of the deeper and broader problem in Somalia, namely anarchy or state failure. Any effort to address piracy or terrorism in isolation from its wider context would not produce the desired results. If a genuinely viable solution to the twin problems of piracy and terrorism is to be found, the international community must primarily focus on helping the Somalis address their deeper malaise themselves. Commenting on the piracy problem, Ken Menkhaus writes "the Somali piracy epidemic is unquestionably an on-shore crisis demanding an on-shore solution. Naval operations to interdict and apprehend pirates will help, but cannot possibly halt the daily quest of over a thousand gunmen in such vast waters when the risks are so low, rewards so high and alternatives so bleak in desolate Somalia." Menkhaus argues that "The solution will ultimately have to be on-shore, with more effective government in Somalia." In keeping with Menkhaus's proposal, Michael Shank argues that if we can find stability on land first, and then order will return to the seas.

What transpires from the foregoing is the fact that the key to solving the twin problems of piracy and terrorism on- and off-shore is to promote a negative peace agenda on-shore and off-shore buttressed by a positive peace agenda on-shore capitalizing on the gains of the Transitional Federal Government while ensuring its inclusiveness. On the former, the West must rally as long as it has all the resources if it has the requisite political will. Countries of the Horn of Africa must build consensus as to the necessity of getting over the prevalent anarchy in Somalia if their effort geared towards realizing a robust and effective regional integration, be it economic or political, is to bear fruit as long as it is in the best interest of the sub-region as a whole and its members as individual states. After all, the Somalis are such a widely dispersed population throughout much of the sub-region, and hence, the stability and prosperity of Somalia is a precondition for the enjoyment of stability and prosperity in the sub-region in general and to be more specific, in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

† The writer, Alemayehu Fentaw (LLB, MA summa cum laude), is an academic lawyer and public policy analyst based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He can be reached at alemayehufentaw@yahoo.com.

Ethiopia: Reflections on the Crusade against Real Estate

2010-12-14T08:46:00.001+01:00

Alemayehu Fentaw^†

What motivated me to write this piece is the recent measures taken by the Addis Ababa City Administration against real estate developers to expropriate their lease holdings. One thing that strikes me as odd is that actions took on the form of a campaign at best and a crusade at worst, pursued with the enthusiasm of a zealot. As a word of caveat, I don't gainsay the government's desire to combat against wasteful rent-seeking and unproductive activities on part of the real estate developers. Again, I don't deny that there remains a class that pillages, seizes and exploits in broad day in Ethiopia today. Nevertheless, in waging the campaign, the role the government played in creating and sustaining this squalid state of affairs has been reckoned without. Undoubtedly, lack of transparency in public affairs encouraged lease-offs of urban land to the well-connected leading to a speculative accumulation of large non-productive land holdings. The recently launched campaign against real estate therefore leaves much to be desired. Above all, the City Administration should remind itself of the fact that this is a country of rule of law and not of rule of zeal.

Constitutional and Statutory Guarantees against Expropriation in Ethiopia

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, under its Article 40(6), provides that "… [the] government shall ensure the right of private investors to the use of land on the basis of payment arrangements established by law", subject to the proviso under sub-article (8) of same, which reads: "Without prejudice to the right to private property, the government may expropriate private property for public purposes subject to payment in advance of compensation commensurate to the value of the property." In keeping with the Constitutional rule, Article 21 of Proclamation 280/2002 provides for investment guarantees. Sub-article (1) of same stipulates that: "[n]o investment may be expropriated or nationalized except when required by the public interest and then, only in compliance with the requirements of the law" whilst sub-article (2) provides that: "[a]dequate compensation, corresponding to the Prevailing market value shall be paid in advance in case of expropriation or nationalization of an investment for public interest." Accordingly, the government may expropriate property for public interest, strictly according to the law and only after making advance payment of adequate compensation corresponding to the prevailing market value of the investment.

Article 3(1) of Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation 455/2005 provides that "[a] woreda or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of compensation in accordance with this Proclamation, have the power to expropriate rural or urban landholdings for public purpose where it believes that it should be used for a better development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative societies or other organs, or where' such expropriation has been decided by the appropriate higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose." Sub-article (2) stipulates that "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-Article (I) of this Article, no land lease holding may be expropriated unless the lessee has failed to honor the obligations he assumed under the Lease Proclamation and Regulations or the land is required for development works to be undertaken by government." Pursuant to Article 2(5) of same, 'public purpose' denotes "the use of land defined as such by the decision of the appropriate body in conformity with urban structure plan or development plan in order to ensure the interest of the peoples to acquire direct or indirect benefits from the use of the land and to consolidate sustainable socio-economic development."

In addition, the Re-enactment of Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation 272/2002, under its Article 15(1), spells out three distinct grounds for termination of lease-hold. It stipulates that the lease-hold of urban land shall be terminated: (a) where the lease-hold possessor has failed to use the land in accordance with Sub-Article (1) of Article 12; (b) where it is decided to use the land for a public interest; or (c) where the period of lease is not renewed in accordance with Sub-Article (1) of Article 7. Firstly, a lease-hold can be terminated in situations where the holder violates Article 12 (1), which stipulates that "Any person, to whom lease-hold of urban land is permitted, must begin to use the land for the prescribed activity or service within the period of time set by Regulations to be issued by Region or City Government." Thus, a lease-holder cannot put his lease-hold to any use, activity or service other than the authorized. However, if a lease-holder wishes to put his lease-hold to a different use than for which he has had authorization, he must obtain permission for conversion pursuant to Sub-Article (2) of same.

Secondly, a lease-hold can be terminated on account of a decision by the concerned administration to use the land for development works to be undertaken by the government in pursuit of public interest. 'Public interest' is defined, under Article 2(7), in the same manner as in the Expropriation Proclamation, as "that which an appropriate body determines as a public interest in conformity with Master Plan or development plan in order to continuously ensure the direct or indirect usability of land by peoples, and to progressively enhance urban development." It follows that expropriation of urban land is permissible as long as it is for the implementation of the master plan or urban development plan, on condition that the expropriated land turns out to be beneficial, be it directly or indirectly, to the public. Finally, a lease-hold is terminated automatically upon expiry of the lease term unless it is renewed for another term.

With respect to the consequences of termination of lease-hold on the ground that
the lease-holder failed to use the land in accordance with Article 12 (1), Sub-Article (2) of same provides that "The lease payment shall be returned, subject to the reduction of costs incurred and penalty fee, where the lease-hold of urban land is terminated in accordance with Sub-Article (1) (a) of this Article. Penalty may not, however, be due where the land fell short of use because of force majeure set forth under Article 1793 of the Civil Code." Therefore, in cases of termination on account of failure to honor obligations on part of the lease-holder, refund of an amount equal to the lease payment less costs and penalty must be made to the lessee by the concerned administration, provided that the lessee could not make use of the land for any reason short of force majeure.

With regard to the legal effect of termination of lease-hold on the ground that
the lease-hold is needed for development projects in the pursuit of public interest, Sub-Article (3) stipulates that "Where the lease-hold of urban land is terminated in accordance with Sub-Article (1) (b) of this Article the lease-hold possessor shall be paid commensurate compensation in conformity with the pleadings institution procedure set forth in Article 17. With respect to the consequence of termination of lease-hold on account of failure to have it renewed, Sub-article (4) provides: "Where the lease-hold of urban land is terminated in accordance with Sub-Article (1) (c) of this Article, the lease-hold possessor must hand over the land to the body which gave it by removing within one year the property he has on the ground." And Sub-article (5) confers on the body, which handed the urban land over to the lease-hold possessor, the power to take over the land, together with the property thereon without any payment, where the latter has failed to remove the property on the ground within the period of time set forth in Sub-Article (4) of this Article. It can also order the Police where it finds it necessary for the execution thereof.

Before winding up my sketchy elucidation of the law governing urban landholdings in Ethiopia, I should like to draw particular attention to an important right that the law entitles the lease-holder to, despite the gross neglect and disregard it suffered recently. Any lease-holder is entitled to transfer, or charge an encumbrance on, his lease right. Article 13 (1) stipulates: "Without prejudice to Article 6 and Sub-Article(1) of Article 10, any lease-hold possessor may transfer, or undertake a surety on, his right of lease-hold; and he may also use it as a capital contribution to the amount of the lease payment he has made." This right is not limited to the lease-holder, nonetheless. It also extends to the transferee or mortgagee. Sub-Article (3) stipulates that "A person, who has the right of surety, may make use thereof by transferring the right, the building on the land and facilities accessory to it according to law or by using it on his own where the person undertaking the surety has failed to perform his obligation in the contract of suretyship, or where he is declared by court that he has proved to be bankrupt." So much for the law.

The Crusade against Real Estate Developers

Citing a statement from the Addis Ababa City Administration, New Business Ethiopia reported that a total of 923,380 square meters of land in different sub-cities was grabbed unlawfully by about 23 real estate developers. In response, the administration launched an all-out campaign against real estate developers for the reclamation of such unlawfully held land to the hitherto-unheard-of land bank in the first week of November 2010. The real estate developers targeted by the administration include, among others, Sunshine Real Estate (sister company of Sunshine Construction Company), Ayat Real Estate, Gad Real Estate, Michael Real Estate, Satcon Construction Company, Berta Construction, and Gift Real Estate.

Reportedly, Bole, Yeka, Nefas Silk Lafto, Kolfe Keranyo are among the major sub-cities of Addis Ababa where significant number of illegal land gabbing took place. According to news reports, in Bole Sub-city alone, Sunshine Real Estate has taken 35,000 square meters of land illegally. In the same sub-city, Gad Real Estate has allegedly grabbed 14,000, whilst Michael Real Estate and Satcon Construction have taken 13,000 and 12,000 square meters of land illegally. In Yeka Sub-city, Berta Construction has allegedly grabbed 33,100 square meters of land unlawfully, followed by Sunshine and Gift Real Estate Company, which took 21,000 and 10,048 square meters of land respectively.

According to Gubae Gundarta, Haile and Alem Real Estate Company, owned by the world-renowned athlete Haile Gebreselassie and his wife, has also been a subject of the expropriation measure taken by the city administration recently. Haile and Alem Real Estate Company acquired 40,000 square meters of land from the city administration on a basis of lease agreement on the 7^th day of October 2005. The blue-print of 38 villas and 224 condos to be constructed on the property located in Bole Sub-city's Kebele 18, has already been taken care of by Gerrita Consultancy. It was when Haile and Alem Real Estate Company was gearing up for construction that a dispute arose between the former and Addis Real Estate over boundaries between their respective adjacent landholdings. Gundarta quoted Haile: "We got the plots of land demarcated only this week, October 26, 2010. It means four years after the land was actually leased out to us. And then, they confiscated the land and all documentation pertaining thereto saying we haven't undertaken the business soon enough. This is not legal."

Groum Abate, a staff writer at Capital,
in his piece entitled 'Real estates swindle banks hundreds of millions', contends that banks will not be able to recover loans they disbursed to real estate developers as a result of the city administration's reclamation of the over 200,000 square meters of land holdings, which had served as collaterals. At the minimum, several private banks will lose more than four hundred million birr in loans to only four real estate developers after the Addis Ababa City Administration reclaimed their holdings. The real estate developers allegedly used their holdings illegally as collateral to secure bank loans, albeit there is nothing in the law that prohibits lease-holders from furnishing their right of lease as collateral to financiers.

According to the City Administration, only 18 percent of a total of 5.9 million square meter of land distributed to 125 real estate developers since 1997 is used properly, whilst the rest of the plots are transferred to third parties without any construction being built or used as collateral for loans in contravention of the land law.
Over two million square meters of plot from different real estate developers has already been taken back. This accounts for over 33 percent of the total amount of land given for real estate development. The administration claims to have expropriated over 1.5 million square meters from real estate developers that allegedly failed or refused to start construction within eighteen months. Besides, the city reclaimed more than 500,000 square meters of plot that has allegedly been held illegally by real estate developers. In the administration's estimation, the city would have raised over 6 billion birr had it leased the 2 million square meters at an average rate of 3,000 ETB per square meter.

Concluding Remarks

In the course of the crusade, due care has to be taken to respect the principle of fairness. First and foremost, the city administration has to see to it that the measure is taken in accordance with the law. Second, the accused real estate developers must be given fair hearings, prior to the city administration taking the measure of expropriating their landholdings and demolishing constructions, where the alleged unlawful urban land lease-holders show to its satisfaction that they possess duly signed and sealed lease-hold title-deeds thereof and have not yet failed to honor the obligations they assumed under the lease proclamations and regulations. Nevertheless, a blanket measure to expropriate lease holdings without a showing that such holdings are unlawful amounts to not only a violation of the relevant statutes but also of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

To that end, the city administration has to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Hence, it has to distinguish between the two category of cases of termination of lease-hold that are likely to arise, namely: cases of termination on account of failure to honor obligations on part of the lease-holder, on the one hand, and cases of termination on account of a decision to use the land for development works in the interest of the public, on the other hand, on the bases of the abovementioned three legal grounds, excluding the third ground which is unlikely to give rise to a dispute in the short- and medium-term. Besides, the administration should be able to distinguish between compensable and non-compensable termination.

Moreover, judicious and level-headed decisions have to be reached lest it should create a sense of insecurity of investment in the minds of our investors, whether actual and potential, already engaged or wishing to engage in real estate development in the country. Furthermore, the administration should not lose sight of the interests of third parties, including banks and buyers that will be adversely affected as a result of such measures and the grave implication they will have on the financial sector. For instance, one can reasonably expect the expropriation measures to result in a proliferation of lawsuits, adding an extra burden to courts that are already congested with backlogs, not to mention the ensuing immense litigation costs, as long as aggrieved parties, whether developers or their clients, are likely to file suits any time soon. It is also not clear enough if our private commercial banks can survive the huge financial losses they sustained as a result of the expropriation measures taken against the real estate developers who borrowed funds by undertaking surety on their rights of lease-hold and consequent civil suits and if their probable failure might not affect the growth rate, if not the macroeconomic stability, of our economy. After all, as Access Capital Research 2010 Sector Report on Real Estate put it, "had it not been for the expansion of this sector and the closely affiliated construction sector, Ethiopia would not have registered double-digit economic growth in the past five years."

The Unbearable Lightness of Pardon: Reflections on Birtukan’s Second Sailing

2010-10-10T21:32:00.001+02:00

Alemayehu Fentaw

“… if I grant forgiveness on condition that the other confess… then my forgiveness begins to let itself be contaminated by an economy, a calculation that corrupts it.”
J. Derrida

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Looking at the blogosphere and papers, the re-release of Judge Birtukan Mideksa, leader of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, Ethiopia’s largest opposition party, from prison on 6th of October 2010 has proven to be a no less potent topic for controversy than her re-incarceration on 29th of December 2008 among pundits and analysts. Although speculation was rife amidst pundits and analysts to the effect that Birtukan would be re-released from Qaliti prison any time soon this year, what contributed to the controversy is the manner in which her re-release was secured. Even if her re-release somehow was expected some way, no one expected that it would come the way it did up until Prime Minister Meles Zenawi hinted at the possibility of re-release and the only acceptable procedure that would secure her re-release from re-incarceration in his lecture at Columbia University on 22nd of September 2010.

In what follows, I shall attempt to unmask the motives behind the selection of the procedure that secured her release again and its ramifications on her political career. In so doing, I shall trace the latest decision by the government to release Birtukan for a second time in just about two years since her re-incarceration back to a couple of posts on Aiga Forum in January and September 2010 and link it to the abovementioned hint made in public by the Prime Minister and to an article published in the Reporter on 2nd of October 2010, just about 3 days before her actual release, or a couple of days before the decision was made or communicated to the prison officials with a view to showing a pattern in the scheme of things preceding the taking of the decision for her re-release.

What struck me as odd, if not suspicious, was the Prime Minister’s point-blank suggestion that the only sure way for Birtukan to secure her release is to request for pardon again. To the best of my knowledge, the first time the suggestion for entering a plea for pardon for a second time by none other than Birtukan, let alone the possibility, was made in public forums. And the forum was none other than Aiga and the writer was no one but Mekonnen Kassa, Chair of EPRDF Supporters’ Forum in the US, as it turned out to be.

Mekonnen writes "Unless granting Birtukan a pardon is prohibited by law, which I am sure is not the case, Birtukan herself, her family members, or her lawyer are legally authorized to petition for a pardon again. I have read “The Proclamation to Provide for the Procedure of Granting a Pardon” and nowhere in Proclamation No. 395/2004 is Birtukan prohibited from petitioning for Pardon again and again. To the contrary, Article 14, sub Article 1 and 2 stipulate that she has the right to petition for a pardon any time after her sentence became effective, and if her petition is rejected, she can apply again every six month,” and expect to be pardoned, as Jesus Christ said, “Not seven times, but, I tell you, seventy-seven times.” If her family members, her lawyer, or the Ministry of Justice and Federal Prison Commission can petition for pardon on her behalf, then why insist on Birtukan herself applying for pardon again? Couldn’t her mother petition for pardon on behalf of her imprisoned daughter? Hasn’t her mother herself petitioned for pardon? Wasn’t the Ministry of Justice or the Federal Prison Commission, instead of Birtukan, able to enter a plea for pardon on her behalf? The motive is blackmail pure and simple.

Mekonnen drives his point home in no uncertain terms: "If all who claim to care for Birtukan are genuine and as they claim miss her and desperately need her leadership, then the right thing to do is to advise her to petition for pardon and follow through the legal process. And if Birtukan were sincere about her first plea for pardon but believed it did not follow the legal process properly; herein lays her chance to do it the right way. Birtukan herself is the only “master of her fate.”"

Now, we've PM Meles Zenawi speaking before the World Leaders' Forum at Columbia University saying "Given her past practice, I wouldn't be surprised if she asked for pardon again. And given the practice of the government, I wouldn't be surprised if the government were to pardon her again." What is it that has changed since the PM, just last year, told journalists in unequivocal terms that "there will never be an agreement with anybody to release Birtukan. Ever. Full stop. That's a dead issue." Wasn’t it non-starter enough? Is the agreement the government reached with the ‘Council of Elders’ led by Professor Ephraim Isaac to secure release of the prisoner not really “an agreement with anybody”?

In an answer to a question posed to him during the Q&A session at Columbia University, Meles explained that Birtukan “went abroad and issued a statement to the effect that she did not ask for a pardon, and she was not given a pardon. Our pardon law says that if a pardon is sought under false pretenses or given under false pretenses, it is automatically null and void. So if she didn’t ask for a pardon, then the pardon given to her was completely illegal. When she came back from abroad, the police told her that her statement would necessarily lead to her being detained again unless she were to admit that she did indeed seek pardon and was indeed given pardon, then the pardon given to her is legally invalid. She was given a month to think about it… Many friends including ambassadors talked to her to try and convince her…if she denied receiving a pardon, she would be put back in prison. She did not feel convinced that she should retract the statement she issued in Sweden. At that point, we had no option but to detain her.”

On the facts of the case, the PM’s statement is tendentious at best and mendacious at worst. On the merits of his argument, it is simple-minded and ill-advised to believe that the government had been left with no other option than to detain her when, she denied, if at all she did, her petitioning a pardon. As can be gleaned from her apologia entitled ‘Kale’, which she made public just two days before she was thrown back to jail, she underscored the fact that she did never deny her requesting a pardon by signing a document together with her comrades under the persuasion of the ‘Council of Elders’ that mediated the deal that secured her release. As an academic lawyer, I know full well that, first, she was released not as a result of a pardon stricto sensu, but as a consequence of a reconciliation mediated by a ‘Council of Elders’ led by Professor Ephraim Isaac. Second, even if it might be considered as a pardon, a full pardon cannot be revoked once granted and accepted by the grantee unless it is shown to have been obtained through fraud. Even when a pardon is alleged to have been obtained fraudulently, there’s no way to revoke it without tendering a written notice and before the expiry of the twenty days’ period. Third, the object and purpose of the FDRE Criminal Code, under its Article 1, is “to ensure order, peace and the security the State, its' peoples, and inhabitants for the public good,” which is reaffirmed in the words of Article 11 of the Procedure of Pardon Proclamation, whose purported chief aim is “to ensure the welfare and interest of the public”. Therefore, what has been done in the interest of public order, peace and security cannot be undone at least without good enough reason.

Therefore, it would seem that these formalities are intended for no apparent reason than to disgrace and humiliate the country’s one and only one rising, young, female political leader in the eyes of the public. In view of this any movement for her release should have set aside any attempt to get her to submit a plea for pardon for the second time at all, or should she do that, under at least less harsh terms and conditions than the present, if it is not possible to secure an unconditional release for her. What should have been done in order to secure her release without compromising her dignity as a human being and integrity as a political leader was for the ‘Council of Elders’ to get the Ministry of Justice and Federal Prison Commission to apply for pardon on her behalf under Article 12(2) of Proclamation No. 395/2004 and avoid giving unnecessary publicity to the embarrassing terms and conditions of her re-release. The Elders Council can get Birtukan’s mother or lawyer to formally file the petition for pardon on her behalf to avoid the embarrassment. It is still mind-boggling how the so-called ‘Council of Elders’ failed to make it a point to impose on both the government and the prisoner to refrain from any act of naming and shaming one another. However, my hunch tells me that the government is incorrigibly irresponsible to abide by any terms and conditions, if any, of the deal and the elder helplessly incapable of imposing them on the former. The elders should be reminded of one cardinal principle of conflict resolution that mediators should be impartial, but not neutral. Being partial means defending one side or the other. Being impartial is working with both parties to a dispute – the mediators’ hearts might go out to that they feel has been wronged, naturally - however, their work is to bring the parties to the table to talk, to get them into dialogue about what they can do to improve the situation. Mediators are not advocates for either side, but for finding common ground: it is not about justice for one but justice for all.

A case in point is when a group of well-intentioned scholars abroad and at home communicated Professor Ephraim Isaac, chair of the so-called ‘council of elders’, of their intention to initiate a process of signing a petition by the public that would be submitted to the President, he warned them: “Please do not interfere with whatever process is going on..... Your message is already throwing a wrench into a process that has gone forward now for a few weeks.... I have nothing else to say at this time” Of course, the legal force of such a petition might be weak as it is not required by the pardon proclamation. But Ephraim’s reaction leaves us wondering what his personal motives are and whether he is full well aware that he might end up in just giving credence to the Government’s wrongdoings.

For those of us who watched ETV, the only national TV, running news of the release of Birtukan, it was clear that she entered a plea for pardon under duress. The story of both of the pardons granted to Birukan on two occasions is easier to tell. The first pardon was part of a larger deal, reconciliation, mediated by the council of elders, whose terms were breached by the Government of Ethiopia in the interest of realpolitik whilst the second was also a deal, but one done between unequal parties, too powerful to deal with and is tantamount to one done under duress pure and simple. Her televised statements, if not confessions, were telling enough of the ordeal she went through.

Another curious piece of writing in the run up to the re-release of Birtukan was that of Ambassador Tesfaye Habisso. The problem with Tesfaye is that he conflates forgiveness with pardon and pardon with reconciliation. Despite our differences on analytic concepts, his grave mistake, albeit not unpardonable, is that he adamantly resists admitting that drawing such distinctions entails legal consequences. I wouldn’t advise him to go to law school at this age of his, though he still persist in adamant defiance of such fine conceptual distinctions I made elsewhere. In his own words, “Does it really matter whether they asked to be pardoned in accordance with the traditional “shimiglina” method (elders’ mediation) or via the modern, legal pardon procedure as long as it secured them clemency and freedom? To me, it doesn’t make a difference at all.”

Having pointed out two of the courses of action that Birtukan might possibly take to secure her release, Ambassador Tesfaye, not unlike Mekonnen Kassa, explicitly opts for the second option. He suggests that “the only reasonable recourse for B. Mideksa now seems legal action to regain her freedom, an up-hill task even for a lawyer like Birtukan, I guess, or to plead again for forgiveness from the President via the Board of Pardons, which seems a more preferable option under the prevailing circumstances.”

Although Tesfaye recommends Birtukan to petition for pardon once again, not every six month unlike Mekonnen, he calls on “all Ethiopians here and abroad … [to] loudly make their united voices heard by sending their humble petition to the FDRE President to re-issue her the “full pardon” that he granted her previously out of compassion and for the sake of her daughter and mother.” If pardon is his preferred course of action, then where in the pardon law are all Ethiopians vested with standing to petition for pardon on behalf of a lifer? Or is it only intended to shift the blame to the President and redirect the public attention to him, rather than, to the Prime Minister?

In order to make his case for the re-granting of a pardon to Birtukan, Tesfaye also indulges in a faulty analogy where he likens her case to that of the Lockerbie bomber who was recently released from prison in Scotland. He writes, “Even the Lockerbie bomber and the Libyan national sentenced to 27 years behind bars by the Scottish supreme court for an atrocious crime of killing over 270 persons was set free and sent back to his homeland to receive a tumultuous welcome by the Libyan people, including their leader Col. Gadaffi. It was indeed a great gesture of compassion to the culprit extended by the people of Scotland and their judiciary;” What’s the case of the PanAm monster got to do with Birtukan? Maybe, the closest analogy to he could have drawn was Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the argument by analogy he could have made was that it was illegal for Myanmar to incarcerate Suu Kyi as was Birtukan for Ethiopia, but he was wiser not to indulge in such a risky analogy.

At any rate, the decision to release Judge Birtukan from jail once again might have helped the Government of Ethiopia to save face for a brief period of time but it is still unclear if the decision has helped it overcome one of the hurdles it needlessly put in the way of the ongoing democratization process since the demise of totalitarianism in 1991, inasmuch as it does not ensure the existence of political pluralism, free press and independent judiciary in the country.

In short, Birtukan was never the master of the ship in her second sailing out of Qaliti as well as her first as Mekonnen or the smart Prime Minister would have us believe. Apparently, in both of her sailings out of prison, the master of the ship was none other than the Prime Minister. One thing that the granting of pardon in both instances proved to all of us is nothing but the unbearable lightness of pardons. In spite of the cruel and inhumane treatment Birtukan received in the hands of her jailors, one thing that is certain is that she will remain to be a source of inspiration for all who work to advance basic human rights in Ethiopia and the world over.

A Bogus Call for a Paradigm Shift - Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy

2009-12-04T07:23:00.002+01:00

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responds to Alemayehu Fentaw's Critique of Its Policy

It has been more than seven years since the current Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy was issued by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It was adopted following extensive public discussions of the draft document, some aired and televised. At various times, different institutions have held discussions on this Policy and Strategy document. It’s been translated and made widely available in English, and is available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is written in a language accessible to the general public. The fact that the Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy has been debated openly and made widely available to the general public is, in itself, already a radical change for a country that used to treat all foreign affairs documents and communications as top-secret.

Despite this, some appear to have found it difficult to grasp the true tenets of this transparent policy instrument, evaluate its worth on merit or measure it by implementation. The fact that the document has been in the public domain from inception has, of course, encouraged comment, often critical, from all sectors of society. This is appreciated, and welcome, but constructive criticism of this, as of any policy instrument, does require it should be read in its entirety. One has to say, for example, that Alemayehu Fentaw (Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy: The Case for a Paradigm Shift, November 2009, www.aigaforum.com) doesn’t appear to have read the Policy and Strategy Document very closely or in great detail before indulging in parallels and analogies with previous regimes in Ethiopia. His comments are in fact widely disconnected from the content and reality of the policy instrument. He appears to have drawn from the archives of the past rather than the current day realities of Ethiopia’s foreign and national security considerations. It isn’t necessary to treat his brief commentary point by point, but it does offer the opportunity to recall the main tenets of Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, and its achievements.

The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy has two major parts. The first lays the foundation of the policy instrument. It contains the principles, values, objectives and strategies that underpin the entire instrument. The second part explicates and expounds the historical value and meaning of Ethiopia’s relations with third parties, and provides guidance on how these relationships should best be handled. This, the most detailed section, should of course be tempered by the understanding that some, if not most of the section, can and will be influenced most significantly at times by ongoing developments around the world or in specific countries and organizations.

The first part of the Policy and Strategy is critical to help refocus the undivided attention of the country on the attainment of economic development and democratization as central to ensuring the stability and continuity of Ethiopia as a country. Democracy and development are questions of survival. For a country as rich in diversity of nations, nationalities and religions as Ethiopia, the establishment of democratic order is a sine-qua-non to avert disorder and disintegration. Democracy allows for mutual accommodation and resolution of conflicting interests. Similarly, lifting the country from abject poverty and underdevelopment is imperative to avert the disorder and chaos that could follow if this situation was allowed to continue. The question of national pride and national heritage are integrated in the policy document with emphasis on the duty of the present generation to fight extreme poverty while building on the proud legacy of the country’s longstanding independence, its past civilizations and glories. Full recognition is given to the phenomenon of globalization as an opportunity and also as a challenge. In a world of increasing interconnection and fierce competition, Ethiopia also has to devise ways and means of mitigating the negatives effects of globalization while exhaustively utilizing the many opportunities it also has to offer.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy sets out specific and realist objectives, easily demonstrating this is indeed a major paradigm shift for the country. It goes back to creating an enabling environment for the economic development and democratization of the country. One major aspect of this is through a transformation in foreign affairs, that is the implementation of a policy of economic diplomacy. This allows for the securing of foreign market opportunities for local goods, attracting of foreign investment and enhancing development assistance through grants, loans, technical assistance and technology transfer, and the promotion of the country as a tourist destination. Technical and financial support for the vital institutions to entrench democratic governance in the country is also critical. The policy instrument seeks to expand the number and role of Ethiopia’s partners and reduce threats by the resolution of conflicts peacefully through dialogue and negotiation. One might add that nowhere in the Policy and Strategy can one find suggestions of the sort of war-based foreign relations objectives that Alemayehu Fentaw appears to see. They simply aren’t there.

The strategies devised to attain the Policy and Strategy objectives are further evidence of the radical shift in Ethiopia’s foreign policy orientation. Unlike the past, the focus is not on any perceived “siege mentality” or on external factors but on the dynamics of the domestic conditions. This is the decisive factor. In other words, this means the determination of Ethiopia’s own priorities, mobilizing and relying on the country’s own resources as far as possible, while seeking foreign assistance to fill any gaps. The strategy also demands that we should minimize threats to national security, study and identify their source, and reduce any vulnerability to such threats by concentrating on the fight against poverty, backwardness, and any absence of good governance.

All this requires the establishment of strong democratic institutions and the construction of a national consensus on the vital national issues of common concern. There has to be a concerted effort to guarantee the rule of law to the fullest extent. At the same time as reducing national vulnerability, the country also has to build a reliable defense and security capability consistent with its economic level, and in a manner that is sustainable and complementary to the country’s economic development. Ethiopia’s strategy has many different nuances including the linking of military expenditure with the economy and making it cost effective. Defense, it might be noted, is another area where Alemayehu Fentaw gets it wrong.

As envisaged in the Strategy, the Government has also endeavored to enhance the implementation capacity of the foreign affairs establishment. This is, in fact, a work in progress. We are continuously working to enhance equitable gender representation and of nations and nationalities in the foreign-service. The focus is equally on the strengthening of the professionalism, commitment and integrity of public servants in this area. It is important that the effort to forge a national consensus on the vital issues for the country, whether inside Ethiopia or outside, should be redoubled while coordination with all relevant public and private actors is enhanced. In sharp contrast to the theories advanced by Alemayehu Fentaw, the Policy and Strategy instrument says that what should matter most is the internal situation of the country. The relevance and validity of Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy is thus determined by its contribution to development, democracy and peace in Ethiopia. This is quite clearly a clean break from the policies of former regimes in Ethiopia which used to relegate internal objectives to external considerations. Equally, giving domestic progress the decisive place does not mean that the defense of the country’s territorial integrity isn’t given the importance it deserves. In fact, the first of the external relations principles in the Constitution provides for the protection of national interest and respect for the sovereignty of the country. It also refers to mutual respect, non-interference, respect for international treaties, integration with neighboring countries and other African states, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Alemayehu Fentaw does not just miss these central elements of the Policy and Strategy instrument. He concocts facts and makes unsubstantiated allegations. One is the suggestion that US-Ethiopia relations would cool under the new US administration. In fact, as is obvious, the relationship between the two countries is thriving. Another is the claim that Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia demonstrates a ‘foreign policy through war’ approach. It shouldn’t need repeating that Ethiopia took action in Somalia following the appearance of a clear and present danger from terrorist groups and at the invitation of the legitimate Government of Somalia. It withdrew as soon as it was in a position to do so when the current Somali political dispensation was created by the Djibouti Agreements. Again, Ethiopia has made major strides in the promotion and protection of human and civil rights, and no misrepresentation of the concept of human security can conceal this. In fact, Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy could be said to represent a well-proportioned human security framework, of human and civil rights. It encompasses both security in the traditional sense and security in terms of democratic rights as well as enjoyment of freedom from hunger and deprivation.

The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy has helped redefine Ethiopia’s place in the world. The country is now successfully attracting substantial foreign investment. It has significantly increased its external trade and is currently negotiating entry into the World Trade Organization. The new approach of economic-diplomacy is making tangible progress in contributing to successive years of economic growth. Ethiopia is preparing to hold its 4th round of national elections with its institutions demonstrating impressive implementation capacity, and with a series of enabling laws creating a conducive environment for the further nurture of democracy. More and more, Ethiopian nationals and foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin are engaged in development activities in the country. Ethiopia is playing an active role in the African Union’s integration agenda and in the maintenance of international peace and security through active participation in the policy organs and peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations. Despite many remaining challenges, these and other achievements clearly demonstrate the intrinsic and practical value of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy: The Case for a Paradigm Shift

2009-11-23T10:21:00.001+01:00

Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy: The Case for a Paradigm Shift

Alemayehu Fentaw†

A good place to start a constructive critique is to look at the logical foundation of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and subject it to the tests of consistency, coherence, and soundness. The FANSPS is premised on the proposition that "security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. The alpha and omega of security is the ensuring of national survival. Other national security issues may be raised only if national existence is ensured. Foreign affairs and security policy must be formulated first and foremost to ensure national security. Issues of prosperity, sustainable peace, and stability and other related concerns then follow." Thus, the FANSPS's primary focus is on potential and actual threats to its territorial integrity. It aimed primarily at protecting its sovereign frontiers against external aggression.
Such being the logical foundation of the FANSPS, it becomes clear that non-military aspects of security are relegated to a secondary place. This is not surprising given that securing its independence and territorial integrity has been the preoccupation of Ethiopian foreign and national security policy for millennia.

In view of the foregoing, it is no wonder that The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) numbers about 200,000 personnel, which makes it one of the largest militaries in Africa. During the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, the ENDF mobilized strength reached about 350,000. The ENDF has its roots in the peasant-based EPRDF guerrilla army and is still in the process of being transformed into an all-volunteer professional military organization with the aid of the United States. The ENDF received training in peacekeeping operations, professional military education, military training management, counter-terrorism operations, military medicine, and unspecified military training funds
from the United States.

The ENDF is one of the largest military forces in Africa along with Egypt and Morocco, 29th largest in the world of 132 in terms of armed forces growth, and 11^th out of 166 countries in terms of personnel. Military expenditure for the year 2005
amounts to $800,000,000.00 and this places her on 56th position of 170. The military expenditure was 3% of its GDP for 2006 and 49^th in the world. Just about the time Ethiopia went to war with the UIC in Somalia, it
imported heavy weapons such as tanks and other armored vehicles from Russia (worth US$12 million) and China ($3 million) in 2006 and from North Korea ($3 million) and the Czech Republic ($1 million) in 2005. Ethiopia also imported military weapons from China ($11.5 million) in 2006 and Israel ($1.2 million) in 2005. Besides, during 2005 and 2006, Ethiopia had acquired a large range of small arms, light weapons and parts mainly from North Korea, China and Russia.

On 13 April 2007 the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement, in response to an article that was published in the New York Times which alleged that the US administration had allowed Ethiopia to import arms from North Korea, in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), to support Ethiopia's military operations in Somalia. The Ethiopian government acknowledged that a cargo shipment from North Korea to Ethiopia had taken place on 22 January 2007, but denied that the content of the cargo violated UN Security Council Resolution 1718 imposing a partial embargo on the trade in arms with North Korea. The Ethiopian government said that the shipment contained spare parts for machinery and engineering equipment and raw materials for the making of assorted ammunition for small arms, and was made on the basis of four contractual agreements which were signed between 12 and 22 June 2006 for the purchase of various items required by the military industry in Ethiopia. Furthermore "irrevocable Letters of Credit were issued between 30 June and 30 September 2006. This means that all payments for the cargo were effected before the adoption of Resolution 1718."

The statement also stated that the US Embassy in Addis Ababa might have been aware of Ethiopia's importation of said cargo from North Korea but the assertion that "the United States allowed the arms delivery to go through in January in part because Ethiopia was in the midst of a military offensive against Islamic militias inside Somalia" is wrong "since the contractual agreements were signed and all payments made before the ICU extremists in Somalia took control of Mogadishu and declared jihad on Ethiopia".

Against this backdrop, a cursory look at the Human Development Index (HDI) for Ethiopia reveals an irony in contemporary Ethiopian political life. Although it is noteworthy that between 1995 and 2007 Ethiopia's HDI rose by 3.13% annually from 0.308 to 0.414, the HDI for Ethiopia for the year 2007 is 0.414, which gives the country a rank of 171^stout of 182 countries with data.

Military Expenditure of Ethiopia

In local currency ( m. birr )

Year
Value

1991
[1,095]

1992
[716]

1993
[819]

1994
813

1995
754

1996
803

1997
1,512

1998
3,263

1999
5,589

2000
5,075

2001
2,959

2002
2,476

2003
2,397

2004
2,686

2005
2,965

2006
3,007

2007
3,253

2008
3,750

In constant ( 2005 ) US$ m.

Year
Value

1991
[235]

1992
[139]

1993
[153]

1994
141

1995
119

1996
134

1997
246

1998
518

1999
821

2000
741

2001
471

2002
388

2003
319

2004
346

2005
342

2006
309

2007
285

2008
262

As percentage of gross domestic product

Year
Value

1991
[5.3]

1992
[2.7]

1993
[2.9]

1994
2.4

1995
2

1996
1.8

1997
3.4

1998
6.7

1999
10.7

2000
9.6

2001
4.7

2002
3.6

2003
2.9

2004
2.8

2005
2.5

2006
2.1

2007
1.7

The figure for 1999 includes an allocation of 1 billion birr in addition to the original defense budget

Source: SIPRI, 2009.

Although the FANSPS explicitly fixes the country's maximum military expenditure at 2% of its GDP, it leaves a leeway for a flexible implementation of the 2% ceiling "depending on the level of threat" during a given fiscal year. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Ethiopia's military expenditure under EPRDF has been well over 2% of its GDP, except for the years 1995, 1996 and 2007. The Central Intelligence Agency raises SIPRI's data for 2006 from 2.1 to 3%.

Despite that, one of the most striking features of FDRE's FANSPS, at least on the face of it, is its emphasis on democratization and development. It also tells us about the threat to national security posed by human rights abuses. In the words of the FANSPS: "In the absence of a democratic order, national and religious divisions will invariably intensify, the abuse of human rights would result in strife, and poverty would spread further - a recipe for disintegration and destruction."
Nevertheless, the Government's bad human rights track record attests to the contrary. The thrust of my argument is that the central purpose of Ethiopia's foreign and security policy has remained the same, in spite of the shift in orientation. A change in discourse has not brought about a change in practice. Human security should have been made to constitute the basis of the FANSPS. Moreover, the Government should work aggressively to get a critical mass of women into leadership positions in the foreign affairs and security sector.

In the received discourse of international affairs, the term "security" connotes the protection of territorial integrity and dignity of the state. This is not surprising given the fact that hitherto, international relations has been more "state-centric" than "people-centric." Nevertheless, with the cessation of the Cold War and the advent of globalization in the international arena, the concept of security is expanding to focus more on people than on the state. Security, in its classical sense, refers to the security of the state from external aggression. It is about how states use force to counter threats to their territorial integrity, their autonomy, and their domestic political system, primarily from other states. The classical formulation restricts the scope of security to military threats from other states. Nevertheless, in its modern conception, security is equated with the "security of individuals, not just security of their nations" or, put differently, "security of people, not just security of territory." The modern formulation gives primacy to the safety and well-being of "all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment", whilst the classical conception of security emphasizes territorial integrity and national independence as the primary values that need to be protected. The latter has been related more to nation-states than to people." What this conception overlooked was "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives."

Human security also encompasses a sense of personal choice and surety about the future and of personal efficacy and opportunity. Thus, in drawing attention to the difference between human security and its cognate, human development, the Report argues that the latter is a "broader concept" and refers to "a process of widening the range of people's choices," while the former implies that "people can exercise these choices safely and freely – and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow". Along with a sense of choice and surety about the future, people should be efficacious and empowered enough to be "able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living."The Report lists seven aspects of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Furthermore, the concept of human security helps us understand that basic human rights, as stated in the international human rights instruments, are indivisible and inter-related. Sometimes, human rights are overridden or ignored for the sake of state security. Human security puts people first, emphasizing that human rights are central to state security. Human security complements human rights law by drawing attention to international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflict.

However, the hitherto emphasis on sovereignty a la the classical approach to security neglected other no less important aspects of security such as ecological security, energy security, economic security, food security, and health security. There has been a host of complex threats to the security of the Ethiopian polity for so long including, but not limited to, poverty, widespread malnutrition, population explosion, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, degradation of the environment, loss of faith in institutions, uncontrolled urbanization/ rural-urban migration, insecurity of employment, brain drain, alienation of the youth, inflation and other economic disruptions.

Donald Levine, in a recent talk, pointed out rapid population growth, poverty, food insecurity, energy, environment, women's rights, health, and quality of education, rather than ethnicity, as the chief challenges facing Ethiopians of diverse background today. He also emphasized the need for green technology as a means of ensuring the country's energy and ecological security at the same time. According to John Podesta and Peter Ogden, climate change will likely create large fluctuations in the amount of rainfall in East Africa during the next 30 years; a 5–20 % increase in rainfall during the winter months will cause flooding and soil erosion, while a 5–10 % decrease in the summer months will cause severe droughts. This will jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of people and the economic capacity of the region, as agriculture constitutes some 40 percent of East Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of the population earns a living from agriculture.

The conceptual distinction that Johan Galtung drew between negative and positive peace can and must be allowed to inform and shape the formulation of a state's national security policy. Once framed a la Galtung, the objectives of the security policy have to go beyond achieving a state of absence of war (negative peace) to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and protection of the environment (positive peace). Although the use of military force is a legitimate means of defense against external aggression, it is not an acceptable means of conducting foreign policy and settling disputes. Such a security framework also recognizes that states can mitigate the security dilemma and promote regional stability by adopting a defensive, if not an "aggression-neutralizing", to borrow an expression from Donald Levine's Conflict and Aikido Theory, rather than an offensive military doctrine and posture. Thus, the security policy should pay greater attention to such sources of internal instability as the problem of human rights violations, population growth, poverty, food insecurity, energy, environment, women's rights, health, child abuse, trafficking in women and children, smuggling in persons, and the physical and psychological security of tens of thousands of women migrant workers in the Middle East that have largely been ignored by state agencies.

In international affairs, Ethiopia is to be found in a state-of-neither-peace-nor-war with Eritrea following the brutal 1998-2000 border war in which tens of thousands died on both sides. Ethiopia, upon invitation from the UN-recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, also entered into Somalia to fight against the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamist group vying for control of Somalia. Between late 2006 and January 2009, Ethiopia maintained a presence of several thousand troops in Somalia. On the other hand, Ethiopia has recently entered into a loose tripartite (nonmilitary) cooperation with Sudan and Yemen. The Saudi-East Africa Forum, in which Ethiopia is an active member, is also another noteworthy international economic partnership. It has also had very good relations with the United States and the West, especially in responding to regional instability and supporting war on terrorism and, increasingly, through economic involvement. Nevertheless, there are indications that the hitherto rather warm diplomatic relationship Ethiopia has been enjoying with the US would seem to begin to cool under Barrack Obama's administration, because of US revulsion at the Government's human rights abuses and the de-securitization of the problem of terrorism in Somalia. It is hard to tell if the relations might further deteriorate and lead to a legislative restrictions on assistance to Ethiopia other than humanitarian assistance.
Although, as Ambassador David Shin observes, "[p]utting pressure on Ethiopia will become increasingly difficult for the United States and other western countries as Ethiopia continues to strengthen its relations with countries such as China and Russia."

In order to understand how de-securitizing external factors brings about a shift in Ethiopia's national security agenda, let's take a look at Somalia. What accounts for Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia is its securitization calculus, albeit not based on paranoia as one might tend to think, that Somalia would set the stage for a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. De-securitizing the problem in Somalia, including the terrorist factor brings about a radical shift in Ethiopia's traditional approach to security. The shift in approach from state security to human security will not only pave the way for regional stability via cessation of hostilities, but also create conditions conducive to domestic security in the fullest sense of the term.

Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia is a clear indication of its strategy of conducting foreign policy through war, albeit war had to be kept to the minimal. Ethiopia should embrace what Owen Harries calls the "prudential ethic" as a signpost to international relations. According to Harries, the just war theory, given that it accepts that it is futile to assume that war can be abolished, provides one such important ethic. The aim of the theory is two-fold: on the one hand, it prohibits an unjust war, by laying down rules for the determination of the legitimacy of use of force (jus ad bellum), and makes war less savage, by establishing rules of conduct (jus in bello), on the other. Hence, a resort to force must have a just cause, in that it is resorted to in response to injustice, is authorized by a competent authority, and is motivated by right intention. It must meet four prudential tests in that it must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil, have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort and be expected to result in a state of peace. The requirements of jus in bello are that when force is resorted to, it must be discriminate and proportional. Leaving the issue of legitimacy aside, (not least because it was invited by the TFG) Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia hardly passes the four prudential tests. At least, we have every reason to doubt that the military intervention was a last resort and was expected to result in a state of peace. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become crystal-clear that Ethiopia's resort to force failed to bring about a state of peace in Somalia. Besides, reports that Ethiopia violated the requirements of jus in bello abound. For instance, in March and April 2007 Ethiopian soldiers violated international humanitarian law by using heavy artillery and rockets to fight an insurgency in Mogadishu, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing up to 400,000 people. Though Ethiopian troops have since withdrawn from Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated in June 2009 that the country has not ruled out a future redeployment. According to David Shin, "both the United States and Ethiopia followed a misguided policy in Somalia."

To illustrate how others' perception of Ethiopia's vulnerability, or miscalculation, led to aggression, the FANSPS invokes Somalia and Eritrea under the leaderships of Siad Barre and Isaias Afeworki respectively. In the words of the FANSPS, "Some time ago the Siad Barre regime in Somalia launched an attack on Ethiopia on the presumption that Ethiopia was unable to offer a united resistance and that it would break up under military pressure. The regime in Eritrea (the Shabia) similarly launched an aggression against Ethiopia thinking along the same lines. Both regimes were soundly defeated because of their misguided and misconceived perceptions." In this regard, it is interesting to note the continuity in foreign and security policy, despite the change in regimes. Somalia has never been removed from Ethiopia's security agenda.

The FANSPS has also failed miserably to recognize the role of women in peace-making, peace-building, and security. The Government should demonstrate its commitment to the principles enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (UNSC 1325). The Foreign Ministry must come up with a workable action plan for the implementation of UNSC 1325. Consequently, it should recruit more women to the diplomatic services; nominate more women to international diplomatic assignments, specifically to senior positions (UN special representatives, peace commissions, fact-finding missions, etc.); increase the percentage of women in delegations to national, regional and international meetings concerned with peace and security, as well as in formal peace negotiations; and include women in all reconciliation, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace building, and conflict preventive posts. In this connection, it is important to recall that women were entirely excluded from the peace processes concerning the Ethio-Eritrean conflict.

Finally, the quality of foreign policy of a country is determined by many factors of which the role-played by top notch, well-groomed, and seasoned personnel, the degree of participation and the method of policy decision-making cannot be over-stated. Thus, the Ministry should open up a definite career path to diplomacy for qualified professionals, whether women or men, if it is to enhance its capacity through professional staffing. The hitherto practice of staffing its foreign services as well as the head office with mediocre party functionaries did not pay. To recap, Ethiopia's FANSPS has to give recognition and full effect to the paradigm shift in the approach to security from state-centricism to people-centricism (human security) as well as from non-inclusive security to what Ambassador Swanee Hunt calls "inclusive security".

Ethiopia: Looking Ahead

2009-11-23T09:50:00.001+01:00

SEPTEMBER 19, 2009

DONALD LEVINE

Professor Emeritus
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A half century ago, the ill-fated coup attempt against Emperor Haile Sellassie I in December 1960 marked the moment when Ethiopia entered the era of modernizing revolutions. The event, I have argued (www.eineps.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=746), became the first of several missed opportunities that Ethiopia suffered while trying to become a politically modern state. In hopes that the 2010 elections may offer an opportunity that this time Ethiopians might seize with complete success, I offer some thoughts on the challenging year ahead.

First off, let us acknowledge that nearly all parties involved in the tragic events of 2005 seem determined not to repeat their major mistakes. The Government will not again react with excessive violence to demonstrations or public protests. Opposition candidates will not refuse to accept the positions to which they were duly elected. Both sides will probably refrain from the most grievously inflammatory elements of their electoral rhetoric and focus on issues.

Second, let us acknowledge that Ethiopia's difficulties during the past half century reflect the growing pains of any country moving from an absolute monarchy to a modern democratic state. Compare Ethiopia, then, not with countries that already attained the conditions of functioning democracies, whereby governments change hands through popular elections–like the U.S., France, Ghana, and now Japan–but with the small group of nations that have had to deal with similar circumstances. These include Iran, Thailand, and Afghanistan. Like Ethiopia, these three countries each possessed a core of indigenous traditions as a historic state. Those traditions helped them withstand colonization during the era of European imperial expansion. At the same time, their patterns of deeply-rooted authoritarian rule at the national level posed stark challenges to their advance toward a modern political system. In 1960, no one really could predict how they would handle that massive challenge. By the mid-1970s, all of them were riven by violent political storms. And today, each of them faces serious internal conflicts.

On the stage of world history Iran was the best known of these states, for being heir to the mighty empire of Persia that flourished as early as the 6th century BCE. The honorific title of its ancient emperors was shahanshah, king of kings, comparable to negusa negest. Retrieving that title, the 20th-century Pahlavi kings initiate robust efforts to modernize the country economically and culturally from the top down. These began with King of Kings Reza Shah Pahlavi (1926-41) and continued with his son Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-78)–the latter's reign punctuated by the short, promising regime of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in which the king was briefly removed. In 1961, the same year that Haile Selassie introduced minor administrative reforms in the wake of the December 1960 coup, the Shah started an ambitious program of economic growth–the "White Revolution"– involving large-scale land reform and technical modernization. Yet politically, he wielded an extremely authoritarian scepter backed up by the SAVAK, a ruthless secret police. In 1978 the fundamentalist Islamist regime of Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the shah, installing a no less repressive regime. The slaughter of vote protesters during this year's election forms a massive blot on the country's political record, not to mention the massive human rights violations produced under the Ayatollahs. As of this writing, waves of protest against the 2009 elections continue to be met with violent repression by the state.

Siam's political modernization began in 1932–the year after Haile Selassie offered Ethiopia its first Constitution–when the Thai military overthrew the king and announced a constitutional monarchy. In 1935 the king abdicated and his son, living abroad, became monarch in absentia for 15 years. The country's history thereafter involved a string of armed revolts, regicides, and politically motivated arrests, jailings, and murders. Through the 1960s, bureaucratic corruption and security force harassment provoked a reform movement that brought a new constitution and popular elections in 1968. After parliamentarians began attacking government corruption, General Thalom Kittikachorn dissolved the parliament. The General's putsch incited protests by University students in late 1973 culminating in a standoff with the military, who mowed them down with tanks and helicopters near the royal palace. The 1973 revolt brought an unstable period of democracy; the military came back after a bloody coup in 1976. Although parliamentary rule returned for the three decades following, military rule erupted in the early 1990s and again following a coup in 2006. Restored civilian government in 2007 promised stability, but nine months later massive protests provoked renewed violence and government crackdowns, igniting a crisis that persists. In April 2009 one knowledgeable observer wrote: "Over the past few years, Thailand's political elites have waged a battle on the streets of the capital using mobs to throw democratically elected governments out of power."

Lacking ancient lineage as a nation, the Afghan state dates from the coronation of an ambitious warrior, Ahmad Shah Durrani, as king in 1747. Even so, Afghanistan entered the modern world with characteristics similar to the three other states mentioned here. Known as "king of kings," Ahmad Shah–like Emperor Tewodros II–unified a number of contending fiefdoms in pursuit of a sacred mission, which included a jihad against a Hindu caste. His clan was ancestral to nearly all subsequent patrimonial Afghan rulers until 1978. The Afghans maintained independence against England and Russia, fighting three wars against the British over eighty years culminating in 1919. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution providing for a bicameral legislature composed one-third each by popular election, royal appointment, and provincial assembly selection. Zahir's "experiment in democracy" produced few lasting reforms; rather, the University he founded facilitated the growth of unofficial extremist parties on both the left and the right. Those extremist parties led first to the Marxist regime following a coup in 1978, and then the Taliban regime from 1991. There is no need to mention Afghanistan's current plight of unending civil wars and recent electoral embarrassment, of which President Jimmy Carter said: "Hamid Karzai has stolen the election. Now the question is whether he gets away with it."

In this comparative perspective, Ethiopia's painful lurches in the direction of democratization can be grasped more readily. She can boast a number of substantial achievements in the areas of political modernization, stability, and democratization, and this in the face of unprovoked military aggression from two of her neighbors. Despite severe setbacks following the National Election of May 2005, she has now a minimally functioning multi-party system, an elected Parliament, a fairly free press, and elites who have learned the importance of nonviolent politics and civil discourse. To be sure, the coalition of opposition parties have accused the government of continued harassment of their potential candidates; political leader Judge Bertukan Mideksa languishes in prison under what legal experts consider a charge fraught with ambiguities in the pertinent law; and allegations of severe human rights violations continue to appear. Even so, Ethiopia does have potentially transparent, official channels through which each of these issues can be addressed: the National Elections Board, and two exemplary institutions established by Proclamations No. 210 and 211–the National Commission on Human Rights and the Institution of the Ombudsman.
The major responsibility for seeing to it that 2010 becomes a resounding success rests with the EPRDF regime and the Parliament. The current regime can claim enormous achievements in the areas of infrastructure development, expansion of schools and medical services, and openness to Green Technology–the energy hope of the future. There is a level of freedom of expression in the country that has no parallel in Ethiopian history. The question is: can the regime find sufficient confidence in its achievements and their popular support to relax the defensive posture, driven by insecurity, that has marked their early years along with all national governments in Ethiopia since the time of Emperor Menilek?
Perhaps above all, at a time when mutual confidence-building is more crucial than ever, can the Government shift from reacting to criticism as treason, and take robust steps toward the kind of openness they claim they really want to facilitate? A few simple steps might convince critics of their intention.

1. Ensure that the National Election Board is independent, impartial, and professional and attends to such incidents as the shouting down of opposition speakers at the peaceful assembly in Adama.
2. Provide whatever assurances it takes to move forward, as the Prime Minister affirmed recently, to devise of a code of conduct designed to put an end to harassment if it exists, or to prevent it if it doesn't.
3. Appoint a committee of experts on constitutional law to consider the status of the law under which Judge Bertukan Mideksa was imprisoned again.

4. Activate, with serious energy and resources, the Office of Ombudsman.
5. Activate, with serious energy and resources, the National Commission on Human Rights.
A heavy responsibility also lies on the shoulders of the diverse opposition groups. A few simple steps might help the government relax and convince the public of their constructive attitude.

1. Reiterate their commitment to the importance of nonviolent politics and civil discourse.
2. Acknowledge publically their respect for the legitimacy of the current regime.
3. Focus effectively on issues and programs rather than grievances.
4. Attend to ways of building consensus rather than infighting
5. Express themselves honestly and courageously without recourse to anonymity.

As we approach the 50th anniversary of the disastrous initiative of the Neway brothers, this may be a propitious moment to stand back and appreciate how far Ethiopia has come today–in spite of the tragic events of 1960, 1974, 1991, 1998-2000, and 2005–and then to resolve to move Ethiopia forward in as constructive a manner as possible this time. It is time for EVERYONE to stop nursing grievances and extending blames, and to begin open, honest, searching discussions of issues which ought to concern Ethiopians of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints: poverty, food insecurity, energy, environment, women's rights, health, and quality of education.

Bertatun Yisten Le Addis Amet!

ANALYSIS - Ethiopian opposition impotent as elections loom

2009-11-03T15:13:00.000+01:00

By Barry Malone

Tuesday November 3, 2009

ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) - When Ethiopia's opposition leaders were freed from jail in 2007, the three most prominent were hailed by fanatical supporters as leaders-in-waiting for sub-Saharan Africa's second most populous nation.

Now, Birtukan Mideksa sits in a prison cell, Berhanu Nega is exiled in the United States, convicted in absentia of plotting a coup, and Hailu Shawel only recently re-appeared in public.

That leaves many Ethiopians wondering where a challenge to the almost 20-year-old government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi could come from when the country holds elections next May for the first time since a disputed 2005 poll ended in violence.

Despite accusations of a crackdown on dissent, diplomats in the capital say the West would be comfortable with Meles staying on -- as long as he remains a loyal ally in the volatile Horn of Africa and liberalises his potentially huge economy.

Secular Ethiopia is Washington's key supporter in the region and sent troops into neighbouring Somalia in 2006 to oust an Islamist group which had seized the capital.

"Most Western governments want Meles to continue because there is no alternative in the opposition," said one diplomat in Addis Ababa who did not want to be named.

"As long as the elections are semi-democratic, they'll probably stay quiet, keep giving aid, hope for liberalisation of the economy and leave full democracy for later," he said.

Foreign investors, who are showing interest in exporting commodities and exploring Ethiopia for probable oil and gas deposits, want stability, analysts say. If the opposition takes power, the future would be uncertain and investments delayed as foreign governments and lenders jostle for influence.

Rich nations are also hoping the government will relinquish control of its potentially lucrative telecommunications and banking industries in a nation of more than 80 million people.

OPPOSITION FIGURES JAILED

Eight opposition parties are trying to register as a coalition to contest the polls under the name Medrek, or the Forum, while retaining their own structures and leadership.

But most people in the country, and even some opposition leaders, agree that Meles' ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) will easily win in 2010.

The opposition says this is because candidates are routinely intimidated and jailed. The government says the opposition parties make the accusations because they know they have no chance of victory and want to discredit the poll.

"The EPRDF has done its best to weaken the opposition in view of the 2010 elections," Rene Lefort, an Ethiopia analyst, told Reuters. "Fear of repression is the main factor which refrains most opposition members from campaigning actively."

Birtukan, Berhanu and Hailu, leaders of a previous opposition coalition, were jailed in 2005 with other figures after they were convicted of inciting supporters to march on state buildings when the government declared victory.

About 200 protesters were killed by police and soldiers on the streets of the capital in that unrest.

Ethiopia has never had a peaceful transition of power. Meles himself took over in 1991 after a rebel group led by him and others overthrew a brutal communist regime.

GENUINE CAMPAIGN?

The opposition leaders were pardoned and released in 2007, along with some journalists and aid workers, on condition they take responsibility for the violence.

But Birtukan, a popular 36-year-old single mother, was jailed for life last December after denying she had accepted blame for the 2005 bloodshed. Authorities said that violated the terms of her pardon.

The government has said it will invite international election observers, most likely from the European Union, and last week agreed a "code of conduct" for next year's elections with three parliamentary opposition parties.

Medrek -- seen as the most significant threat to Meles -- refused to take part, demanding bilateral negotiations on issues they say were left out, including electoral board reform.

Diplomats in Addis Ababa are now trying to persuade the opposition coalition to sign the code of conduct deal.

Some ruling party members privately told Reuters they were frustrated a deal could not be agreed, and Birkutan released, so there could be a genuine campaign on Meles' achievements.

While some 13 million Ethiopians still rely on some form of foreign aid for survival, the government has reduced infant mortality and poverty rates and says the economy has been growing at an annual rate of more than 10 percent.

"I don't agree with jailing Birtukan," a senior EPRDF member, who did want to be named, told Reuters. "She's a strong opponent, but Meles is good for Ethiopia and I wanted us to debate openly and show the people our economic achievements."

(Editing by David Clarke)

Copyright © 2008 Reuters

What's the truth behind Ethiopia's "coup" plot?

2009-05-07T15:11:00.000+02:00

Barry Malone, Reuters

May 7, 2009

ADDIS ABABA (May 6) - A plot is defined as “a plan made in secret”, but even by the usual shadowy nature of such matters around Africa, the recent conspiracy to overthrow the Ethiopian government has been hard to see clearly.

The story broke two weeks ago when the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said 40 men had been arrested for planning a coup after police found guns, bombs and “written strategies” at their homes. But a few days later the government communication office was asking journalists not to use the word coup anymore. The “desperados”, they said, had planned to “overthrow” the government by using assassinations and bombings to create enough chaos to get supporters on the streets to topple the government.

The sensitivity surrounding the language and the details of what was actually going on highlight the caution that still exists in sub-Saharan Africa’s second most populous country after a disputed 2005 election ended with police and soldiers killing about 200 opposition street protesters who were marching on government buildings.

Understandably, many Ethiopians are sceptical that people would take to the streets again. And others question whether the will is still there to march against a government that most analysts consider the most effective the desperately poor nation Horn of Africa has ever had.

The suspected involvement of an Ethiopian-American university professor was a detail that caught the interest of the international media. Berhanu Nega, who called the accusation “baseless”, was elected mayor of Addis Ababa after the 2005 poll but was imprisoned along with about 100 other opposition members when the government accused them of orchestrating the street protests.

He was released in 2007 after a pardon deal and soon fled to America, where he teaches economics at Bucknell University in Philadelphia. Another leader released as part of that pardon, 36-year-old former judge Birtukan Mideksa, was rearrested last year after the government said she violated the terms of the pardon. She remains in prison.

Ethiopians love to talk politics in the bars and cafes of capital Addis Ababa — often in very hushed tones, which is perhaps a hangover from 17 years of brutally repressive communist rule that ended when the rebel group led by Meles came to power in 1991.

And the “coup” is now the subject of those whispered chats. Some say there was a real threat to the government that came from Berhanu and his allies in the sizeable and vocal diaspora. Some say there was dissent in the military and Berhanu simply provided a convenient excuse for the government to move against that in its early stages.

And one opposition leader even told me that the government may have invented the coup plot so it could arrest potential politicians ahead of national elections due in 2010.

“Without third party verification I can’t believe there was a plot,” said Bulcha Demeksa, leader of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement.

Amnesty International now says the government is arresting more people in secret.

This intriguing story will surely develop over the weeks to come as the Ethiopian government has said it is preparing evidence that will be presented before “an independent judiciary” and has promised the 40 accused will appear in an Addis Ababa court next week.

What sort of truth will emerge from the shadows?

BEYOND PIRACY: NEXT STEPS TO STABILIZE SOMALIA

2009-05-07T12:34:00.000+02:00

Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen

May 7, 2009

For the first time in a long time, Americans are paying attention to what their government does in Somalia. Following last month’s hostage drama off the coast of Somalia, President Barack Obama is under increasing political pressure to address the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. While short-term measures to curb pirate attacks are certainly necessary, the Obama administration must not allow the politics of the piracy problem to distract it from putting in place a long-term strategy to help Somalis forge a state that, with measured external support, can fight piracy, promote peace and reconciliation, and combat the threat of terrorism within its borders.

Historically, the international community’s engagement with Somalia has more often made matters worse for both Somalis and external actors. Rather than invest in the time-consuming and undoubtedly frustrating process of helping Somalis forge consensus and build functioning state institutions, the United States, the United Nations, and others have often backed governments based on narrow coalitions, or they have opted to partner with questionable nonstate actors in pursuit of near-term counterterrorism goals. This approach has frequently stoked further conflict and human rights abuses. Fourteen attempts in the past 19 years to reconstitute state authority in Somalia have failed, with ordinary Somalis bearing the brunt of these ill-advised, poorly executed, underresourced efforts. The latest effort—a five-year transition to democratic elections administered by a Transitional Federal Government, or TFG—nearly collapsed after two years of Ethiopian occupation and brutal counterinsurgency warfare. Ethiopia has now withdrawn, and a new, more broad-based TFG offers some hope, but the human rights crisis in Somalia remains acute and continues to deepen, the threat of Islamist extremism that the U.S.-backed incursion sought to neutralize persists, and piracy continues despite the deployment of a multinational armada.

Although the situation on the ground remains critical, we believe that the election of a new president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, and the establishment of a moderate Islamist government under his authority—“TFG version 2.0”—are potentially the best chance Somalia has had to pull itself out of nearly two decades of state collapse. For this effort to succeed, however, the Obama administration must resist calls for immediate, unilateral military action against terrorist and pirate targets on Somali soil and chart a new course in its approach to Somalia that privileges Somali-driven political processes, prioritizes inclusive governance, and respects Somali preferences. It not only needs to reshape U.S. policies toward Somalia, but must also press other external actors not to proceed with policies that are either flawed or intentionally destructive. This short paper describes the current state of international engagement with the TFG and offers recommendations for improvement.

Analysis: The current state of play
The establishment of a new TFG in January 2009 featuring a more broad-based coalition and moderate Islamist leadership is a significant step forward. That, along with the withdrawal of Ethiopian occupying forces in January, was a setback for the jihadist group al-shabaab, which had emerged as the strongest insurgency force against both Ethiopian forces and the TFG. The shabaab continues to control the largest swath of territory in southern Somalia, but it has been unable to exploit the vacuum left by the departing Ethiopians, and faces growing armed resistance from clan militias. While many Somalis were skeptical that the new TFG could succeed, they recognized that Sheikh Sharif and his newly formed government were more closely aligned with their long-term interests than the shabaab.
However, the TFG has thus far enjoyed only limited progress in establishing itself as a functional authority. Its main successes have been in negotiating alliances with clan militias and authorities—which have helped to block the shabaab—and developing a more accountable, transparent customs revenue collection system at the seaport, which has earned support from businesspeople and generated at least a modest flow of revenues to pay some TFG salaries. It is also reaching out to elements of the shabaab and other Islamist rejectionists in the hopes of broadening its coalition and weakening the jihadists. But the government’s civil service has yet to become functional, and crime and insecurity remain high. Armed groups which were supposed to be integrated into a joint security force continue to remain separate militias answering to separate commanders. Shabaab insurgents, whose numbers now include foreign fighters, continue to launch attacks on the African Union mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, protecting key government installations in the capital.

Meanwhile, one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters continues to unfold. Three and a half million Somalis need emergency assistance (nearly as many as in Darfur), and humanitarian access is terrible: Forty-nine aid workers have been killed in 2008 and 2009 and scores more kidnapped. The TFG is still, for the most part, a government on paper, and would face difficulty remaining in Mogadishu without the protection of AMISOM forces.

International actors have rhetorically committed to making the TFG work, and the U.N. Special Representative Ahmedou Ould Abdallah has been especially active in generating external support for the TFG. A major donor conference on Somalia was held on April 23 in Brussels, where these priority needs were discussed and donors pledged more than $200 million to support AMISOM and strengthen TFG security forces. The key question for policymakers is how to condition and monitor the dispersal of those funds. In a report from the U.N. secretary general to the Security Council this week, the United Nations emphasized the need for strong donor support to the TFG, especially in the security sector. This is a priority shared by the TFG leadership. The United Nations is specifically calling for the international community to provide funding for training and equipping the TFG police and security forces, and for stipends for 10,000 police officers.

Significantly, the secretary general’s report does not recommend replacing the 4,000-strong AMISOM force with a 23,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping operation. A proposed U.N. force has been on the table for well over a year, but although the proposal had strong backing from the Bush administration, the Obama administration’s support has been lukewarm, and rightly so. The United Nations itself concluded that such a force would be counterproductive at this time, by catalyzing armed insurgents and thereby endangering rather than protecting the TFG. The TFG’s security against the shabaab will have to come largely from its own capacity to recruit and maintain the loyalty of its own security forces, albeit with generous external financial backing.

Establishing security: Challenges and policy implications
The immediate policy dilemma for international donors is one of sequencing: Must a security force first create conditions in which a civil government can survive and operate? Or must government authorities first establish a capacity to control security forces? Some may see a preference for checks and balances—and constraints on government security forces—as a normative agenda for human rights groups. But in Somalia it is also a cold realist calculation—abusive security forces will undermine, not protect, the TFG. And as in 2007 and 2008, such forces will strengthen public support for the shabaab and other opposition and extremist groups.
The international community has already had one calamitous experience providing direct salary support to the TFG police in 2007 and 2008, when the government was under different leadership. The TFG police under then-President Abdullahi Yusuf committed grave human rights abuses against the Mogadishu population. The police commissioner during this period, Abdi Qeybdid, is still in place despite a track record of abusive behavior, lack of confidence among ordinary Somalis, and protests by human rights groups. Moreover, key branches of the transitional government—the judiciary, the interior ministry, and others—that are supposed to exercise oversight of police and other security forces are not yet functional. What the United Nations and some donors are proposing, then, is the strengthening of security forces in a context where the new government appears to lack the ability to hold them accountable. The U.N. secretary general’s report is clear on this, identifying its strategic objective as “to assist the TFG in creating security conditions in which the process of building the country’s state institutions can take root.”
The good news is that the TFG has made some progress on its own, and the international community may finally have a more credible partner than the previous TFG or its predecessors. A bank account has been established in Djibouti and an interdepartmental financial oversight body has been established to monitor the use of funds. Revenues from the port are reportedly now flowing to the central government, and although corruption has not been eliminated, it has been reduced. From these funds, the TFG announced this month that it had begun to pay salaries to its security forces. The key challenges for the United States and other external actors in the immediate term are help to ensure that the TFG continues to pay its security forces, provides training and nonlethal equipment conditioned on their improved conduct, and establishes oversight mechanisms to ensure that funding does not support abusive forces or political score-settling.

This daunting task is further complicated by the diversity of security threats facing the TFG, which include the following:

Insurgency by the shabaab and other radical groups
The shabaab and other Islamic extremist movements in Somalia are an existential threat to the TFG and a major security concern for neighboring states and the West. As noted above, these extremist groups have lost much of their credibility in Somali circles now that Ethiopian occupying forces have withdrawn and the old TFG leadership has been replaced with new, moderate Islamist leaders. A portion of the shabaab—some argue most of the movement—are not ideologically committed hardliners, but rather tactical allies who could be negotiated with and brought into an expanding TFG power-sharing circle. If this group can be successfully weaned from the shabaab through negotiations, it would leave the recalcitrant hardliners exposed and weakened, and easier to defeat outright.

This is the two-pronged approach that President Sharif and his supporters are seeking to employ, and the TFG has reportedly already enjoyed some successes in pulling some armed groups away from the insurgency. The most important contribution the international community can make to this effort is to protect and expand political space for Sharif to negotiate—even with individuals who might raise eyebrows in some corners. Ethiopia’s security concerns are especially important to address in this regard. The United States and its allies must avoid the temptation to arbitrarily “redline” individuals and groups to whom Sharif will attempt to reach out. The acceptability of Somali armed opposition groups should be judged principally on their positions on a few core positions: Do they accept peaceful coexistence with their neighbors, especially Ethiopia? Do they reject affiliation and alliance with Al Qaeda? Do they renounce terrorist attacks and assassinations against domestic rivals and foreigners?

Even as it negotiates with part of the insurgency, the TFG will unavoidably have to fight to defeat the most hardline, foreign-backed wing of the shabaab. Direct external aid to TFG security forces is seen by many as unavoidable if the TFG is to defeat the hardliners and expand its authority in south and central Somalia, and the United Nations has asked donors to provide training, equipment, and stipends to the emerging TFG security forces. However, this places the United Nations and other external actors again in the position of a direct backer of one party in an ongoing civil war, a fact which contributes significantly to the targeting of international humanitarian aid workers by insurgents. External donors must be very clear about what they are doing if providing direct support to national security forces: They are choosing sides in a war.

Fragmentation of ad hoc militia
The TFG has forged alliances and understandings with a range of local, mainly clan-based militias that have resisted the shabaab encroachment but that remain outside the TFG military. Bringing these groups into the formal TFG national security forces is a high priority, as they otherwise are vulnerable to defection to opposition groups and pose a potential armed obstacle to extension of TFG authority. To maintain these fragile alliances the TFG primarily needs cash to provide regular salaries. This should mainly be the responsibility of the TFG, not external donors. External donors should ensure that their funding does not provide salary support for clan paramilitaries, which are largely unaccountable.

Criminal violence and lack of public order
Reducing criminality and establishing public order is a critical matter of legitimacy and credibility for the TFG in the eyes of the Somali public, and it is the principal yardstick that Somalis will use to assess the TFG’s performance. A more effective police force is a necessary first step. The international community already has established police support, and is likely to provide stipends as well, but the burden rests with the TFG to ensure that the police are a source of order and not predation. Under the old TFG, the police were a menace to the public. Until Police Commissioner Abdi Qeybdid is removed from office, it is not clear that citizens of Mogadishu will have any confidence in the police force. International donors must press hard for accountability in the ranks of the Somali police as a precondition for aid.

The TFG is likely to relax rules on the operation of private security forces employed by businesses, which in the past have been important sources of security for neighborhoods adjacent to the business compounds. Additionally, the TFG may opt to encourage the re-establishment of nonradical, local Islamic courts, which were the foundation for the dramatic improvements in security under the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Under the courts’ brief rule, Somalis were willing to trade some of their personal freedoms for greater security. Donor states can play a constructive role by protecting political space for Sheikh Sharif and his government to pursue this option if they so choose, rather than reacting in alarm at the prospect of courts based on sharia law. At the same time, donors can support Somali-driven efforts to reduce the incompatibilities of sharia court proceedings and rulings with international judicial and human rights standards.

Piracy
The lowest order of threat to the TFG, the Somali people, the region, and the United States is actually the security item enjoying the greatest attention right now—piracy. Even so, the continued epidemic of piracy off the Somali coast is a problem and a test of the capacity of the TFG to extend its authority. Proposals to provide external assistance to the TFG for the establishment of a coast guard are premature, do not reflect the security priorities of the Somali people, and are unlikely to work. Indeed, training up coast guard officers could easily produce unintended consequences, as that new skill set will be more valuable in the piracy sector than in the public sector, producing defections from the coast guard. A more appropriate approach for the TFG will be to tackle piracy onshore. That will require time, funds, and extensive negotiations. External actors will have only limited roles to play in this internal Somali process.

Antipiracy measures would attract much greater support among Somalis if those efforts were accompanied by international action to end illegal fishing off Somalia’s coast. Like the shabaab during the Ethiopian occupation, pirates have managed to cloak their criminal agenda beneath a veil of Somali nationalism. Although illegal fishing has undoubtedly decreased due to the effectiveness of Somali pirates, international commercial fishing boats have for years violated Somalia’s territorial integrity and severely disrupted local Somali livelihoods.

Upending the status quo: Next steps for the Obama administration
Given the significant national security interests that the United States has in Somalia with respect to counterterrorism, and the international political and commercial pressure generated due to piracy, the Obama administration should more deeply engage in Somalia’s state reconstruction. The United States should appoint a senior diplomat along with a small diplomatic team to work with the U.N. mediation team. The American officials can provide focused, low-key support to this process of state reconstruction through the TFG. If this support is too visible or forceful, it will undermine President Sharif’s efforts to reach out to disaffected clans and constituencies. In this space, the United States should work within the already established International Contact Group to maintain the focus on the transition and help ensure that President Sharif does not embark on a failed attempt at empire-building like so many before him.

The immediate priorities and recommendations for the United States should be the following:

1. Improve security: Support locally owned efforts to improve security and public order and reduce the threat posed by armed insurgents.
Somalia’s most urgent need is unquestionably improved security. There are multiple security threats in Somalia, each of which requires a distinct response. Some security threats in the country are amenable to carefully calibrated external support—others are not. In all cases, local ownership of security policies is essential if those responses are to be sustainable, effective, and viewed in the eyes of local communities as legitimate. External aid is important, but it must not be allowed to overtake local responsibility to finance essential security operations. Moreover, direct support to the Transitional Security Forces must be conditioned on increasing inclusiveness of the TFG and effective steps to curb human rights abuses, including a commitment to investigate allegations of abuse and removal of officials implicated in serious abuses. The United States and other donors should establish oversight mechanisms under the auspices of the Joint Security Committee and AMISOM and must be prepared to halt funding if, as was the case last year, TFG forces engage in widespread human rights violations and other forms of criminal behavior.

2. End impunity: Support Somali efforts to seek justice for war crimes and end a culture of impunity.
The Ethiopian intervention in late 2006 calcified a brutal insurgency that in turn provoked a heavy-handed and vicious counterinsurgency campaign. Without fear of punishment, all sides committed atrocities against civilians. Continued impunity is an affront to the victims and fuel for further conflict. A necessary first step is a credible investigation of crimes committed. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States should call for a U.N. Commission of Inquiry to investigate and document war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ultimately the question of how to hold perpetrators accountable must be answered by Somalis themselves, but a credible external investigation must occur to begin the process.

3. Focus on the transition and governance: Help President Sharif refocus on transitional tasks and improve governance in order to enlarge participation in the political process and defuse armed opposition as Somalia prepares for possible elections in 2011.

Under former President Abdullahi Yusuf, the TFG ignored the “T” (transition). Yusuf and his allies (including the Ethiopians) sought to destroy their enemies without building functioning Somali institutions or advancing key transitional tasks. The success of the transition now depends on whether President Sharif can establish credible, inclusive, and consultative national commissions to complete the transition.

As with transitional governments in other settings, the TFG will face complex problems related to constitutional choices on systems of representation, central and local government division of labor, checks and balances, and many other matters that will have a powerful impact on the question of “who rules” in Somalia in the future. It will also face daunting technical challenges with regard to other key transitional tasks, especially those related to the work of the electoral commission. Here the outside world has considerable experience and expertise that can be offered to Somali representatives. Again, donors must be careful not to erode Somali ownership of decision making on these matters by overloading the transitional process with outside consultants and preset templates that may not fit in a Somali political setting.

4. Manage external spoilers: Somalia is a theater for regional meddling and proxy conflict, and the United States must seek to end cross-border adventurism and neutralize sources of support for groups inside Somalia seeking to undermine the peace process.

Eritrea, Libya, Qatar, and Iran, among others, are actively supporting groups that oppose the TFG, and the Obama administration should construct a diplomatic strategy to erode that support. The Security Council has already authorized sanctions against individuals and groups that obstruct the peace process, and as an immediate first step the United States should work with other members of the Security Council to build consensus for sanctions against those individuals and groups identified by the U.N. group of experts to be implemented if they become spoilers to the peace process.
Ethiopia’s cautious support for Sheikh Sharif is promising, but there will be great temptation for Ethiopia to intervene again if the shabaab and other extremist elements make further gains, or if the TFG’s outreach to the opposition includes figures Ethiopia deems unacceptable. Renewed Ethiopian military activities in Somalia would undermine and likely collapse the TFG and fuel the insurgency. Simmering tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to destabilize the subregion and undermine Somalis’ state-building efforts. The United States should resume serious efforts to fully implement the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal, demarcate the Ethiopia/Eritrea border, and normalize relations between the two countries. Without a resolution of the Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, Somalia is likely to remain a site of ongoing proxy war between the two.

Conclusion
Somalia has become the poster child for transnational threats emanating from Africa. By sea, pirates much more dangerous than their predecessors from centuries past prowl the Indian Ocean and Red Sea waterways and make tens of millions of dollars in ransom. By land, extremist militias connected to Al Qaeda units ensure that Somalia remains anarchic and the only country in the world without a functioning central government.
In fighting terrorism on land and piracy at sea, U.S. national security interests will be better secured if we aligned ourselves more with the interest of most Somalis in better security and effective governance. Helping to build the house and using the back door will be much more effective than barging into the front door of a house that has yet to be built.

Ethiopia: On Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Pardon

2009-05-06T16:06:00.003+02:00

Alemayehu Fentaw

Dear Reader: This article is a revised version of the one first published in Sudan Tribune on 10 April 2009. By the way, I was not able to post anything on my website for the past five or so months, as all blogs along with a few targeted Diaspora websites were blocked in Ethiopia. I really appreciate the measure taken by the government to unblock all of the websites without any discrimination based on their content. This is a step in the right direction if the government cares to respect in deed the freedom of expression that its constitution upholds in words.

Revocation of the pardon granted to Ms. Birtukan Mideksa has been a subject of bitter debate recently between those who admonish it as unlawful and retrograde, on the one hand and those who approve of it as not only lawful, but also as a measure that advances the causes of justice and rule of law, on the other. The government news agency, quoting the Ministry of Justice said the pardon had been revoked since she had denied requesting her pardon. Of course, Ms. Birtukan’s trouble started when she spoke to her supporters in Sweden about the process of negotiation which had taken place between the opposition leaders and government, mediated by a “council of elders” led by Prof. Ephraim Isaac, before their pardon was granted. The government seems to prefer to lay emphasis on a petition signed by the prisoners, admitting guilt collectively and individually for the crime they had committed and asking for pardon, which implies that their release was part of the normal legal procedure of pardon, rather than part of a negotiated political deal.

The revocation strikes me as not only ridiculous but idiotic. To assume that this affair is “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” of political substance and that the solution to this madness is simply revocation and re-incarceration of the woman is to entirely misread the problem.

My aim here is neither to engage in partisan politicking nor in high-profile philosophical and legal discourse, but to point out the serious flaws and irregularities observed in the whole process, from grant to revocation, of the pardon with a view to making out a case for quick amends as an academic lawyer as well as peace and human rights activist.

I. Forgiveness: A Philosophical Aporia?
Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential and prolific contemporary philosopher, raises a compelling question as to whether or not to forgive somebody who has caused us significant suffering or pain. For Derrida, the crux of the matter consists in the proposition that if one forgives something that is actually forgivable, then one simply engages in a calculative reasoning and hence does not really forgive. Derrida contends that according to its own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the impossible: that is, the forgiving of an ‘unforgivable’ transgression. There is hence a sense in which forgiving must be ‘unconscious’ and it must remain outside of political and juridical rationality. This unconditional ‘forgiveness’ explicitly precludes the necessity of an apology or repentance by the guilty party, although Derrida acknowledges that this pure notion of forgiveness must always exist in tension with a more conditional forgiveness where apologies are actually demanded. However, he argues that this conditional forgiveness amounts more to pardon and reconciliation than to genuine forgiveness.

The paradox of forgiveness depends upon a radical disjunction between self and other. Derrida explicitly states that “genuine forgiveness must engage two singularities: the guilty and the victim. As soon as a third party intervenes, one can again speak of amnesty, reconciliation, reparation, etc., but certainly not of forgiveness in the strict sense”. Given that he also acknowledges that it is difficult to conceive of any such face-to-face encounter without a third-party – as language itself must play such a mediating role – forgiveness is caught in an aporia that ensures its empirical actuality appears to be decidedly unlikely. To recap, the reason why Derrida’s notion of forgiveness is caught in such an inextricable paradox is because absolute forgiveness requires a radically singular confrontation between self and other, while conditional forgiveness requires the breaching of categories such as self and other, either by a mediator, or simply by the recognition of the ways in which we are always already intertwined with the other. Indeed Derrida argues that when we know anything of the other, or even understand their motivation in however minimal a way, this absolute forgiveness can no longer take place. Derrida can offer no resolution in regard to the impasse that obtains between these two notions (between possible and impossible forgiving, between a pardon where apologies are asked for and a more absolute forgiveness). He will only insist that an oscillation between both sides of the aporia is necessary for responsibility.

The upshot of this all is that to punish is the easiest thing to do for the powers that be. Even if the human impossibility of absolute forgiveness cannot be denied, it is still possible to forgive in various forms. Derrida helps us appreciate the limits set by human nature. What is so attractive to society and government in punishment? Nietzsche understood the way punishment is “over determined by utilities of every sort” and survives now under this, now under that interpretation of its purposes – because the desire to punish (and thereby subordinate, coerce, transform) other persons is so deeply rooted in human nature.

II. Reconciliation: A Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanism
In what might be called a major departure from the received constitutional tradition of the country, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides the framework for the independent validity of non-state or unofficial laws such as customary and religious laws in some fields of social activity. Both formal and informal legal pluralism are discernible in Ethiopia. According to Andre Hoekema formal pluralism “is a legal concept referring to the inclusion within the legal order of a principle of recognizing ‘other’ law.” Article 34 (5) of the federal constitution provides that ”This constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious and customary law, with the consent of the parties to the dispute. Particulars shall be determined by law.” Article 78(5) also stipulates, “Pursuant to sub-article (5) of Article 34, the House of Peoples’ Representatives and State Councils can establish or give official recognition to religious and customary courts that had state recognition and functioned prior to the adoption of the constitution shall be organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by this constitution.”

As can be gleaned from the above-cited constitutional provisions, formal legal pluralism under Ethiopia’s new constitutional order is confined to certain matters: only personal status and family law. The state legal system, however, carried on to monopolize competence over criminal matters. Only family and personal law have been singled out for recognition. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the existence and active role of customary criminal courts, which are by far the most important institutions of dispute settlement as some researches indicate. With respect to family matters, there is a dual family law system: the state recognizes official and non- official forums. The official forums consist of courts that are organized in a hierarchical order: the Regional/Federal First Instance Courts, the Regional/Federal High Court and the Regional/Federal Supreme Court in that order of superiority. To name but a few of the nonofficial forums in Ethiopia: the Shemagelle (Council Elders) and the Family Council (Yebetezemed Gubae) in Tigray and Amhara, the Luba Basa in Oromia, the Xeer in Somalia, the Shari’a courts, and the Church tribunals. In addition, the choice whether to take a dispute to regular state courts or to one of those non-official forums is entirely left to the parties.

However, it is this self-same traditional method of conflict resolution, which is commonly used to resolve family and personal law matters, that has been extended to such high stakes political dispute. Orly Halpern, [correspondent] of the Christian Science Monitor, in an article entitled “In Ethiopia, elders dissolve a crisis in a traditional way” told the story of a Harvard-educated Ethiopian scholar Ephraim Isaac who helped resolve his country’s two-year political crisis using a traditional peacemaking method. In the words of Halpern, “It was a deadlock that no amount of outside pressure seemed able to loosen, and the life sentences threatened to escalate the crisis. So it was clear to Mr. Isaac that his people needed a strong dose of traditional peacemaking methods. He led a nonpartisan Ethiopian “council of elders” that quickly negotiated a deal acceptable to both sides: clemency in exchange for admission of guilt and promise to respect the rule of law.”

III. Pardon: A Legal or Extra-Legal Procedure?
Black’s Law Dictionary defines pardon as “the act or instance of nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime.” It further distinguishes between full pardon (aka, absolute or unconditional) and conditional pardon. It defines full pardon as “a pardon that releases the wrongdoer from punishment and restores the offender’s civil rights without qualification.” Article 71(7) of the FDRE Constitution confers on the President the power to grant pardon in accordance with conditions and procedures established by law. Under the Procedure of Pardon Proclamation No. 395/2004, the President’s pardon power extends only to federal crimes. All requests for pardon for federal offences are directed to the Board of Pardon for investigation. The Board of Pardon prepares and submits its recommendations to the President for final disposition of each application. As per Article 4(1) of the Proclamation, The Board has the power to “submit to the President recommendations that the penalty be remitted conditionally or unconditionally, in whole or in part, or that the penalty be of a lesser nature or gravity, or that the penalty be confirmed when it is found unpardonable after examining applications for pardon made pursuant to relevant law.” Therefore, Presidential pardon may take several forms, including full pardon, conditional pardon, partial pardon, commutation (reduction) of penalty, remission of fine or restitution, and reprieve.

In my opinion, the entire process of granting and revoking Ms. Mideksa’s pardon was wrought with numerous major defects from a strictly legal point of view. First, lack of vested interest or standing on part of the party that initiated and eventually submitted the petition to the Board of Pardon. In other words, the pardon was not pleaded by the real party in interest. It was mediated by the council of elders, signed by the convicts, and transmitted to the Board of Pardon by the Prime Minister. Pursuant to Article 12 (1) of the Procedure of Pardon Proclamation, the only persons who have standing to plead pardon on behalf of a convicted and sentenced person include own spouse, close relatives, representative or lawyer. Second, the application for pardon was signed before final judgment was entered contrary to an explicit provision of the Procedure of Pardon Proclamation. Third, the mediation (shuttle diplomacy) that had taken by the “council of elders” has no place in the normal pardon procedure. Fourth, default on part of the Board of Pardon to serve a written notice on the pardoned as per Article 17(1). Fifth, default to respect the twenty days’ period, as she could have availed herself of the opportunity to write her reply to the satisfaction of the Board of Pardon (Art. 17(2). Sixth, confusing criminal liability for civil liability (one pillar of Criminal Law is the principle of individualization of criminal responsibility), which is unbecoming of an academic lawyer was the mark of the petition for pardon as well as the certificate of pardon, as in both of these documents the petitioners purport to admit being guilty collectively and individually of the wrongs that they had committed. “Joint and several liability” is a concept unheard of in criminal law.

Seventh, a full pardon cannot be revoked once granted and accepted by the grantee unless it is found out that it was obtained through fraud. Even when a pardon is alleged to have been obtained fraudulently, there’s no way to revoke it without tendering a written notice and before the expiry of the twenty days’ period.

Eighth, the various government organs themselves did not seem to be clear with their respective competences. Recall official statements issued by the Federal Police, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the President. The different organs made different releases explaining the reasons for the revocation. One said the pardon was revoked as it was obtained through fraud whilst the other alleged that the pardoned failed to comply with one of the conditions under which the pardon was granted. This ambiguity heightens the suspicion that partisan utilitarian considerations have taken precedence over legal considerations of the common good. While one official statement would seem to have based the revocation on grounds of fraud or deceit by virtue of Article 16 (2) while the other bases the decision of revocation on grounds of non-compliance with conditions for granting the pardon in accordance with Sub-Article (3) of the same. How can the executive allude to two different causes of revocation alternatively?

Finally, the manner in which the woman was arrested might have been unlawful provided that the arresting officers did not have an arrest warrant. Besides, to re-incarcerate her before a decision to revoke her pardon under sections (2) or (3) of Article 17 has been taken by the Board after proper investigation of the allegation, with due regard to her written reply is a clear violation of the provision under Sub-Art (4) of the same.

In conclusion, the object and purpose of the FDRE Criminal Code, under its Article 1, is “to ensure order, peace and the security the State, its' peoples, and inhabitants for the public good.” Also, in the words of Article 11 of the Procedure of Pardon Proclamation, “the main purpose of granting pardon is to ensure the welfare and interest of the public”. Therefore, what has been done in the interest of public order, peace and security cannot be undone at least without good enough reason.

For me the release of the 38 political prisoners cannot be an outcome of a traditional peacemaking process (a reconciliation mediated by a “council of elders”) and a normal procedure of pardon simultaneously. I believe that the government allowed the “council of elders” to get involved and settle the dispute in a traditional way in good faith and the right thing to do for the executive organ at the time when they reached agreement with the prisoners was to order the Minister of Justice to withdraw charges against them in his capacity as the Attorney General in pursuance of Article 42(1) (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which reads “the public prosecutor is instructed not to institute proceedings in the public interest by the Minister by order under his hand.” This was not done, maybe because the Prime Minister was too intelligent to be advised by the then Minister of Justice and Attorney General, who is also chief legal advisor, ex officio, of the Federal government on how to proceed with the matter. Or perhaps, the Prime Minister wanted to see the detainees convicted so that he can use it as a political scorecard against them whenever he finds it important. Or, the PM has acted in the manner he did in order to expedite the rather protracted normal legal procedure. Whatever might have been the case, to leave the single mother behind bars will not do any good to the democratization process in Ethiopia, nor will any party emerge victorious by playing the same foul game.

Family of Ethiopia 'plotters' arrested too: Amnesty

2009-05-06T12:57:00.001+02:00

By Barry Malone

ADDIS ABABA, May 6 (Reuters) - Relatives of a group accused of plotting to overthrow the Ethiopian government have been unfairly arrested by association in the Horn of Africa country, a rights group says.

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's government said last month a group led by an Ethiopian-American professor had planned to use assassinations and bombings to provoke street protests and topple the government.

Addis Ababa says it arrested 40 former and current army personnel and members of a disbanded opposition group from a "terror network" it said was formed by Berhanu Nega, an opposition leader now teaching economics in the United States.

"Several may have been detained solely for their family ties to men who have expressed political opposition to the government," said Michelle Kagari of Amnesty International in a statement late on Tuesday.

"They should be released immediately."

The arrests represent the biggest roundup of opposition figures in Ethiopia since more than 100 opposition members were imprisoned after a disputed 2005 election.

They were released in a 2007 pardon deal but Birtukan Mideksa, the leader of the Unity for Democracy and Justice party, was rearrested last year after the government said she violated the terms of her pardon.

Amnesty say she is a "prisoner of conscience" and should be released.
The rights group also demanded those detained be named and said one -- the 80-year-old father of a London-based opposition leader -- was in urgent need of medical care.

Opposition parties routinely accuse the government of harassment and say their candidates were intimidated during local elections in April of last year.

The government denies that.

Ethiopia will hold national elections in June 2010 and opposition leaders have said the arrests are an attempt to jail potential candidates ahead of that poll.

The Ethiopian government's head of information, Bereket Simon, told Reuters that nobody would be arrested for being related to someone opposed to the government.

"Evidence is being prepared and will be considered by an independent judiciary," he said.

The accused are due to appear in court on May 11th. (Editing by Jon Hemming)

Ethiopia opposition says anti-govt plot invented

2009-05-05T11:57:00.000+02:00

By Barry Malone | May 6, 2009

ADDIS ABABA, May 5 (Reuters) - An Ethiopian opposition leader said on Tuesday an anti-government plot had been invented as an excuse to arrest potential candidates ahead of national elections next year.

"Without third party verification I can't believe there was a plot," Bulcha Demeksa, leader of one of the largest opposition parties, the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, told Reuters.

"This government is just looking for an excuse to imprison potential politicians."

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's government said last month a group led by an Ethiopian-American professor had planned to use assassinations and bombings to provoke street protests and topple the government.

Addis Ababa arrested 40 former and current army personnel and members of a disbanded opposition group from a "terror network" it said was formed by Berhanu Nega, an opposition leader now teaching economics in the United States.

The Bucknell University lecturer, who has publicly said he wants to overthrow the Ethiopian government, has called the accusations "baseless".

"When Berhanu says he wants to overthrow the government, it is just words," said Bulcha.

"He couldn't have organised these people from the U.S."

Former Ethiopian president Negaso Gidada, now an independent member of parliament, also told Reuters he doubted Berhanu's involvement, but said the government was using the alleged plot to root out dissenters in its military.

"There is no democracy in Ethiopia," added Negaso, citing recent legislation governing the activities of charities and the media that rights groups have condemned as repressive.

COURT PROCESS

The Ethiopian government's head of information, Bereket Simon, told Reuters that evidence was being prepared and the accused would appear in court on May 11.

"Nobody has any right to prejudge the evidence and undermine the rule of law," he said.

Opposition parties routinely accuse the government of harassment and say their candidates were intimidated during local elections in April of last year.

The government denies that.

Another opposition leader, Birtukan Mideksa, a former judge who heads the Unity for Democracy and Justice party, has been in solitary confinement since December.

She was jailed after a disputed 2005 poll, with Berhanu and other opposition leaders, when the government accused them of instigating riots in Addis Ababa in an attempt to take power.

About 200 opposition protesters were killed by soldiers and police in violence that followed.

Mideksa and Berhanu were released in a 2007 pardon, but she was re-arrested last year after the government said she had violated the terms of the pardon.

Meles was hailed as part of a new generation of African leaders in the 1990s, but rights groups have increasingly criticised the rebel-turned-leader for cracking down on opposition in sub-Saharan Africa's second most populous nation.

The party that wins next June's parliamentary election will pick the prime minister. Meles is expected to win comfortably.

Ethiopia's political climate is closely watched by foreign investors showing increasing interest in agriculture, horticulture and real estate prospects.

The nation's economic progress has been hampered of late by high inflation and a fall in foreign exchange inflows.

The country is one of the world's poorest, ranked 170 out of 177 on the United Nations Human Development Index, and one of the largest recipients of international aid.

"Humanitarian aid should be continued, but development assistance should be conditional on a country being democratic," said Bulcha. "How can you imprison and kill your people and have the world treat you like a democracy?" (Editing by Andrew Cawthorne)

Ethiopia's biggest pop star jailed for hit-and-run

2008-12-05T07:24:00.000+01:00

Fri 5 Dec 2008, 14:43 GMT
[-] Text [+]

By Barry Malone

ADDIS ABABA, Dec 5 (Reuters Life!) - Ethiopia's best-known pop star, Teddy Afro, was sentenced to six years in jail on Friday for killing a homeless man when driving his BMW in the capital Addis Ababa.

The 31-year-old singer, whose real name is Tewodros Kassahun, was found guilty of manslaughter earlier this week for the death of 18-year-old Degu Yibelte in a hit-and-run incident late last year.

Afro denied the charge and said he was out with friends on the night the man died.

Many Ethiopians believe the charges were politically motivated. Last month's Great Ethiopian Run -- a road race for more than 30,000 people through the capital -- was marked by constant shouts from the crowd of "Free Teddy".

The singer is hugely popular among young Ethiopians and sings mainly in the local Amharic language. Hundreds protested outside the court when Afro's trial began in April -- an unusual event in a country where dissent is extremely rare.

Afro's last album, Yasteseryal (Redemption), coincided with Ethiopia's 2005 election that led to violent protests and the jailing of opposition leaders.

Some of his lyrics were construed as critical of the government and his songs were used as protest anthems by opposition supporters who took to the streets.

"This court will not hand out a sentence based on a vendetta but based on fairness and justice," Judge Leul Gebremariam said before sending Afro to jail and fining him $1,800.

On streets nearby young Ethiopians gathered in small groups to discuss the sentencing.

"All Ethiopians will be sad today," said Mikias Sisay, a 23-year-old student. "Many people have accidents but are not sent to prison like this. It is because of politics."

A defiant Afro -- wearing his trademark black sunglasses -- raised one finger in the air to a smattering of applause from friends and family when he walked from the courtroom.

"I feel free," he said to reporters as he was led away by police.

(Editing by David Clarke and Michael Roddy)

Ethiopia: A feast for the eyes

2008-11-22T23:23:00.000+01:00

By Nik Quaife
Independent
Saturday November 22 2008

Announcing a holiday to Ethiopia is likely to be met with the following response: "But will you be able to eat?" Everyone, it seems, thinks that they know Ethiopia. The famine of 1984 and planet-wide publicity of Live Aid portrayed this troubled African state as an immense, muck-brown desert filled with flies and starving children. The bleak pictures broadcast on TV effectively destroyed it as a tourist destination.

Yes, Ethiopia is a poor country -- one of the world's poorest -- and food distribution problems persist, but there is, nonetheless, much to enjoy there. The country's ancient monuments, burial chambers and religious history rival Egypt's, and the surprisingly green and fertile landscapes feed a plethora of wildlife, from baboons to zebra.

Ethiopia will surprise even the most jaded traveller. As the only African country never colonised (the Italians only 'occupied' what was then Abyssinia during the Second World War), Ethiopians proudly call themselves 'pure' Africans. With its own calendar (seven years and eight months behind our own), year length (13 months), clock (12-hour cycles starting at 6am), and an ancient language -- Amarhic -- not spoken anywhere else, Ethiopia and its people are strikingly idiosyncratic.

Bigger than France and Germany combined, it is Africa's second-largest country after Nigeria. Its high mountain ranges and altitude have earned it the nickname 'Switzerland of Africa'; a fitting description given that the capital, Addis Ababa, has the highest concentration of embassies after Geneva and New York, and is headquarters to the 53-member African Union. The high dose of diplomacy might explain Ethiopians' openness, tolerance of hardship and eagerness to help.

With none of the chaos of Cairo or nuisances of Nairobi, Addis is, by African standards, a safe and cordial city. You can put in hours people-watching: young girls wearing the modest national garb of white cotton shawls, stooped in day-long prayer outside the city's numerous Orthodox Christian churches; rows of barefooted shoe-shiners perched underneath newly-constructed cement buildings, which are held up by fragile scaffolding made from eucalyptus trees; traditional dancers in white robes hissing through clenched teeth and rhythmically jerking their shoulders to the asymmetrical beats of the national folk dance in tourist bars with corrugated roofs.

Other sights in the capital include the National Museum of Ethiopia, home to the world's oldest hominid skeleton -- the fascinating 3.3 million-year-old 'Lucy' -- and hiking the eucalyptus-clad slopes of nearby Mount Entoto to visit the former palace of Emperor Menelik and Empress Taitu.

However, you're unlikely to fly seven hours to Ethiopia and only stay in Addis. After a few days in the capital acclimatising both to Africa and the lack of oxygen (the 2,000m-plus altitude that awards Ethiopia more than its fair share of Olympic medal-winning marathon runners can seriously challenge the used-to-sea-level Irish), you'll want to head north on the historical route -- a 600km must-see circuit which many consider to be the real highlight of Ethiopia.

The route starts a little under an hour's flight north from Addis at the jacaranda-lined, Mediterranean-like town of Bahir Dar. The lakeside vistas and colourful palm-lined avenues of this tourist-friendly town are a good base from which to explore the nearby Blue Nile Falls. Often compared to the better-known Victoria Falls, these gushing waters, more than 45m high, are as far from the images of drought-and-desert, Live Aid Ethiopia as you can get. The falls are the source of the great river Nile, which flows east from here, nourishing Ethiopia's green and plant-rich Rift Valley before crossing into Sudan, where it joins the White Nile and heads north to Cairo. The Falls are fed from the nearby circular-shaped Lake Tana, Ethiopia's largest lake and home to dozens of islands, peppered with centuries-old monasteries where monks study and pray.

There is an incredible serenity here, watching the tankwas (papyrus boats) ferry firewood across the sticky water to churches; an ideal location for an afternoon's contemplation beneath the flotillas of white flamingos and pelicans.

Leaving Bahir Dar, heading north to the impressive former capital city of Gonder, you'll pass small market towns with grass-roof huts, where barefoot goat farmers wearing the sh'ma -- a white shawl -- sell mangoes, papaya and coke (a fig-like fruit) to villagers, who shelter from the equatorial sun under handmade parasols. The city's piazza, Royal Enclosure and stone palaces are solid and impressive and would not look out of place in post-Renaissance Italy.

Gonder is the gateway to the dramatic Simien Mountains, where the landscape starts to resemble a giant chess game with bishops' mitres, queens' crowns and rooks' turrets carving their way up more than 4,000m towards the Arizona-blue skies. This checkerboard landscape is an animal lover's and birdwatcher's paradise, but most come to these craggy and remote mountains for the the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela.

More than 15 interconnecting churches, some towering 10m high, were carved more than 800 years ago directly into the red tuva rock of this mountain village, creating what many say should be the eighth man-made Wonder of the World.

How these churches were built is as puzzling as the construction of Egypt's pyramids. Some estimates say that more than 40,000 people would have been required to carve the supernatural churches, and the resulting giant shrine is as close as anyone can get to praying inside a mountain. The resident Orthodox monks, priests and shamma-wearing hermits spend their lives here, praying and studying scripture. Their home, only recently discovered by outsiders, is by far the major highlight of Ethiopia.

The final stop on this historical route, and a short distance from Ethiopia's disputed northern border with Somalia, is the holy city of Axum (Aksum). A must for Da Vinci Code addicts, it was once the centre of the Axumite Empire (in existence at least 300 years before Christ's birth) and it's here that the famous Lost Ark of the Covenant is said to reside.

These two stone tablets, on which God is believed to have engraved the Ten Commandments, are in the town's Cathedral of St Mary of Zion. Guarded by a single priest who can never leave, only two Westerners have ever claimed to have seen the Lost Ark, but the pageantry and secrecy surrounding it make for an interesting afternoon tour -- as well as fodder for a range of books and a lucrative Indiana Jones franchise.

Other highlights of antiquity in this otherwise inconspicuous town are the ancient Stellae fields with their obelisks, burial chambers, mummies and hidden treasures, and the baths of the Old Testament's Queen of Sheba.

As an introduction to sub-Saharan Africa, Addis Ababa and this northern circuit are unequalled. The country is safe (muggings are rare compared with neighbouring countries), easy on the pocket (the local St George beer is 25c, SIM cards are less than €1), and not as hot as other equatorial countries, thanks to the high altitude.

Some things will remind you that you're not in Europe -- the afternoon power cuts, sporadic hot water, and hole-in-the-ground toilets -- but, for the most part, Ethiopia presents nothing more challenging than backpacking around South-East Asia.

The one drawback is the roads. They are notoriously bad, with giant pot-holes, no tarmac and frequent dead-ends, so it's wise to think about flying to most of the destinations on the historical route (Ethiopian Airlines has regular daily flights to all the cities mentioned here).

It's also difficult to find luxury accommodation. There is one five-star hotel in Addis, but Western-style lavishness has yet to come to the rest of the country. Staying at the government-owned Ghion chain hotels is a perfectly comfortable option, if you don't mind intermittent cold showers and jumble-sale furniture.

And besides, do you really need luxury? Only the most selfish of travellers would demand a high cotton count in one of the poorest countries in the world. You don't go to Ethiopia to be pampered but to be among the first to see it, with the added satisfaction of knowing that your money benefits the locals. Seeing the smiles of two young boys in Lalibela who converted a disused lorry container into a profitable internet café, thanks to the patronage of two Dutch tourists, illustrates how foreign currency can help improve the lot of a country and perhaps develop it into one of the great tourist destinations.

Putting up with minor inconveniences is a small price to pay for Ethiopia's history, people and landscape. And, yes, you can eat -- the food's quite good, actually.

Go there soon; it's time to turn Ethiopia's image from one of famine to feast.

- Nik Quaife

Egyptians decry doctor's sentence of 1,500 lashes

2008-11-11T23:44:00.000+01:00

By SALAH NASRAWI Associated Press Writer | AP
Nov 11, 2008
(CAIRO, Egypt) Demonstrators in Cairo demanded Tuesday that Saudi Arabia release an Egyptian doctor sentenced to 15 years in prison and 1,500 lashes after he was convicted of malpractice — reportedly after treating a Saudi princess.

His wife said she feared the punishment would kill him.

Raouf Amin el-Arabi, a doctor who has been serving the Saudi royal family for about 20 years, was convicted last year of giving a patient the wrong medication. Egyptian newspapers reported that he was accused of driving a Saudi princess "to addiction."

He initially was sentenced to seven years in prison and 700 lashes, but when he appealed two months ago, the judge not only upheld the conviction, but more than doubled the penalty to 15 years in prison and 1,500 lashes.

Family members, friends and colleagues gathered at the headquarters of Egypt's doctors' union in downtown Cairo and urged Saudi King Abdullah to pardon el-Arabi.

"My children want their father to return swiftly and safely," the doctor's wife Fathiya el-Hindawi told the Associated Press. "I hope the king will give them back their smiles."
She maintained her 53-year-old husband was innocent and feared he would die if given the full penalty.

"1,500 lashes is unprecedented in the history of Islam," read one banners carried by protesters. "Who is responsible for the humiliation of our doctors abroad?" read another.

The case has drawn nationwide criticism in Egypt and local human rights groups have demanded that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who maintains close ties with the Saudi royal family, intervene to free el-Arabi.

The Saudi government has refrained from comment but Egyptian newspapers report that el-Arabi was treating a female member of the royal family when he was accused of "driving a patient to addiction." The newspapers identified the princess as one of the wives of Abdullah's nephews.

Saudi Justice Ministry officials did not answer the phone on Tuesday to comment on the case.

Egypt's Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday that diplomatic and political efforts are under way to resolve the problem, but warned that relations between the two countries should not be affected.
"The ministry is very much concerned with this case," said Ahmed Rizq, a ministry official, in a statement. "However, the Saudi judicial and political system should be respected."

Egypt's state-owned Middle East News Agency later reported that Cairo's ambassador to Riyadh, Mahmoud Auf, met with the powerful mayor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, to discuss "the status of Egyptian expatriates in the kingdom."

El-Arabi is in a jail in the Red Sea port city of Jeddah and is believed to have received at least one of his weekly installments of 70 lashes so far.

Broken bones and body bags: horrors facing Ethiopian domestic workers

2008-11-11T21:58:00.002+01:00

By Tania Tabar
The Daily Star
November 11, 2008

BEIRUT - At the Ethiopian Consulate in Beirut, Lebanon, a poster declares "Ethiopia: 13 weeks of sunshine" as two officials sit at their desks. The three chairs in the waiting room are usually occupied these days: In just one recent week, the mission heard of one Ethiopian domestic worker who died a suspicious death and another who is in hospital with both legs broken, possibly paralyzed, and can only communicate by blinking her eyes.

The previous week, a woman walked in shaking. When the social officer asked her what was wrong, she replied that her "Madame" - her employer - threatened her with a knife.

It has long been the case that women from impoverished countries like Ethiopia come to Lebanon to work, that many encounter abuse and even violence, and that most find they have nowhere to turn.

Elinore Molla and Victoria Andarge, two Ethiopian women who are involved with the Full Gospel Church in Beirut, have turned an apartment they are renting into a makeshift sanctuary for women who flee their employers after facing some sort of abuse.

"The consulate doesn't have a resting room. Women sleep under the cars [outside the consulate], so many guys come and harass them. They are only 20 years old with a future and destiny. I take the decision in my life to suffer for them," said Molla, 27, who is originally from Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa.

Molla first found out about the women sleeping underneath the cars about a year ago.

"When I was walking I saw the girls," she recalls. "I found four girls … I was shocked. They said, 'help us.'"

She took them into her home, which today houses about two dozen women at any given time. "I'm Christian, I'm a believer," she told The Daily Star. "Everyday I see my people and my nation, with no one to take responsibility. The idea comes from God - helping protect someone who was abused. I ask the girl when I take her to my home: 'What's the problem with your sponsor?' And she says, 'so many things.'"

The head of the social affairs office at the Ethiopian Consulate, who preferred not to be identified by name, confirmed that women continue to sleep under cars near the mission until this day.

There are several problems with the situation of domestic migrant workers in Lebanon, she explained: "It is not only Ethiopian workers facing problems, but because women from other countries stopped signing contracts, the number of Ethiopians increased."

There is currently no reliable data, but the consulate estimates the number of Ethiopian workers in Lebanon to be between 40,000 and 50,000, a substantial increase since the number of women coming from Sri Lanka and the Philippines dropped off following the 2006 war with Israel - and attendant stories of abuse and neglect. The Ethiopian government officially barred its own women from coming to Lebanon earlier this year, but many are now traveling here through third countries.

The head of the consular section, who also did not want to be named, said that problems frequently begin from the day of arrival. Many sponsors do not adhere to the terms of the contracts, he explained, such as duration, remuneration, and hours of work expected.

What is even more problematic, he added, is when agencies do not take responsibility when a woman files a complaint, paving the way for a volatile relationship between the workers and their employers.

"We are facing a lot of problems," he said. "One problem is by the housemaids, second by the sponsors. Since we are foreigners to this country we have a different culture, so from the beginning it is difficult for her to get accustomed.

"But I want to turn to the sponsors' problem," he added. "There are a lot of problems from sponsors, they don't pay salaries on time, they treat them aggressively, they don't get enough food, and they don't provide shelter."

According to the consulate, some 70 percent of employers who employ Ethiopians don't pay their employees on a monthly basis.

"Sometimes they close the balcony and make them sleep on the floor," added the head of the social affairs office, "and they beat her to make her understand. That's why she becomes aggressive toward agencies, the consulate and herself."

Most troubling of all, the mission says it has been sending a record number of corpses back to Ethiopia.

The consulate estimates that 150 women have died in a little more than a year, and there is no accountability.

In one recent case, Mekdes Tesfaye Tefera's corpse was found with a noose around her neck. But the consulate has doubts that this was a self-inflicted death and has filed a police report.

"They always say, 'she killed herself,'" the social affairs officer said.

In the case of Zebiba Kedr, who is currently hospitalized, the consulate is working on having charges laid against the woman for whom she was working. The employers have stated that Kedr fell from the 12th floor of their building, but the head of the consular section said that when he went to see her in the hospital and asked her "Madame" had pushed her, she indicated 'yes' by blinking her eyes.

Stories like these make the unofficial shelter run by Molla and Andarge even more essential. Andarge said the agencies were the main problem, accusing them of "playing a game" with people's lives. The government needs to get involved, she added, and make sure the agencies take responsibility for the women and how they are treated.

The consulate representatives said they had an agreement with all the agencies that said the latter were to be responsible for the women they bring to Lebanon, and that this is why mission does not have a shelter.

The nongovernmental organization Caritas offers a safehouse for workers who are flee their employers' homes, but Molla said that these spaces are usually reserved for those who are very sick or have psychological problems.

Molla is one of the lucky ones. She came to Lebanon when she was 17 years old and says she has always been well treated by her employer.

"She is like my mom, she is Lebanese, and she supports me. I love her," Molla told The Daily Star.

But since she regards her own experience as the exception rather than the rule, she discourages other Ethiopian women from traveling to Lebanon for work - a process which she described as getting easier by the day.

"The Lebanese name is collapsing everywhere," she said, explaining that in Addis Ababa, Lebanon's reputation is causing fewer and fewer would-be migrant workers to sign up.

To compensate, she added, the recruiters have started concentrating on women from remote villages.

Molla said she tells women in Ethiopia "what is going on" in Lebanon, "and that it's better to stay in your country, because you still have hopes there. Here there are no hopes."

Nonetheless, a young woman now staying at the makeshift safehouse said she would like to stay here and support her family back home - if her employers here were to treat her well.

Andarge believes there is hope to change the situation and has already noticed changes in public opinion and awareness. New York-based Human Rights Watch recently conducted a hard-hitting campaign on the plight of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, and last month the American University of Beirut hosted a conference and roundtable discussion on the issue. Some of the students were appalled at what they heard, she said, and their reaction was a pleasant "surprise."

"It will be changed," Andarge said with tears in her eyes. "We just need strong people."

Living History in Ethiopia

2008-11-08T23:20:00.003+01:00

Ties to ancient Israel run deep in the home of the Queen of Sheba, where Christianity came early and the churches are ancient and unique

Melissa Burdick Harmon , Special to the Sun

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia - The Queen of Sheba's palace isn't what it used to be. Its roof is long gone. Its grand entrance is but a memory. Yet the 3,000-year-old ruins remain, sprawling over thin-grassed farm fields in Axum -- once the capital of a great world power and today a dusty Ethiopian town where cows and children, goats and donkeys roam free.

The Queen lived well. It is still possible to stride across her vast flagstone-floored throne room, just one of 50 excavated chambers. The sophisticated drainage system features fish-shaped granite gargoyles. Several brick ovens line the large kitchen, and multiple stairwells indicate that there were many more rooms above.

Here, according to Ethiopians, a great dynasty was born. And, as all great dynasties should, this one begins with a love story. As they tell it, the Queen of Sheba left Ethiopia only once, to visit King Solomon in Jerusalem. Solomon, despite being married, became smitten with the beautiful Queen. She reciprocated his desire and upon her return to Axum she gave birth to his son, Menelik.

Menelik I took the throne when his mother died, roughly a thousand years before the birth of Christ, and began a line of Solomonic rulers that endured with only a brief interruption until Emperor Haile Selassie, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, was deposed 31 years ago.

Menelik I is also, according to the Ethiopian Orthodox church, responsible for that country's possessing the greatest relic of the Judeo-Christian tradition. It seems that the king went to visit his father, and somehow brought back the original Ark of the Covenant, previously kept in the great temple in Jerusalem.

The Ark is believed to hold the original tablets containing the Ten Commandments that God handed to Moses on Mount Sinai, and it is now said to be kept in Axum's Church of St. Mary of Zion. Only one elderly monk guards this treasure, which no one else may see.

St. Mary of Zion is one of thousands of Christian churches that dot the Ethiopian landscape. Christianity came early to Axum, and soon after A.D. 300 this new faith became the country's official religion. It has evolved little over the years, and its vivid churches are unlike any found elsewhere in the world.

This town's greatest attractions, however, are not its churches, but its stelae -- towering obelisks piercing the bright blue sky, the largest nine stories tall and cut from a single piece of granite. An even taller one, the height of a 13-storey building and weighing some 500 tonnes, lies on its side, broken. It fell, according to a written account, in about 850 AD.

Each stele has an altar for sacrificial offerings and a false door. No one knows exactly when or why they were built. Some say they were meant to house spirits.

Axum today shows much and hides much. Only about three per cent of this once vast city has been excavated. Kids routinely pull ancient coins from farm fields. It is a place rich with the feeling of unsolved mysteries.

In fact, mysteries and miracles abound all along Ethiopia's Historic Route, with each of the three remaining stops reflecting a different era in the county's rich life.

The 11 rock-hewn churches in the town of Lalibela have often been called the "Eighth Wonder of the World." Like the monoliths at Axum, they are a UNESCO World Heritage Site. And, according to legend, they were each carved out of a single piece of rock at record speed, "as angels worked on them during the night."

The churches, many carved in deep trenches with only their roofs exposed, others cut directly into the rocks of caves, are all connected by a labyrinthine series of tunnels, paths and steep steps. Each has been used continuously since the beginning of the 13th century. Most are decorated with a Star of David, underscoring the church's close kinship with King Solomon. One displays a very old painting of a black Jesus.

It is a remarkable place, as priests and monks in brilliant brocade vestments carry on a religious life that has gone on here, hidden among the hills and caves, for nearly a thousand years.

If the rock churches of Lalibela impress with their stark simplicity, the 29 churches and monasteries scattered over the islands of Lake Tana, headwaters of the Blue Nile River, delight with their vivid paintings in primary colours.

Abba Hailemariam Genetu, Head Priest at Azwah Maryam -- a circular church with a grass roof, located on an isolated peninsula -- greets visitors.

"This church," he says, "dates back to the 14th century. It is younger than most."

The handsome Abba, or Father, Genetu, speaks a Semitic language related to Hebrew, doesn't eat pork and performs ritual circumcision. He, like all Ethiopian Orthodox, practices a Christianity that is older, closer to Judaism, and far more exotic -- complete with ritual dancing and drumming -- than you'll find anywhere in North America.

His remote church was constructed to protect the faith, but also to reserve Ethiopia's ancient religious treasures -- ornate silver and bronze crosses, prayer sticks that recall Moses' staff and centuries-old illuminated manuscripts.

The church walls are covered with paintings which, over time, have also become treasures. One shows the child Jesus zooming down a board from a second story window, while less sacred children, who have tried and failed, lie scattered around the ground. Others illustrate the Holy Trinity: three identical dark-skinned, white-haired, white-bearded men.

If the rock churches are marvels of construction, and the churches of Lake Tana delight with their vivid paintings, the castles of Gondar simply astonish. Getchu Eshetu, my guide throughout Ethiopia, calls this site "Africa's Camelot," and he does not overstate the case. This palace complex looks as though it has been airlifted from medieval Europe.

In fact, the castle construction was begun by Emperor Fasiladas in 1632, when he declared the town of Gondar to be Ethiopia's first official capital.

His brown basalt palace was assembled using mortar and boasts four domed towers and battlements.

A Yemeni merchant who visited in 1648 wrote that it was "one of the most marvelous of buildings" he had ever seen, mentioning rooms trimmed in ivory and jewels, courtiers in fine brocade and thrones embroidered in gold.

Succeeding rulers constructed their own palaces. The 18th-century Empress Mentewab built a lovely one, where it is said she hosted Scotsman James Bruce (for five years!) when he came through searching for the headwaters of the Nile.

Other Europeans were less kind to the castles. Mussolini's Italians, who occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1941, used them as barracks. The British found out and bombed the buildings. Restoration is a slow process in a poor country, yet much of the complex remains, a reminder of the days when Gondar ruled a great empire.

As travellers complete the historic circle, it becomes abundantly clear that this mountainous country in the Horn of Africa contains treasures that should be on every history buff's wish list. Someday they will be, but for now it's still possible -- and lovely -- to experience Ethiopia's great sites without being jostled by hoards of tourists.

- - -

ACCOMMODATIONS IN ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa, the capital city and jumpin off point for tours, offers several luxury hotels:

Sheraton Addis, a member of the chain's luxury collection, is one of the finest hotels in Africa. Its vast pool and gardens, excellent shops and Italian, Indian and fine dining restaurants make it a lovely oasis in a sometimes chaotic city. Doubles from $181 US a night. 888-625-4988 or 011-251-1-171717; www.starwoodhotels.com; Taitu Street, Box 6002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The Hilton Addis Ababa, on six hectares in the heart of the city, features a heated pool, four tennis courts and a spa (where a one-hour massage costs roughly $8.50). The hotel has a vast array of shops and restaurants, and rooms complete with balconies. Doubles from $151 a night. 800-HILTONS or 011-251-1-518400; www.hilton.com; corner of Menelik II Avenue, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Ghion Hotels, a chain run by the Ethiopian government, are the best available on the Historic Route. They are well located (on the shore of Lake Tana, on a hill overlooking Axum, for example), but the accommodations tend to be rather simple. Prices vary, and will be included in tour packages. Phone: 011-251-1-1513-222; Ghion Hotels Enterprise, Res Desta Damteu Ave., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Be sure to sample Ethiopian cuisine, typically a fermented, sponge-like pancake called injera, topped by a spicy stew called wat. The hotels on the Historic Route, however, are accustomed to catering to western tastes, serving up fresh fish, chicken and spaghetti. Save your fine-dining appetite for meals at the Hilton or the Sheraton, at journey's end.

Melissa Burdick Harmon served as travel editor of Biography Magazine and its predecessor, A&E Monthly, for 12 years.

© The Vancouver Sun 2005

A conference on security policy in the Greater Horn of Africa held in Cairo

2008-11-07T12:04:00.000+01:00

A Week in the Horn
07 November 2008
Addis Ababa

A conference on regional security policy in the Greater Horn of Africa was held in Cairo last week. It was the fourth such conference organized by a German NGO, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation. Participants included representatives from the African Union, the League of Arab States, the German, Ethiopian and Somali Foreign Ministries, Southern Sudan's Ministry of Irrigation, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in Bonn, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung offices in Germany, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan, UNECA, the European Union, Transparency International, the International Crisis Group, the Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat, and various think tanks and institutes including the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, the Center for Policy Research and Dialogue in Addis Ababa and Kenya's National Commission on Human Rights. Six panels dealt with Western Sudan, the Horn of Africa, State building and social inclusion, the Nile water and resource management, South Sudan and Northern Uganda; Secession and trans-border issues.

The root problem in Western Sudan, as in the conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic, was identified as the way the political culture of these countries focus only on development for the benefit of the group in power. The solution suggested was a need to find an institutional political system to allow an effective sharing of resources. In Darfur, participants felt the need for coherence and coordination between all international actors who should get beyond their own organizational interests and create a space for the Sudanese to find their own solutions. The ICC issue should be separated from the issue of peace in the Sudan. State-building and social inclusion, and Secession and trans-border issues were discussed in detail. Ethiopia's ethnic federal structure was identified as ‘the best conflict management device with its promise of shared power and space for multiple identities/loyalties’. The representative of the ICG did not agree, characterizing it as a continuation of narrow ethnic group domination, and calling Ethiopia “the most unstable country in Africa”. No one else agreed and other participants cited evidence of stability and development in all the regional components of Ethiopia's federal structure. Indeed, Somalia and Kenya, and even other countries in the region and beyond, were recommended to follow such a federal structure as the recipe for successful state building and resource sharing as a way out of current predicaments. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) attracted considerable discussion. There was agreement on the need to build confidence among riparian states, particularly between Ethiopia and Egypt, to make the NBI an effective organization, to discontinue unilateral development, and on the necessity to deal with the unmet development programs of NBI member states. In conclusion a number of actions were recommended as ways forward to help achieve regional security. These included the need to practice good governance characterized by a responsible and participatory approach; for governments to engage their populations in a dialogue; increase the role of civil society; establish a system of conflict management; create cross-border cooperation; and expand regional trade.

The most hotly discussed issues were the conflicts in the Horn, the Ethio-Eritrean border, the Eritrean invasion of Djibouti, and conflicts in Somalia. Dr. Annette Weber, from the Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, presented a provocative paper which minimized the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and anticipated much of what the ICG representative was to say. In the extensive discussion it generated the most outspoken comments came from the representative of the Brussels based International Crisis Group. He surprised other participants by taking an identical line to that of the Eritrean Government, arguing the need for Ethiopia to withdraw from “occupied Eritrean territories”, and claiming the 'virtual' demarcation decision of the Boundary Commission was final and legal and, ignoring the numerous anomalies acknowledged by the Boundary Commission, claimed it should be endorsed by the UN Security Council. He also claimed Ethiopia’s ‘invasion’ of Somalia was intended to balkanize Somalia, that any claim of a terrorist threat to Ethiopia’s security was a fabrication in collaboration with the US, and that there was no border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti and claims of this were no more than a US invention. Participants and organizers were surprised by the complete association of the International Crisis Group with the position of the Eritrean government and the ICG representative's comments were strongly challenged, indeed refuted, by participants from Ethiopia and by other discussants. Surprisingly, the ICG continues to be unconcerned by its credibility in the region.

Barack Obama wins presidency, making history

2008-11-05T12:16:00.002+01:00

The Democrat breaks the ultimate U.S. racial barrier with his defeat of Republican John McCain.

By Mark Z. Barabak
November 5, 2008

Barack Obama, the son of a father from Kenya and a white mother from Kansas, was elected the nation's 44th president Tuesday, breaking the ultimate racial barrier to become the first African American to claim the country's highest office.

A nation founded by slave owners and seared by civil war and generations of racial strife delivered a smashing electoral college victory to the 47-year-old first-term senator from Illinois, who forged a broad, multiracial, multiethnic coalition. His victory was a leap in the march toward equality: When Obama was born, people with his skin color could not even vote in parts of America, and many were killed for trying.
"If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer," Obama told more than 240,000 celebrants gathered along Chicago's waterfront. Many had tears streaking their faces.

"It's been a long time coming," said Obama, who strode on stage with his wife, Michelle, and their two daughters, Sasha and Malia. "But tonight, because of what we did on this day, in this election, at this defining moment, change has come to America."

Obama was beating Republican John McCain in every state Democrats carried four years ago, including Pennsylvania, which McCain had worked vigorously to pry away. Obama also made significant inroads into Republican turf, carrying Ohio, Colorado, Indiana and Virginia; the latter two voted Democratic for the first time in more than 40 years. He won the swing states of Florida, Iowa and New Mexico, which backed President Bush in 2004.

In winning the White House, Obama modified the electorate:About 1 in 10 of those casting ballots Tuesday were doing so for the first time. Though that number was about the same as four years ago, most of the newcomers were younger than 30, about a fifth were black, and a fifth were Latino. That was greater than their share of the overall population, and those groups voted overwhelmingly for Obama.

He also won large majorities of female, black and Latino voters. Although he lost among white voters, Obama did better than Democratic nominee John F. Kerry in 2004.

Voters also handed Obama a fortified congressional majority, as Democrats picked up at least five seats in the Senate and more than a dozen in the House. The party knocked off at least two GOP incumbents, including North Carolina Sen. Elizabeth Dole.

With Obama leading every preelection poll, his hometown of Chicago was primed for a celebration. Downtown skyscrapers stayed lighted for the occasion on an improbably warm November night. At Grant Park, giant video screens were tuned to CNN, and raucous cheers erupted each time a state fell Obama's way, until finally victory came just a few moments after polls closed on the West Coast.

Shortly after, Arizona Sen. McCain called the president-elect to concede. President Bush then telephoned with his congratulations.

In Phoenix, McCain, 72, delivered a gracious concession speech that nodded to history and his erstwhile foe.

"We have come to the end of a long journey," a somber McCain said. "The American people have spoken, and they have spoken clearly. This is an historic election, and I recognize the special significance it has for African Americans and the special pride that must be theirs tonight."

He shushed the crowd when they booed Obama -- "Please," McCain said, motioning for silence -- and urged them to join him in working with the incoming president for the greater good of the country. "Whatever our differences," McCain said, "we are fellow Americans."

McCain, burdened by his party's frayed image, prevailed in a band of states that make up a shrinking Republican base, mainly in the South, the Plains and parts of the interior West.

Two of the hardest-fought states -- North Carolina and Missouri -- were too close to call.

For most voters, the sagging economy was the topmost concern -- a dynamic that played strongly to the Democrat's favor. Six in 10 voters said the economy was the most important issue facing the nation, according to exit polls -- far more than cited energy, Iraq, terrorism or healthcare.

Obama alluded to those worries and others in his victory speech, offering a note of sobriety amid the celebration.

"The road ahead will be long," he said. "Our climb will be steep. We may not get there in one year, or even one term. But America, I have never been more hopeful than I am tonight that we will get there. I promise you, we as a people will get there."

Voters flocked to the polls in record numbers Tuesday, continuing a pattern of electoral exuberance that started in the primary season.

There were scattered voting problems reported throughout the day, including long lines, malfunctioning voting machines and mislaid ballots. But there was nothing like Florida's infamous "butterfly ballot" fiasco, which sent the 2000 presidential contest into several weeks of overtime before the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in to settle the race.

Mostly, there was patience, good cheer, and for many, pride in taking part in a slice of history, whatever the result; had McCain won, his running mate, Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, would have been the first woman to serve as vice president.

Lines began forming across the country before the sun had risen, with queues starting at 4 a.m. in New York City. The outcome across most of the Democratic-leaning Northeast was never in doubt, but many felt it was their responsibility -- and privilege -- to vote.

"I needed to cast my own ballot today, not just because it's my duty as a citizen but because for once it feels like it counts," said Eric Schwartz, 36, a computer specialist on New York's Upper West Side. "It's a more global feeling. Like I needed to make a mark on a day when things matter. Today, everyone matters."

Obama will be one of the youngest presidents in American history, the first born outside the continental United States (in Hawaii) and only the third to move directly from the Senate to the White House.

He burst on the national political scene just over four years ago, with an electrifying keynote address to the Democratic National Convention in Boston. His soaring speech previewed themes he would reprise in his presidential bid, including a call to end the partisanship symbolized by a country divided into Republican red and Democratic blue.

Months after that address, Obama won his Senate seat, and there was immediate talk of a run for president. The speculation, however, vastly understated the challenge facing Obama, who by his own admission entered the crowded Democratic field as an underdog. His victory over New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton after a long, contentious primary season was in itself a major political upset.

Contrary to the wisdom at the time, the battle did not sap but rather strengthened Obama. He built campaign organizations in traditionally Republican states, such as Nevada, North Carolina, Colorado and Indiana, that came into play in the fall thanks to the groundwork laid in the spring.

Obama also became a better, more substantive candidate and a much stronger debater, which served him well in his three matchups with McCain. Obama's unflappable performance on stage and steady response to the Wall Street meltdown helped allay voter concerns about his judgment, maturity and readiness to assume office, undercutting what was perhaps McCain's strongest argument against the freshman lawmaker.

For all the wild celebration -- in Los Angeles, New York, Kenya and outside the gates of the White House -- there were quieter moments Tuesday that captured the weight of history.

Former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, a veteran of civil rights protests in Selma and Birmingham, Ala., and other racial flash points, was among hundreds of black Atlantans who crowded the pews for an election-watch party at the Rev. Martin Luther King's Ebenezer Baptist Church. When CNN called Pennsylvania, an early harbinger, Young pulled out a handkerchief and dabbed away tears.

Later, in Chicago, Obama recalled images of that turbulent time: "the buses in Montgomery, the hoses in Birmingham, a bridge in Selma, and a preacher from Atlanta who told a people, 'We shall overcome.' "

He spoke of other triumphal moments: landing a man on the moon and winning the Cold War. "America, we have come so far. We have seen so much. But there is so much more to do," Obama said. "This is our chance to answer that call. This is our moment. This is our time."

Barabak is a Times staff writer.

mark.barabak@latimes.com

Times staff writers Richard Fausset in Atlanta, Michael Finnegan in Chicago, Johanna Neuman in Washington and Maeve Reston in Phoenix contributed to this report.

IPI Condemns Brutal Assault on Editor-in-Chief of Ethiopian Newspaper

2008-11-04T01:44:00.001+01:00

PRESS RELEASE

Vienna, 3 November 2008

The International Press Institute (IPI), the global network of editors, media executives and leading journalists in over 120 countries, strongly condemns the 31 October 2008 attack on Amare Aregawi, editor-in-chief of the Ethiopian bi-weekly newspaper The Reporter.

"IPI denounces this assault on Amare Aregawi in the strongest possible terms," said IPI Director David Dadge. "Given that Aregawi has been targeted for his work in the past, IPI is concerned that this attack was linked to his journalism. IPI calls on the authorities to not only bring those behind this brutal act to justice, but to also do everything in their power to ensure that Ethiopian journalists are free to carry out their profession without fear of attack."

According to information before IPI, Aregawi was assaulted at approximately 16.30 on 31 October by two assailants, while leaving his son's school following a parent-teacher meeting. Aregawi was struck on the back of the head, and left bleeding and unconscious on the ground. His assailants were apprehended shortly afterwards and Aregawi himself was brought to a local hospital by school employees, where he is currently being treated for head injuries.

Aregawi has previously been singled out for his writing. In August of this year, he was detained by authorities for a period of five days following the publication of articles addressing criticism of a local brewery and a government office. This most recent incident follows a series of editorials in The Reporter criticising members of the local business community, leading local sources to believe that the attack was also linked to his work as a journalist.

___________________________

International Press Institute (IPI)
Spiegelgasse 2/29
A-1010 Vienna
Austria
Tel: + 431-512 90 11
Fax: + 431-512 90 14
E-mail: ipi@freemedia.at
http://www.freemedia.at

IPI, the global network of editors, media executives and leading journalists, is dedicated to the furtherance and safeguarding of press freedom, the protection of freedom of opinion and expression, the promotion of the free flow of news and information, and the improvement of the practices of journalism.

Attempt to Assassinate Amare Aregawe, Editor-in-Chief of the Reporter, Committed

2008-11-02T04:08:00.005+01:00

Saturday, 01 November 2008
የሪፖርተር ዋና አዘጋጅ የግድያ ሙከራ ተደረገበት

ህክምና እየተከታተለ ነው

(በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር)

የሪፖርተር የአማርኛና የእንግሊዝኛ ጋዜጦች ባለቤትና ዋና አዘጋጅ የሆነው ጋዜጠኛ አማረ አረጋዊ ዓርብ ዕለት ከሰዓት በኋላ በድንገት ባልታወቁ አጥቂዎች በደረሰበት የግድያ ሙከራ ለጉዳት ተዳርጎ በሕክምና ላይ ይገኛል፡፡ ጤንነቱ እየተሻሻለ መሄዱን ተገል..ል፡፡

ዓርብ ጥቅምት 21/2001 ዓ.ም አማረ አረጋዊ እንደሌሎቹ የሪፖርተር ጋዜጣ ባልደረቦች ሁሉ ለዛሬ እሁድ በሚወጣው ጋዜጣ ሥራ ተጠምደዋል፡፡ የዕለት ሥራውን አጠናቅቆ የአባትነት ኃላፊነቱን ለመወጣት ወደ ልጁ ትምህርት ቤት (አንድነት ኢንተርናሽናል ት/ቤት) ያመራል፡፡ ልጁን እቤት አድርሶ የወላጅ መምህራን ስብሰባ ስለነበረበት በትምህርት ቤቱ ቅጥር ግቢ ተገኝቶ ስብሰባውን ካጠናቀቀ በኋላ አገር ሰላም ብሎ ወደ መኪናው ሲያመራ አሸምቀው ሲጠብቁት በነበሩ ግለሰቦች ከኋላው ጭንቅላቱን ሲመታ ራሱን ስቶ መውደቁን በወቅቱ በሥፍራው የነበሩ የዓይን እማኞች ተናግረዋል፡፡

አማረ ላይ ጥቃቱን የሰነዘረው ግለሰብ ግዳጁን ፈፅሞ እንዲያመልጥ የላዳ ታክሲ ቢዘጋጅለትም በታክሲው እንቅስቃሴ መታገድ ምክንያት በእግር ሮጦ ቢያመልጥም ግብረ አበሩ እንደሆነ የተገመተ አንድ ግለሰብና ባለታክሲው በፖሊስ ቁጥጥር ስር መዋላቸውን የፖሊስ ምንጮች አረጋግጠዋል፡፡

በዕለቱ ጥቃቱ የተፈፀመበት ቦታ ከፍተኛ እንቅስቃሴ ያለበት መሃል ቦሌ ከዲ.ኤች.ገዳ ሕንፃ ገባ ብሎ ካለው አንድነት ኢንተርናሽናል ትምህርት ቤት 50 ሜትር ያህል አለፍ ብሎ የሚገኘው ማስክ ባር አካባቢ ነው፡፡

ጋዜጠኛ አማረ በግምት ከቀኑ 10፡30 ሰዓት ገደማ በጠራራ ፀሐይ ለመግደል በተመደቡ ሕገወጦች በቅርብ ርቀት ሆነው ባደረሱበት ድንገተኛ የድንጋይ ናዳ ራሱን ስቶ በወደቀበት በዚያች ደቂቃ በአንድነት ት/ቤት መምህርና ተረኛ የጥበቃ አባል ትብብር ለመጀመሪያ ዕርዳታ ወደ ሐያት ሆስፒታል ተወስዷል፡፡

በዕለቱ የሐያት ሆስፒታል የሕክምና ባለሙያዎች የደረሰበትን የጉዳት መጠን ለማወቅ የተሟላ ምርመራ ካደረጉ በኋላ በጋዜጠኛ አማረ ላይ የደረሰው ጉዳት ለክፉ የሚሰጥ አለመሆኑን ተናግረዋል፡፡

“ከዚህ ጥቃት ጀርባ እነማን አሉ?” የሚለውን ፖሊስ ጥቃቱ በአቶ አማረ ላይ ከተፈፀመበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ በክትትል ላይ መሆኑንና በተያዙት ግለሰቦች መነሻነት ምርመራ እያካሄደ መሆኑን የፖሊስ ምንጮች ለሪፖርተር ጋዜጣ ጠቁመዋል፡፡

ጥቅምት 16/2001 በወጣው ሪፖርተር ጋዜጣ ርዕሰ አንቀጽ በአገር ደረጃ ስውር መንግሥታት አቋቁመው የፈለጉትን ለማድረግና ለማግኘት የሚንቀሳቀሱ አካላት መኖራቸውንና መንግሥት በጥሞና ሊያየውና ርምጃ ሊወሰድበት እንደሚገባ ተፅፎ ነበር፡፡

በሌላ በኩል በኢትዮ ቻናል ሳምንታዊ ጋዜጣ ለተከታታይ ሶስት ሳምንታት በአቶ አማረ ላይ ያነጣጠሩ ስም ማጥፋትና ማስጠንቀቂያ መሰል ፅሁፎች ሲወጡ መቆየታቸው ይታወሳል፡፡ “የሪፖርተር ጋዜጣ የዛሬው ሁኔታ በእሳተ ጎመራ ላይ ከመደነስ የተለየ አይደለም፣ የሪፖርተር አባ አስገብር ጦር በአምስት ብርጌዶች የተደራጀ ነው እና ነብር ሆይ ጉድጓድ አትቆፍር..” በሚሉ ርዕሶች ዘለፋ ሲያወጣ ቆይቷል፡፡

ባለፈው አርብ በአቶ አማረ ላይ ጥቃቱ ከተፈፀመ በኋላ ኢትዮ ቻናል በሪፖርተር ጋዜጣ ዋና አዘጋጅ ላይ የፃፈውን ቀጣይ ፅሑፍ ወደማተሚያ ቤት ለሕትመት ካስገባ በኋላ ፅሑፉን መለወጡን ከሕትመት ክትትል ባለሙያዎች ለመረዳት ተችሏል፡፡

Editor in hospital after brutal assault

2008-11-02T02:46:00.001+01:00

Editor-in-chief of the Reporter newspapers’ Amare Aregawi was brutally assaulted late Friday by individuals whose identity was not determined until the time this paper went to press.

Amare was taken to hospital and is being treated for head injuries.

At about 4:30, he was leaving from his son’s school after attending a parent-teacher meeting, when he was attacked on the back of the head and left lying unconscious and severely bleeding on the ground.

A teacher at the school and the guard, who saw people gathered around Amare, immediately recognized him and took him to a nearby hospital.

The physician on duty at the hospital provided first aid, and had him take CT-Scan to check for signs of internal bleeding.

Doctors were monitoring his condition closely for any signs of “acute or sub-acute hematoma.”

The details as to what actually happened are still sketchy.

But according to individuals who were at the scene when the assault was carried out and spoke with The Reporter, one of the assailants was apprehended along with a taxi driver whose vehicle was intended to be used as a get-away car.

By a Staff Reporter,
The Reporter

The Authoritarian Executive, the Rubber-Stamp Parliament, and Delegations of Powers in Ethiopia

2008-10-15T09:20:00.003+02:00

Alemayehu Fentaw

The Nondelegation Principle

The doctrine of nondelegation is explicit or implicit in all written constitutions that impose a structural separation of powers. It is usually applied in questions of constitutionally improper delegations of legislative powers to the executive. In 1690, John Locke (1632-1704), one of the most influential political philosophers of the modern period, wrote that legislators “can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.” According to John Locke, “The legislative is … sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by that power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law…” Furthermore, “[t]he legislative power cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others…nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for them…the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.”A century later, in 1789, the US federal Constitution provided that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” A little more than a hundred years later, in 1892, the Supreme Court declared in Field v. Clark: “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”

James Madison compared the delegation problem to the power of creating executive offices. Madison argued that the Constitution “has not only given the Legislature the power of creating offices, but it expressly restrains the Executive from appointing officers, except such as are provided by law….the President is invested with the power of filling those offices; does it follow that we are to delegate to him the power to create them?

Madison’s comparison suggests that another factor in weighing delegation problems may be the number of new offices or positions that the statute gives the executive power to create.

Nevertheless, in 1989, nearly a century after Field v. Clark, the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States upheld an essentially unconstrained grant of power enabling an administrative agency to set guidelines for federal criminal sentences, offering the stark observation that “our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”

Many an architect of the modern administrative state was full well aware of the constitutional implications of their handiwork. A case in point is James Landis, who contended in 1938 that the administrative state “springs from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government to deal with modern problems.” For Landis, modern government “vests the necessary powers with the administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to which such action does violence to the traditional tripartite theory of governmental organization.” Put differently, if the needs of a modern bureaucracy come into conflict with the Constitution, too bad for the Constitution.

My aim in this paper is two-fold. First, I aim to establish that the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, like its counterpart in the United States, prohibits the kind of delegation of legislative authority that took place in Ethiopia a few days ago. Second, I aim to establish that the House of Federation, which is vested with the final say on the issue of un/constitutionality of legislations in Ethiopia, is capable of identifying unconstitutional delegations if it puts its mind to the task.

The Nondelegation Principle under the FDRE Constitution

The constitutional principle of separation of powers underlies the current Ethiopian federal system of government. The FDRE Constitution contains many provisions that deal with the separation of powers. The Constitution vests legislative, executive, and judicial powers in three distinct institutions. To keep parliament’s legislative power separate from the executive and judicial branches of government, the Constitution limits parliamentary delegation of legislative power to the other branches of government. It contains provisions about such matters as the formalities of legislation, the making of treaties, the appointment of unelected government officials, and the accountability of the executive. But there is no provision that expressly forbids the delegation of legislative power like the US Constitution. The U.S. Constitution does not address the issue directly. The main constitutional provision cited in

support of the nondelegation doctrine reads simply, “All legislative Powers granted herein shall be vested in a Congress.” Commenting on the US Constitution, Gary Lawson wrote “The absence of such a provision is often taken as an argument against a strong nondelegation principle; even some of the nondelegation doctrine’s most articulate champions seem bothered by the absence of a nondelegation provision. But the search for a nondelegation clause is fundamentally misguided because the federal government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. Therefore, the proper question to pose is whether the Constitution affirmatively grants power to a particular institution of the federal government to perform the act under consideration.” In the same manner as the US Constitution, Art.55(1) of the FDRE Constitution provides that “The House of Peoples' Representatives shall have the power of legislation in all matters assigned by this Constitution to Federal jurisdiction.” Besides, Art. 50(3) stipulates that “The House of Peoples' Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government. The House is responsible to the People.”

Furthermore, Art.76(3) provides that “In all its decisions, the Council of Ministers is responsible to the House of Peoples' Representatives.” The only Constitutional provision that may arguably interpreted as granting to the Executive the power to legislate on the organization of the Executive is Art. 77(2). It reads: “It shall decide on the organizational structure of ministries and other organs of government responsible to it; it shall coordinate their activities and provide leadership.” Even this Article does not say that the Executive has the power to enact a law on the matter. It only states that the Executive has the power to “decide” on the issue under consideration. This does only mean that it has to submit its decision for reorganization or whatever of the structure of the ministries and other organs of government to the House for approval.

By virtue of the principle of enumerated powers, any action by the Executive (the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister) must fall within a grant of power to the Executive in the Constitution. The Constitution grants to the Executive a number of specific powers. The opening provision of Art.72 provides: “The highest executive powers of the Federal Government are vested in the Prime Minister and in the Council of Ministers.” One problem that figures in prominently in connection with this provision has to do with the definition of the term “executive power.” What exactly does it mean to have executive power? The Constitution identifies three distinct governmental powers- legislative, executive, and judicial-but never defines them or their respective boundaries. The absence of a precise definition does not mean that there are no boundaries between the three governmental powers. The Constitution clearly assumes the existence of such boundaries by vesting different powers in the different institutions. And as was pointed out by Madison in The Federalist, he did not consider the problem of drawing boundaries as a reason to avoid the task altogether.

Although the precise frontiers of the executive still remain blurred, we can say with some confidence that the essence of the executive power is carrying into effect – executing, if you will – the laws of the nation. The Constitution grants the Council of Ministers the power to execute the laws but not to enact a law. So, the problem is defining where execution ends and enactment begins. Execution is not a mechanical task. The meaning of “executive power” is broad enough to include some measure of rulemaking discretion, even some measure of interpretative discretion.

The next problem is to consider the issue of whether there are limits on what parliament may delegate. The principle of enumerated powers serves as a blanket ban on unilateral acts by the Executive without parliamentary authorization. What if parliament grants such authorization? Is there a limit to the authority that parliament can properly vest in the Executive by legislation? This constitutes the heart of the matter, i.e. the nondelegation problem.

The Rubber-Stamp Parliament and Delegation of Powers

In the first week of its fourth year, the House of Peoples’ Representatives has enacted a new legislation that authorizes the Council of Ministers to decide the fate of federal executive organs. The House voted the passage of the bill with 269 votes in favor, 68 against and one abstaining. As per the new law, the Council from now on, can establish, reorganize, merge, divide and even close down federal executive organs such as Ministries when it finds it necessary. The law also gives the Council power to change any executive organ’s accountability. By virtue of this proclamation, the Executive secured unlimited legislative powers to reorganize federal executive organs.

According to the new law amending the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No.471/2005, the Council of Ministers will now have the final say on matters regarding dissolution, establishment, or reorganization all federal executive organs in the country without parliament exerting any form of supervision or approval.

The EPRDF-dominated rubber-stamp parliament violated the Constitution by endorsing a prima facie unconstitutional bill that was initiated and masterfully drafted by the Executive on First Reading despite strong objections by parliamentarians from the so-called loyal Political Opposition. Of course, ironically enough, this newly enacted amendatory legislation could not have been passed without Constitutional amendment, even so at the risk of setting aside, ad infinitum, the Constitution and the democratic principles of separation of powers and non-delegation of powers enshrined therein. The ratio legis behind this piece of legislation is nothing but "entrench[ing] the dictatorial power of EPRDF,” as was rightly observed by Bulcha Demekssa.

In an all-too-embarrasing argument that backfires, albeit meant to defend the passage of the Bill, at himself, Berhanu Adole, Head of the Prime Minister’s Office, told the House “If it is not to exaggerate the essence of the article, it doesn’t introduce as a new procedure as it is already stipulated in the Constitution that the ruling party may restructure the executive organs.” He went on to say that “the practice isn’t a new one, it was the same during Emperor Haile Selassie period where the Emperor reorganizes the organs by issuing regulations. The Emperor did not take a historic blame and neither will we, nor do governments of many other nations.” If the self-same provision has already been in the Constitution, how does the introduction of this legal rule into the new proclamation improve its legal quality as the proclamation is only inferior to the Constitution? What Adelo failed to understand, and does not seem to get it in a million years, is that the House is different from the ruling party in principle, though it is undeniably dominated by EPRDF. The equation does not hold. The mere fact that EPRDF has the majority seats in the House does not entitle EPRDF-dominated House to give away legislative powers falling within its proper province to the Executive. The Constitutional provision he was alluding to is Art. 56 that stipulates “A political party or a coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats in the House of Peoples' Representatives shall form the Executive and lead it,” which is irrelevant to the issue at stake. Furthermore, what strikes me as odd is his comparison of the current practice with that of the Imperial regime of HIH Emperor Haile Selassie. This is so much revealing, as he interestingly and unawares divulgates the imperious project, common to the Emperor and EPRDF, of taking away and consolidating all governmental powers into their own hands.

To show that there has not been any doubt or ambiguity as the regards the issue of whose power it is to enact such legislation, it suffices to quote the closing clause from the Preamble of all of the four amendatory proclamations, which reads: “NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with Article 55 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, it is hereby proclaimed as follows.” Therefore, the issue flies in the face of the above clause from the preamble. What remains now is to unmask the motives and this can be done more efficiently by raising the following questions than by answering. Why introduce a change now? If it properly belonged to the Executive, why did it fail to exercise it until this time around? Why not without enacting a law? Why not claim it back by submitting it before the House of Federation for Constitutional interpretation?

The passage of this bill is simply against the two well-established constitutional principles delegata potestas non potest delegari -a delegated authority cannot be again delegated, and delegatus non potest delegare - a delegate or deputy cannot appoint another, whatever the motives.

The writer, Alemayehu W. Fentaw, was teaching law at Jimma University Faculty of Law and, currently, is an Advanced MA Candidate in Peace and Conflict Resolution at the European University Center for Peace Studies, Stadtschlaining, Austria. For comments, he can be reached at andreasalemayehu@gmail.com

Ethiopia: Legislature cede power to the executive

2008-10-13T20:18:00.002+02:00

On its first act of legislation during its current term, the House of Peoples’ Representatives on Thursday ceded a big chunk of power it used to exercise to the Council of Ministers. Parliament, which was opened after its summer recess on Monday afternoon with the president of the republic addressing the joint session of the House and the House of the Federation, convened on Tuesday morning to pass a Motion of Thanks on the president’s speech.

However, to the surprise of many opposition MPs, on Thursday morning, it debated on the legislation to grant the executive branch more powers at its own expense.

On Thursday morning, the executive branch of the federal government secured, in the opinion of some, “an unlimited legislative power” to reorganize federal executive organs.

According to the new law amending the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No.471/2005, the Council of Ministers will now have all the say when it comes to dissolving, establishing or reorganizing all federal executive organs in the country without parliament exerting any form of supervision or approval.

The amendment provides that the Council of Ministers is empowered, where it finds it necessary, to reorganize the federal executive organs by issuing regulations for the closure, merger or division of an existing executive organ or for change of its accountability or for the establishment of a new one.

Opposition MPs strongly opposed the move to cede over parliament’s power to the executive branch.

Some MPs said that the way the bill was introduced to parliament did not follow the correct procedure in the first place.

Most of the articles in the proclamation deal with the setting up of a new Science and Technology Ministry along with explanatory notes on the need to set up the new ministry.

It is in the last part of the proclamation that, the controversial article was inserted.

Ledetu Ayalew, Chairman of the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party (EDUP-Medhin), said that the new legislation has a serious constitutional implication.

“The constitution provides for checks and balances between the three pillars of government. And without doubt, parliament is relieved of at least 50 percent of its powers. There should have been public debate before a decision was passed,” Lidetu said.

He said that surrendering parliament’s power was a mistake of historical proportion, adding it was sad and unprecedented that the legislature did that of its own free will.

Temesgen Zewdie, deputy chairperson of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), said that the move showed the executive organ’s intention to control the country’s institutions although the constitution stipulates that there should be checks and balances in the government.

The same sentiment was echoed by Bulcha Demeksa, chairman of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), and Gebru Gebremariam, parliamentary whip of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF).

“The legislation we are discussing today is intended to entrench the dictatorial power of EPRDF (the ruling party),” Bulcha said.

Gebru entreated MPs not to pass the legislation. “The executive organ will have an unlimited power. Please don’t vote for it. We will be judged by history,” Gebru pleaded.

A legal expert said, on condition of anonymity, that the new legislation was intended to legitimize the government’s poor record in reorganizing institutions.

“The government says that it came up with this proposal in order to efficiently implement the Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) of state institutions under way without the cumbersome and time consuming process of going through parliament,” the expert says.

“But” he continued, “the many attempts by government at reorganizing institutions so far has failed to bring results. And this bill is no more than legitimizing its past inefficiencies on reorganizing the institutions and implementing the BPR.”

The expert said that the legislature also violated the constitution when it handed over its powers to other organs.

“Parliament can not surrender or cede its legislative powers to a third party as that power of delegation is given it to it by the people,” he argued.

“In effect, parliament violated the doctrine of non-delegation,” the expert added.

By Bruck Shewareged

The Reporter

RECOMMENDATIONS: SECURING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN AND CIVIL SOCIETY

2008-10-10T12:22:00.006+02:00

Alemayehu Fentaw was Fellow of Session 455, "Peace-Making and Peace-Building: Securing the Contributions of Women and Civil Society," which was organized by the Salzburg Global Seminar from 7-12 September 2008, at Schloss Leopoldskron, Salzburg, Austria. Below is the full-text of the recommendations made by the participants with a view to securing equal contributions of women and civil society in peace processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-BUILDING:

SECURING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN AND CIVIL SOCIETY

SEPTEMBER 2008

The Salzburg Global Seminar, in collaboration with the Initiative for Inclusive Security, gathered more than 60 leading thinkers from policy, practice and research to identify actions to be taken by key stakeholders to enact inclusive peace-building processes. The participants, from more than 30 countries, representing the UN system, additional
multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations, academia and the private sector
met to identify critical gaps in policy and implementation related to the full and equal
participation of women and civil society in peace processes and to articulate strategies to
close those gaps.

Participants examined progress in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 and in securing the contributions of civil society as a whole in peace building processes. They recognized that parties to the resolution have depended for too long on “calls to action”, many of which have been ignored, without sufficient attention to “action itself”.

Many of the recommendations are, therefore, focused on how all the actors, from the highest levels of the United Nations to the grassroots, can design and implement concrete mechanisms and actions to give life to SCR 1325 and related resolutions. Recommendations are aimed at the UN system and other key international organizations; at governments, whether donors or countries affected by crisis, or in their capacity as member states of the UN; at non-governmental organizations, both local and international, working individually or in networks as well as other non-governmental entities such as media and the private sector. The recommendations are also relevant to conflict prevention.

As a concerned and engaged stakeholder, we urge you to review the recommendations and
help put them into action.

General Recommendations to all Parties:

1. Adopt the 40-40 approach, under which men and women are guaranteed a minimum of 40 percent representation in all peace making and peace building decision-making fora.

2. Activate and update data banks of qualified women for senior decision-making posts
and professional specialties related to peace processes, including peace accord implementation.

3. Draw on civil society expertise on the conflict and/or country(ies) in question during peace processes and when seeking to prevent conflict.To the United Nations System:

To the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General, and Heads of Operational

Departments:

1. Include in the next “Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace, and Security”,
proposals for specific mechanisms, including financing, to ensure full implementation of
the recommendations of SCR 1325 and SCR 1820, and the putting in place of national action plans and compliance from governments. Following receipt of the next “Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace, and Security”, issue a follow-on resolution to SCR1325, comparable to SCRs 1379 and 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict, which provide mechanisms for follow-up, funding, and the option of sanctions.

To Member States:

2. Provide greater numbers of female troops and police, including commanders. Troop
contributing countries must train their troops prior to deployment to prevent proliferation
of sexual exploitation and abuse, and promote understanding of SCR 1325.

To the UN Secretary General, Heads of Operational Departments, and Member States:

3. Implement the recommendation of SCR 1325 to appoint women Special Representatives
to the Secretary General and special envoys and continue to appoint senior women to UN
Secretariat positions and to senior peace and security positions. Establish quotas for balanced representation of women in UN-mediated negotiations and peace-making processes.

4. Consider the needs of women associated with armed groups while designing, planning,
and implementing UN-supervised disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs, including recognition of their positions in armed groups, their need for training,
including nontraditional training, and their special reintegration needs.

To National Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Inter-Governmental Organizations:

1. Develop national action plans or similar strategies for implementation of SCR 1325 that
identify activities, timelines, and benchmarks involving all levels of government and all
sectors of society.

2. Increase the number of women professionals in ministries and security institutions
through targeted recruitment, and feeder programs consistent with the 40-40 approach.

3. Create formal venues for linking government, civil society, and women’s organizations,
particularly building on existing professional associations in order to increase inter-sector dialogue.

4. Provide to local women’s organisations and their partners adequate human and financial
resources to ensure full implementation of 1325 and hold them accountable for results.

Donor funding of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security and concerns. Create facilities and conditions that enable both women and men to participate in peace operations, including the implementation of codes and conduct and oversight mechanisms.

To Non-Governmental Organizations, Corporations, Academia, and Media Organizations:

1. Engage in coalition building. Local non-governmental organizations should reach out
to relevant partners, including media, private sector, trade unions, and political parties.

2. Initiate the creation of a contextually-appropriate group that will assist in decision making for progressive actions in the community. Local actors might approach or establish a neutral and respected “council of elders” to support and assist women’s organizations as well as other civil society organizations and their partners in peace making, peacekeeping,and peace building.

3. Support and fund local initiatives of existing civil society organizations and women’s
groups to develop women’s charters and other tools pre-negotiations, during the conflict,
throughout the peace process, and post-conflict.

4. Establish and promote economic reintegration programs to the benefit of women,
including micro-finance, which supports refugees, returnees, those who stayed behind, ex-combatants, service providers, and all families and others affected by conflict.

Note: The above stated recommendations are the result of multiple days of debate and discussion concerning many complex and nuanced issues. A report from the program, Peace-making and Peace-building: Securing the Contributions of Women and Civil Society, held September 7 – 12, 2008 in Salzburg, Austria, providing additional context, provocative ideas and more complete description of key points will be disseminated and made available through the organizing institutions web sites (indicated below).

The Salzburg Global Seminar is a unique international institution, a place dedicated to candid dialogue, fresh thinking and the search for solutions to global issues. Founded in 1947, the
organization has brought more than 25,000 participants from 150 countries and regions to its
programs. The Salzburg Global Seminar challenges current and future leaders to develop creative ideas for solving global problems. It is an institution focused on global change – a place where innovative ideas lead to practical solutions. www.SalzburgGlobal.org

The Initiative for Inclusive Security advocates for the full participation of all stakeholders,
especially women, in peace processes. Since 1999, Inclusive Security has connected more than
800 women experts with over 5,000 policy shapers to collaborate on fresh, workable solutions to long-standing conflicts across the globe. www.HuntAlternatives.org

Ethiopia: Assault on academic freedom corners young family

2008-10-09T22:05:00.002+02:00

Editor's note - Before he left for Austria on a scholarship, Alemayehu Fentaw was a lecturer at the Law Faculty of Jimma University. A few days prior to his departure, Alemayehu was interviewed by the Reporter newspaper on such issues, among other things, like federalism, regional governments, multi-party democracy. While elaborating, Alemayehu said that opposition parties may never seize power in Ethiopia unless the army stages a coup and removes the regime. The Reporter made that remark the headline of the story. Trouble began to haunt Mr. Alemayehu and family.

His wife and a baby were supposed to survive on Alemayehu's salary. When she couldn't receive a penny for five months, the young mother travelled to Addis and became dependent on her poor grandmother. The fight for survival continued for eight months by which time the academic vice president had taken a series of measures that stripped Alemayehu of even his right to get a job at any higher learning institution in the country. Because of this injustice, the dean of the university, a Nigerian national, submitted his resignation, and left. From Austria, the young scholar sent the following letter about the assault he and his family suffered because his words didn't fall in line with the policies of the one-man dictatorship that has been in power since 1991, and has turned Ethiopia into a failed state.

http://www.ethiomedia.com/accent/8270.html

Ethiopia: The Assault on Academic Freedom Continued

2008-10-05T04:01:00.002+02:00

Alemayehu Fentaw
I had been teaching law at the Law Faculty of Jimma University for two years and half until I was given a scholarship and a study leave from Jimma University, Ethiopia to pursue my Advanced MA in Peace and Conflict Resolution at the European University for Peace Studies in Austria. However, Jimma University has grossly failed to discharge its obligations from the moment I set foot in Europe, as it refused to pay out my salary to my family, albeit, I on my part, have discharged my duties. I have returned everything that belongs to the University and have also submitted student grades. The Academic Vice President of Jimma University, however, refused to sign on my clearance sheets, though all the rest officials of the University have signed on them on the alleged ground that there are complaints as regards the grades he submitted by few Law III students. This all happens after I left home and on different occasions I received an e-mail from the then Vice Dean and Dean of the Faculty requesting me to send them the student papers on which I cannot lay hand, as I was already in Europe. I directed them to where they may find exam papers at my home in Addis Ababa. The papers could not be found as my family had already moved from Jimma to Addis Ababa following my departure. I was not given a chance to check my roaster and correct mistakes, if any, unlike the tradition. They did not send me a list of students whose grades have not been reported or whatever their case may be.

In the mean time, my wife went to Jimma to demand payment of my salary to her. The Academic Vice President did not only tell her that she is not going to get any salary, but also that he is going to get cancelled my scholarship. Having exhausted the University administrative hierarchy, my wife filed her complaint with the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman, since Jimma University failed to pay her my salary for no reason without any administrative or judicial decision for about five months. Although the University was demanded by telephone to submit a formal explanation, or decision, as to why it withheld my salary, it did not do so. In the mean time, the University Administration , particularly its Academic Vice President indulged himself in the act of intimidating the Faculty Dean and other instructors to make them pass a decision against me and my scholarship. As he more often than not encountered strong resistance and criticism from the Faculty, he resorted to the wanton use of his authority to blackmail the Dean, Barrister Shipi M. Gowok. He asked him to fire me in absentia and cancel my scholarship if he wants to have letters of support to be written for his planned official travel to the USA, for the Jessup Moot Court Competition and to the University of Pretoria. Consequently, the Dean submitted his letter of resignation to the University President and left Ethiopia for good. The Vice President found it easier to dictate his whims to the newly-appointed all-too-young and naive Dean and his newly constituted members of the Academic Commission. In the mean time, the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman sent to the University Administration a formal letter demanding any decision on my case within fifteen days, as I also made an online complaint using the website of the Institution. Although, it has already been more than 8 months since my salary has been withheld by JU without any administrative and judicial decision , the University Administration finally sent its decision on my case to the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman. As I was told by my wife, the University has decided to dismiss me from my job and has also written a letter to the Ministry of Education requesting it to deny me any future teaching opportunities at any Ethiopian institution of higher learning.

Although the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman sent me an e-mail acknowledging receipt of my wife's complaint, it has refused to forward a copy of the decision to me nor to my wife.

In order to grasp the crux of the matter, it is important to look at what The government owned Ethiopian Airlines did to me. Before, I left home, Ethiopian Airlines refused to take me on board after I went through all the check-in process on the alleged ground that I need to have a transit visa to enter Germany, though the Austrian and German embassies in Addis Ababa confirmed to me that the visa issued to me by the Austrian embassy is a valid visa (Schengen Type D) and I need not any transit visa. Even if I talked to the flight supervisors, they insisted on my getting another visa to Germany. The German embassy refused frequently to grant me a transit visa saying that the type of visa I already have is sufficient to warrant me entry into Germany. Finally, after they received a support letter from my Austrian school and after I explained my situation the embassy granted me the transit visa. Even after I went to Ethiopian Airlines after both visas I had to pass through harassment before I flew. As you may know, the Airlines is owned and operated by the Ethiopian government. When I wonder why this all is happening to me, it is because, as was surmised to me by a few well-intentioned staff members of the Airlines and other friends of mine, it is because of my critical attitude towards the government and more particularly because of the interview that The Reporter, an Amharic Weekly, made with me a few weeks prior to my flight. The Interview was taken as seditious and inciting the Army to topple the government down by force. The decision is nothing but an attempt to silence political dissidence as well as an outrageous violation of academic freedom pure and simple.

Please find attached herewith (1) a support letter written for me by the Academic Vice President before the Reporter Interview, (2) the contract I have concluded with Jimma University obliging me to serve the University for two more years upon completion of my graduate studies or to repay the costs in full, (3) The Reporter Interview with me.

Peace,

Alemayehu Fentaw
Stadtschlaining,
Austria

CAMBRIDGE, MA MAYOR RECOGNIZES ETHIOPIAN NEW YEAR

2008-09-27T19:39:00.003+02:00

September 25, 2008

Cambridge, MA, United States – During a colorful Ethiopian New Year event on Saturday, September 13, Cambridge Mayor E. Denise Simmons presented Ethiopian American Youth Initiative founder Samuel Gebru with a resolution formally recognizing the Ethiopian New Year of 2001. The event was held at Saint Paul’s A.M.E. Church on Bishop Allen Drive, and was hosted by the Ethiopian Community Mutual Assistance Association. The resolution was passed unanimously during the Cambridge City Council meeting on Monday, September 8, 2008

The City Council resolution recognizes the Ethiopian New Year, and acknowledges the numerous political, social and economic contributions of Ethiopians to the city. The Ethiopian New Year falls on September 11 of the Gregorian (“Western”) Calendar. As Cambridge is home to the largest concentration of Ethiopians in Massachusetts, the passing of the resolution was a natural show of support for part of the community.

Mayor Simmons expressed her support for the resolution by stating, “Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest, independent and continuously surviving nation. Cambridge is graced with the presence of a large population of people of Ethiopian descent. They add to the rich cultural diversity in our City, and they link us to our friends in Africa. We passed this resolution in a show of support and friendship for our Ethiopian friends in Cambridge, in Africa, and worldwide.”

Mr. Gebru, who resides in Cambridge, thanked Mayor Simmons for her support of the Ethiopian community in the city.

“To my knowledge, there has not been a proclamation acknowledging the Ethiopian New Year in the past in Cambridge, nor has there been one recognizing the Ethiopian community’s contributions to the city’s multicultural identity,” said Gebru. “I would like to commend Mayor Simmons for her support of the Ethiopian community in Cambridge. I would also like to commend my organization, the Ethiopian American Youth Initiative, for initiating this endeavor which resulted in a proclamation for our new year.” The proclamation, included with this press release, is the result of an ongoing partnership between the Ethiopian American Youth Initiative, Mayor Simmons, and the City of Cambridge.

For more information on the City of Cambridge, visit www.cambridgema.gov.
For more information on the Ethiopian American Youth Initiative, visit www.ethusa.org.

The challenge of humanitarian aid

2008-09-26T21:59:00.002+02:00

A Week in the Horn

26 September 2008

Addis Ababa

It is no secret that Ethiopia has once again been affected by drought and consequent food shortages, as have most of the countries in our region. In the last few months, Ethiopian Government institutions, donor governments and international institutions, government or non-government alike, have redoubled efforts to assist those in need. Efforts are continuing and a number of governments have donated extra assistance for those suffering from drought and rising food and energy prices. Reports indicate the situation is beginning to stabilize in some of the originally affected areas and the main maize harvest is due to start soon in the south, but with different agro-climatic zones and a variable time-frame for rains there are still areas of serious need. The Ethiopian government and people are eternally grateful to a multitude of institutions and selfless individuals for making it possible for Ethiopians in need to be cared for at this most difficult and trying time. These institutions and individuals know that the victims of natural vicissitudes are not to blame for the calamity they face. But the charitable convictions of such institutions and individuals are now being overshadowed by increasing attempts to politicize humanitarian aid. This is an emerging, indeed a disquieting, phenomenon and one worth scrutinizing.

Humanitarian assistance, for people affected by natural disasters and the sort of complex emergencies from which Ethiopia is currently suffering, has a long history. Originally, the organizations devoted to humanitarian assistance were limited in their numbers and capacities. They generally adhered to principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality, and scrupulously complied with these in human catastrophes of any magnitude. Any divergence was rapidly denounced by the organizations themselves. It was these principles that constituted the link between the organizations, the state authorities and those in need. Over the years, however, the numbers of organizations providing humanitarian assistance, and the amount of money they manage, have increased exponentially, largely due to the almost biblical proportions of new humanitarian challenges. Many of these new bodies were no longer prepared to provide food aid or medicine. Their members were also political activists, focused not just on the catastrophes that required aid and assistance but on other issues. They were no longer neutral, independent and impartial, operating out of moral conviction, but political actors in their own right, lobbyists for their cause and important constituents of a political elite. They can and do sway votes in national elections, and have political roles in their own countries while using their humanitarian organizations. Parallel to this, the attention and coverage of the international media has also been transformed, and these organizations and the media happily feed off each other. The media publicizes the work of the humanitarian agencies and the organizations benefit from the outpouring of public sympathy for their actions and assistance for the victims of disaster. This in turn propels politicians in the aid-sourcing countries to take their opportunity, and respond to the concerns of their constituencies. Recipient countries and direct beneficiaries all-too-often become no more than the objects of patronizing hand-outs and providers of graphic, often obscene, pictures for prime-time television and newspapers. This, in turn, encourages involvement of state actors and further politicizes humanitarian work. They feed upon each other rather than impact usefully on the supposed objects of their charity. Inevitably, growing numbers of non-governmental groups in any one geographical area have consequences for increased politicization, resource mobilization and expenditure.

Ethiopia has been one of the areas most affected by these developments in humanitarian aid. Before the fall of the military regime, most such organizations were kept out. Subsequently, Ethiopia has hosted a significant number of non-governmental organizations claiming to provide humanitarian assistance or undertake development projects. Many have complemented government developmental efforts and assisted in the provision of aid to people in need, making up one element of government strategy. In the long run, of course, it is economic development, investment and democratization which will ensure the well-being of those affected, for example, by drought. As part of its efforts to mitigate the effects of such problems, the Government put in place an early warning system for the prevention of natural disasters, working closely with international agencies. The agency involved has recently been restructured, enlarging its responsibilities to meet the challenges that such emergencies represent more effectively. The Government will continue to strengthen the institutional and legal structures responsible for identifying and providing lasting solutions to such humanitarian crises.

One critical aspect of these efforts is the empowerment of local communities to participate in finding lasting solutions in the design and implementation of development polices. In fact, the decentralization of decision making to local level will eventually make widespread inroads in tackling some of the existing structural problems. The current process of enacting legislation for charities and societies is part of the Government's effort to create an enabling environment for the operation of the still increasing number of non-government organizations and actors. This will ensure transparent and predictable processes for accreditation, and allow such bodies to carry out their mandates in full compliance with Ethiopian law. The draft legislation is a work in progress. It has involved extensive consultations with stakeholders and external partners, and the draft is now undergoing its third revision. The institution of a modern legal framework, drawing on the best practices from around the world, together with the efforts to restructure Government agencies providing for early warning, prevention and response to emergencies, is meant to guarantee that no fatalities will be caused by a lack of the necessary structures. The Government is determined to do its utmost to ensure all those in need receive care. It is a major priority. Certainly, in the long run, the socio-economic development of the country is the only way to provide a sustainable response. In the meantime, however, it is necessary to address these challenges, of provision of assistance at need and of providing an acceptable framework in which all non-governmental organizations can operate in accordance with acceptable norms of humanitarian assistance and respect for the minimum standards of objectivity, independence and impartiality. Indeed, it might be argued that it is now time for the United Nations and other forums to deliberate on suitable solutions to restore integrity and confidence in the real ideals of humanitarian aid.

Supporting Senator Obama shouldn't mean vilification of Ethiopia

2008-09-26T21:56:00.000+02:00

A Week in the Horn

26 September 2008

Addis Ababa

Last week, US Congressman, Representative Donald Payne (Democrat, New Jersey) addressed a gathering of Ethiopians in Washington, D.C. The apparent purpose was to urge the community to support the Democratic presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama, in his bid to become the next President of the United States. We do not, of course, have any intent to be involved in the domestic politics of another state, even of a close friend. However, when a US Congressman uses a domestic political campaign event to vilify Ethiopia, it does raise some questions why he goes to such lengths to try to tarnish Ethiopia’s image and damage the good relations between Ethiopia and the United States.

In his address to the meeting, Representative Payne claimed he was particularly concerned by political and human rights conditions in Ethiopia. He cited a litany of unsubstantiated allegations of violations. Ethiopia, of course, does not claim to have a perfect record in its efforts to build a strong democratic society, but it is, nevertheless, a country that has regular free multi-party elections, a thriving free press, a constitution and mechanisms to address human rights issues including a Human Rights Commission and an Ombudsman's Office. Is there room for improvement? Certainly. That is why both government and people continue efforts to strengthen the judicial and political institutions necessary to achieve and sustain improved performances in all areas of democratization including the protection of human rights.

If Representative Payne is really genuine in his frequently stated concern for human rights and democracy, it is surprising that he has made so little of Eritrea, a country he visited early this year. Eritrea, after all, has no constitution, refuses to hold elections, only allows one political party, the ruling Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice, does not allow any independent media, has been designated as a country of particular concern for severe violations of religious freedom for the last four years,and has been roundly criticized by Reporters Without Borders and by all Eritrean Human Rights organizations, all of which are obliged to operate from exile. Mr. Payne is also no doubt aware of the eleven ministers and senior officials, and a number of journalists, rounded up by the Eritrean government on September 18, 2001. Held incommunicado, without charge or trial, for seven years, nothing has been heard of them. Thousands more are detained indefinitely, again without charge or trial, many for attempting to escape national conscription which for tens of thousands has lasted for more more than a decade. Representative Payne's reluctance to comment on Eritrea's appalling record on human rights while continuing to vilify Ethiopia, suggests he is driven less by any concern for human rights than by his own personal anti-Ethiopian agenda.

Representative Payne also told his audience that under an Obama administration, “we will not turn a blind eye to abuses just because some governments pretend to be allies in the war on terror.” This is obviously an allusion to Ethiopia which the United States certainly considers a friend. We have no knowledge whether Mr. Payne is accurate in his view of Senator Obama's possible policies. However, his effort to raise support for Senator Obama among members of the more extreme Ethiopian opposition elements in the Diaspora, by promising hostility to the present government of Ethiopia, is scarcely a friendly act. It is also perhaps unfair to the Presidential candidate himself who appears far too statesmanlike to associate himself with such disgraceful activity. We would recall that Representative Payne was the main architect of HR 2003, a much criticized bill which he claimed would support human rights and democracy in Ethiopia. The bill failed to materialize in part because it was seen as ill-conceived and hardly conducive to good US/Ethiopian relations, nor, we might add, to US/African relations either. In his speech last week, Representative Payne made clear his regret for the failure, claiming that the Government of Ethiopia had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to kill it. The Government did not: it had no need to.

Eritrea’s fixation on 'third parties'

2008-09-26T21:50:00.000+02:00

A Week in the Horn

26 September 2008

Addis Ababa

It has become something of a trademark of Eritrea’s foreign policy to launch violent attacks on any third party that fails to sympathize with its belligerent stance in its relations with its neighbours. At various times the United Nations, the African Union and, increasingly in recent months, the United States have been vilified for failing to force Ethiopia to succumb to Eritrea’s views on the settlement of disputes between the two countries. The United Nations has been attacked for failing to impose mechanical demarcation of the boundary on Ethiopia. Despite its own violations of the Algiers Agreements, Eritrea wanted the United Nations to act as enforcer for its own position. Rebuffed by the UN, Eritrea has displayed characteristic outrage at being refused its demands, accusing the Security Council of abdicating its legal responsibilities and claiming Security Council resolutions had no legal substance. The African Union has long been vilified by Eritrea as an “ineffective” regional body. The reason is clear. The AU, like the OAU before it, has consistently refused to applaud Eritrea’s adventurism in the region and the rest of Africa. In 1998, the then OAU requested Eritrea to withdraw its invading forces from Ethiopian territories it had illegally occupied. It also played a critical part of facilitating the negotiations which led to the signing of the Algiers Agreements and was one of the Witnesses to the Agreement. The AU has been similarly critical of Eritrea’s latest adventure in invading Djibouti.

Now the increasing focus of Eritrea’s criticisms has shifted to the United States, with almost daily, and increasingly virulent, attacks. It is worth noticing that these scurrilous attacks against the US and other western countries, do not indicate any genuine oppostioin based on principle, as Eritrea would like to pretend. Eritrea’s record provides clear evidence to the contrary. Indeed it was only a year or two ago, that Eritrea was offering “blanket flyover rights, the use of Eritrea’s two major ports and the use of the new airport near the port of Massawa that is able to accommodate all types of aircraft”, to the United States. Eritrean authorities were stressing that Eritrea’s strategic location in the Horn of Africa, with more than 600 miles of coastline along the Red Sea, located just across from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, provided a unique resource for US use. However, when the US failed to see that “the time has come for the US to capitalize on this unique opportunity”, Eritrea’s attitude changed sharply. The US became responsible for concocting “endless diversionary ploys and schemes.” It had misused its “leverage” in the Security Council to paralyze implementation of border demarcation. Earlier this year, President Issayas even wrote the President of the Security Council calling on the council to examine “the acts of destabilization that the US Administration is fomenting day and night in our region”. All this apparently because, in Eritrea’s view, the US refused to put the necessary pressure on Ethiopia to accept Eritrea’s position on border demarcation.

The Week in the Horn cannot pretend to speak for the US, nor for the UN nor the AU, but it is clear the real focus of these attacks on third parties is certainly Ethiopia. This is the kind of mentality that effectively blocks progress towards peace in this region. Solutions cannot be imposed by one side or the other, or by third parties. Eritrea knows well that no government in Ethiopia would accept the sort of imposed solution of which it has been dreaming. That is why some of the unfriendly proposals on Ethiopia and Eritrea, coming from the US Congress, are so dangerous; they feed the delusions of Eritrea. This is why Eritrea still refuses to make any move towards dialogue and negotiation. Eritrea should realize that solutions for the boundary or any other dispute can only be found by the two parties working together in a peaceful and legal manner. Vituperation will not get either of us anywhere.